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Summary

Marriage law is often conceptualised as an instrument of power that illegitimately
imposes the will of the State on its citizens. Paradoxically, marriage law is also offered
as a route to liberation. In this thesis, I question the efficacy of this type of analysis by
investigating the actual power effects of marriage law. Using Michel Foucault’s
concepts of bio-power and government, and his genealogical approach to history, I
identify the role played by marriage law in governing the social domain over a discrete
period of Irish history. Drawing on this analysis I suggest that marriage law is part of
a dense network of power relationships that cannot be reduced to a binary relationship
of oppression and liberation. Rather marriage law acts, in conjunction with other
techniques of government, to conduct conformity in social behaviour.
Until the 1960s, marriage was considered a fully social matter outside the
jurisdiction of politics. With the adoption of a Keynesian economic model at the end
of the 1950s, the welfare of the population became a matter of political concern. In the
1970s, the vulnerable dependent wife emerged as an object of regulation and marriage
law was enacted to protect her through enforcement of the obligations of morally
bound, gendered, lifetime marriage. The need to protect this form of marriage drove
further reform of marriage law in the 1980s and divorce legislation enacted in 1997.

4

An increasingly rationalised, economic approach to government, adopted following
ratification of the Maastricht treaty, required the deployment of social scientific
knowledge by government. Within the domain of family life, science connected social
stability to relationship stability. Marriage law reform in the 2000s, therefore aimed to
promote stability in relationship behaviour by acknowledging, regulating, and
promoting relationship practices that performed lifetime marriage. Over the research
period, marriage law operated as one among many techniques of government that
installed a detailed apparatus of surveillance and control around individual lives, with
the objective and effect of conducting conformity in relationship behaviour.
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One - Introduction

Marriage as a social practice involving the union of two spouses for affective,
procreative or economic purposes has existed for millennia, so too have legal rules
regulating its practice. In Roman Law, the essence of legal marriage was the husband’s
intention to raise the rank of his wife ‘to make her equal’1 whilst the Brehon law of
fourteenth century Ireland recognised ten types of couples of cohabitation and
procreation.2 Today, marriage and the law that regulates it, is an issue of significant
social, legal and political concern. In 2006, Ann Louise Gilligan and Katherine
Zappone failed to convince the Irish High Court that the legal definition of marriage
could accommodate spouses of the same-sex.3 Nonetheless, their legal action and the
activities of rights campaigners have succeeded in placing the regulation of marriage,
once again, on the political agenda. A Constitutional referendum on the issue will take
place in Ireland in 2015. 4 Contemporary political concern with marriage is not,
however, limited to Ireland. Same-sex marriage has been legally sanctioned in a

Emile Stocquart, ‘Marriage in Roman Law’ (1907) 16(5) Yale Law Journal 303, 304.
The forms of marriage ranged from those between equals in terms of property and status,
the ‘union of common contribution’ to ‘union by rape or stealth’ which required the payment
of compensation and ‘union of mockery’ involving a ‘union of a lunatic or madman with a
deranged woman or madwoman,’ neither of whom were bound to make payments. Donnchadh
Ó Corráin tr, Cáin Lánamma (Text ID T102030, Copus of Electronic Texts UCC 2005).
3
Zappone & Anor v Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404.
4
Stephen Collins, ‘Taoiseach backs vote on same-sex marriage: Several proposals to be
put to people on the same day in first half of 2015’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 6 November
2013).
1
2
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number of jurisdictions, and is the subject of vigorous political campaigns in others.5
As Nicola Barker remarked in 2012, ‘same-sex marriage has become a litmus test of
how gay-friendly society is.’ 6 Central to political campaigns for the extension of
legally sanctioned marriage is the assumption that marriage law reform can liberate
individual lives and produce a more just social order. Barker notes that, ‘same-sex
marriage is expected to provide access to specific legal provisions and equally to solve
wider social problems of homophobia and heterosexism.’7
This belief that reform of the legal rules governing marriage can solve social
problems is neither unique to the present nor a recent phenomenon. In 1960s and 1970s
Ireland, campaigners sought solutions to female poverty and sex-based discrimination
through marriage law reform. In the 1980s, campaigns for removal of the divorce ban
focused on the vulnerability of dependent housewives, and in the 1990s a ‘right to
remarry’ was intended to liberate those suffering in failed relationships. Marriage law
reform at the end of the twenty first century was constructed as a way to redress the
exclusion and vulnerability of those who formed relationships outside the parameters
of traditional marriage.
Marriage law reform continues to be offered as a solution to social problems
despite widespread criticism of the content, functioning, and effect of existing

The world’s first same sex marriage took place in the Netherlands in 2001 and it is now
legally permissible in Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Portugal, Sweden, Norway,
Iceland, Argentina, Mexico City, Uruguay, New Zealand, and a number of states in the United
States. Legislation facilitating same-sex marriage came into force in England and Wales on
23 March 2014; Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, implemented by the Marriage (Same
Sex Couples (Commencement No 2 and Transitional Provision) Order 2014.
6
Nicola Barker, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage
(Palgrave-Macmillan 2012), 1.
7
Barker, Not the Marrying Kind, 126.
5
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marriage laws.8 Marriage law has been described as epitomising patriarchy,9 imposing
traditional values on modern relationships, 10 and privatising the social cost of
inevitable human dependency.11 Critics argue that marriage law in practice is veiled
in secrecy making outcomes unpredictable,12 and that existing law fails to produce
justice for real lived relationships.13 Marriage and family law are chaotic, not ‘real
law,’14 and rarely produce effective solutions to either personal or social difficulties.15
The incongruity between activist expectations for marriage law reform, and its
practical effects, was the impetus for this research. I am interested in identifying what
marriage law is actually doing, rather than assuming an effect (such as patriarchal
oppression or social exclusion) and seeking to substantiate it. In broad terms, I
question the exercise of political power through marriage law by describing how, over
a 65 year period of history, relationships have, in fact, been governed by law in Ireland.
Furthermore, I connect the characterisation of marriage law, as both a problem and a
solution to problems during this period, to shifts in broader social and economic

8

There is a large body of academic literature advocating the extension of marriage law to
a broader range of relationship types, in particular to same-sex couples. Most focuses on the
exclusionary effect of existing law and the extent to which this exclusion infringes legal
equality guarantees. See for example, Robert Wintemute R, ‘Marriage or “Civil Partnership”
for Same Sex Couples’ in Oran Doyle and William Binchy (eds), Committed Relationships
and the Law (Four Courts Press 2007).
9
See for example, Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (The New Press 2004), discussed
further in chapter two.
10
See for example, Anne Barlow, ‘Cohabitation Law Reform – Messages from Research’
(2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 167, discussed further in chapter two.
11
See for example, Lucinda Ferguson, ‘Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive
Force of Interpersonal Obligation’ (2007) 22 Intl Jnl Law Policy Family 61, discussed further
in chapter two.
12
Carol Coulter, Family Law in Practice: A Study of Cases in the Circuit Court (Clarus
Press 2009), 18 – 19.
13
Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (2003, LexisNexis), 43.
14
John Dewer, ‘The Normal Chaos of Family Law’ (1998) 61 MLR 467, 469.
15
For example, despite the introduction of improved spousal maintenance laws in 1976,
intended to reduce the financial burden on the State, the number of separated women requiring
financial support from the State increased. This, and other examples of the disconnection
between the purpose of legal reform and actual outcomes, are considered in chapters five et
seq.
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conditions in order to identify the role played by legal regulation of couple
relationships in securing the strategic objectives of political government. My work
suggests that marriage law is a political technique that aims to conduct conformity in
relationship behaviour. This thesis, therefore, begins to address the failure of legal
scholarship to mount any sustained, or vigorous, challenge to the centrality of marriage
in the legal and social policy systems of Western States.

1.1 Michel Foucault and the Functions of Marriage Law
These objectives require the deployment of analytical tools and concepts that facilitate
a contextual, external, analysis of the process of marriage law reform and its practical
effects. It is necessary to describe the politics of law reform and the effects of legal
regulation rather than participate in current debates and political struggles that assume
the progressive nature of reform. Speaking in 1982, Michael Foucault described the
objective of his historical studies:
It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are part of their
landscape – that people think are universal – are the result of some very precise
historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in
human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space
of freedom we still enjoy, and how many changes can still be made.16
Marriage and the law that regulates it, are generally considered essential to social
functioning, and whilst I do not attempt to completely deconstruct the conceptual
foundations of marriage law, my more modest objectives fall broadly with Foucault’s
philosophical orientation. I seek to challenge current assumptions regarding the
necessity of institutional marriage and the laws that regulate it.

Michel Foucault, ‘Truth, Power, Self: an Interview with Michael Foucault October 25
1982’ in Luther Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: A
Seminar with Michel Foucault (University of Massachusetts Press 1988), 11.
16
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Foucault developed a number of tools and concepts to demonstrate the contingency
of our present, and I employ two of these, government and bio-power, to analyse the
process of marriage law reform in Ireland. Specifically I address two central questions:


How are we, in fact, governed by marriage law?



What is the role of marriage law in modern ‘government of life?’17

The theoretical basis for these questions is discussed in detail in chapter three, but for
the moment, a brief explanation will suffice.

1.1.1 Governed by law?
Existing critiques of marriage law often argue that it represents an illegitimate use of
political power, imposing patriarchy or traditional values on individuals who would
prefer to think and act otherwise. Nonetheless, the same critics argue that marriage
law offers a solution to social problems, creating a paradoxical role for law as both
oppressor and liberator. Foucault’s concept of bio-power suggests an alternative
conceptualisation of political power, which in turn offers a different way to think about
the operation of legal rules and processes, a way to identify how our lives are, in fact,
governed by law. Foucault argues that, rather than command or prescribe social
behaviour, modern governments attempt to manage the behaviour of the population in
accordance with its ‘natural’ characteristics. They deploy a form of power, ‘biopower,’ that aims to take control of life, ensuring that it is regularised and maximised.
In order to achieve this, Foucault argues, government requires information, a method
for identifying what is normal or natural, and a set of techniques for directing human
behaviour.
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Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Part I (Robert
Hurley tr, Penguin Books 1998), 141.
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In order, therefore, to identify how marriage law operates to manage social
behaviour, I examine the information available to government in formulating the
objectives of law reform, how a picture of normal or natural relationship behaviour
was constructed or assumed, the specific legal techniques deployed by government in
achieving their objectives, and the actual effects of this deployment. My approach thus
differs significantly from existing analyses of marriage law, which assume an
oppressive motive and effect from the outset. By examining law reform in its social
and economic context, over an extended historical period, I demonstrate the mobility
and complexity of political power as exercised through ‘the legal complex.’18 How
marriage law governs us in the present does not always correspond with past
articulations, and legal change does not necessarily indicate, nor produce, social
change. In Foucault’s terms, I aim to show the arbitrariness of legal regulation of
marriage, and open a space within which alternative ways of thinking about the
relationship between social life and the State might be formulated.

1.1.2 The role of marriage law
It is often assumed in the present that marriage law can bring about greater social
justice and equality for marginalised groups. Whilst not denying this possibility, I
nonetheless aim to unsettle the assumed necessity of marriage law and its
characterisation as a vehicle for social justice. Using Foucault’s description of the
normalising objectives of modern forms of government, I investigate the possibility
that marriage law has become a political technique that supports the broader, economic

Nicolas Rose and Mariana Valverde use this term in preference to the more usual ‘law’
to describe legal sites, legal concepts, legal criteria of judgement, legal personnel, legal
discourses, legal objects and objectives. They maintain that there is no such thing as ‘the law’
and that the term has no fixed or absolute meaning. I have repeated their approach in using
‘the legal complex’ throughout this thesis to refer to the diverse practices and ways of knowing
that we commonly describe as ‘law.’ Nicolas Rose and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governed by
Law?’ (1998) (7) Social and Legal Studies 541, 544.
18
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objectives of political government. In modern, Western liberal democratic States like
Ireland, social stability, predicated on family stability, is considered essential to
achieving balanced and stable economic growth. My research suggests that in legally
regulating marriage the Irish government has sought to promote social stability in the
interests of economic development. Encouraging lifetime marriage was an explicitly
stated objective of marriage law between 1970 and 1997, but more recently, political
claims for marriage law have focused on rights and justice. The aim of social, and thus
economic, stability nonetheless remains and, I suggest (following Foucault), that
government uses whatever knowledge is available to it (religious, moral, rights-based,
sociology) to justify continued support for stable couple relationships.
In furtherance of its social-stabilisation objective, the Irish State has installed a
detailed apparatus around our affective lives that promotes ‘normality’ and identifies,
observes and knows those falling outside its parameters. These detailed mechanisms
act, in tandem with other techniques of government such as social provision, taxation
and labour market policies, to encourage conformity in relationship behaviour. This is
achieved not only through economic advantaging of marriage, but also by acting on
the self-regulatory capacities of individual citizens. Government techniques adopt and
re-enforce a common standard or norm against which individuals make judgements
about their own relationship behaviour. We are not simply oppressed or liberated by
marriage law – rather it governs our lives through more dispersed and insidious
mechanisms of power.

1.2 Marriage Law
As will become apparent, this thesis is not about marriage law in the sense of ‘law
regulating marriage;’ rather, it is about the legal rules and processes that regulate the
relationship behaviour of individuals, encompassing but not limited to, laws governing
21

marriage, divorce, separation, cohabitation and civil partnership. The term ‘marriage
law’ is adopted for two reasons. First, it distinguishes law governing relationships
between adults from that which regulates familial relationships between adults and
children. This is an important distinction as marriage law, family law, and child law
are often conflated in both political and academic debate, despite the relationship
between marriage, family, and children being neither self-evident nor inevitable. 19
Secondly, the concept of ‘marriage’ occupies a central position in the Irish
Constitutional definition of family, and has been deployed by the Irish government in
managing the social domain since the foundation of the State. Thus, to maintain
continuity, I use the term ‘marriage law’ to refer to that complex of legal rules and
processes that regulate adult intimate relationships.20 Use of the term ‘marriage’ does
not imply any fixed definition or understanding of what marriage is, or ought to be,
only that as a (malleable) concept it has existed over the research period.

1.3 An Irish Experience
Most western jurisdictions have taken hundreds of years to build a body of law
corresponding to that enacted in Ireland in the past 50 years. In England, political as
opposed to church, regulation of marriage began in the 1750s with Lord Hardwick’s
Act, and provision for widespread civil divorce was introduced in 1857.21 One of the

Rosemary Auchmuty refers to British ‘rebranding’ of ‘matrimonial law’ as ‘family law’
at the end of the 1980s. The term ‘matrimonial law’ never held much currency in Ireland and
marriage law seems to have always been referred to as ‘family law’ in Ireland. Alan Shatter’s
Family Law in the Republic of Ireland was first published in 1977 (Wolfhound Press 1977).
Rosemary Auchmuty ‘Law and the Power of Feminism: How Marriage Lost its Power to
Oppress Women’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 71, 80.
20
Nicola Barker refers to ‘the marriage model’ in her discussion of the extension of
marriage law to same sex couples to capture the legal structure and social ideologies associated
with marriage. Barker Not the Marrying Kind, 21.
21
The Marriage Act 1753 and the Divorce Reform Act 1857 respectively. Parliamentary
divorce, that is divorce by private Act of Parliament, was available to the wealthy from the
end of the sixteenth century. For a full account of the history of British marriage and divorce
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first pieces of social legislation enacted by the newly unified Germany was an act to
regulate marriages, 22 and in France, marriage was considered a matter for State
regulation from the 1600s.23 When Ireland gained independence from Britain in 1922,
it inherited a body of marriage law built upon the political concerns of a colonial power
and the ecclesiastical rules of a church with few Irish adherents. Initially, no political
efforts were made to reform this inheritance. The 1937 Constitution, and subsequent
political practice, placed the regulation of marriage entirely within the authority of the
various churches.24
Beginning in the 1970s, successive Irish governments pursued a programme of
marriage law reform, initially by legislating for maintenance rights and family home

law see Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford University Press
1992).
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German unification took place in 1871 and the Civil Marriage Law was enacted in 1875,
providing a unified regulatory system for marriage registration. The legislation outlawed
purely religious unions, with all couples being required to marry in a civil ceremony prior to
participating in a religious ceremony. Para 67, Reichsgesetz über die Beurkundung des
Personenstands und die Eheschließung vom 6. Februar 1875.
§ 67 Ein Geistlicher oder anderer Religionsdiener, welcher zu den religiösen
Feierlichkeiten einer Eheschließung schreitet, bevor ihm nachgewiesen worden ist, daß
die Ehe vor dem Standesbeamten geschlossen sei, wird mit Geldstrafe bis zu dreihundert
Mark oder mi tGefängniß bis zu drei Monaten bestraft.
In English: Para 67, Commonwealth law on the certification of personal status and the
entry of marriage of 6 February 1875.
Paragraph 67 A clergyman or other religious servant, who proceeds to the religious
celebration of the entry of marriage, before it has been proven to him that the marriage
has been entered before the civil registrar of marriage, is liable to a fine of three hundred
marks or imprisonment of up to three months.
With thanks to Dr Julia Moses, University of Sheffield, for drawing my attention to the
existence of the provision, and Dr Daniel Simms, Law Library, for its identification and
translation.
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family, based on marriage, as a proxy for the State from early modern times. The head of
family, usually the husband/father was responsible for enforcing the law over his family
members. Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families: Welfare versus the State (Random
House, 1977), 48.
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The Constitutional provisions relating to marriage were largely adapted from Papal
encyclicals and the solemnisation of Roman Catholic marriages was not subject to civil
oversight. The marriage relationship itself was largely unregulated.
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protection in 1976.25 Judicial Separation rules were substantially reformed in 1989,
and divorce introduced in 1997. 26 In 2010, marriage law (but not marriage) was
extended to same-sex and cohabiting couples through the introduction of civil
partnership and the concept of ‘qualified cohabitant.’ 27 The Irish position thus
provides a unique opportunity to examine the politics of marriage law reform. The
outcomes of reform largely reflect those of other western liberal democracies, but
almost all of the jurisdiction’s statutory regulation of marriage law took place over a
relatively short period.28
Although a focus on one jurisdiction has its limitations, the purpose is not to
compare legal systems but to suggest alternative ways of thinking about the
relationship between law, politics and the relationship practices of individual citizens.
Whilst my findings may be specific to Ireland, the methodological approach and
theoretical precepts have wider implications for understanding how we conceptualise
the political significance of marriage law in the present. Further, this research begins
to challenge the role of legal marriage in mediating the relationship between individual
citizens and the State apparatus.
Mary Ann Glendon, in a 1989 review of marriage and family law in Western
Europe and the United States, noted an upheaval in the family law systems of Western
industrial societies beginning in the 1960s. Legal rules, governing marriage, divorce,
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family support obligations, inheritance, the relationship of parent and child, and the
status of children born outside marriage, relatively unchanged for centuries, were
discarded or radically transformed. At the same time, other regulatory systems, not
generally thought of as ‘family law,’ such as social welfare, employment and taxation
came to increasingly touch on family life.29 Despite significantly different cultural and
political systems, Glendon noted remarkable similarities between the jurisdictions
studied. Trans-national similarities in marriage and family regulation are also apparent
in the present, particularly with respect to the extension of marriage law to same-sex
couples.30 The intense focus on marriage law in Ireland beginning in the 1970s may
therefore suggest a scheme of intelligibility for reforms begun in other jurisdictions a
decade earlier.

1.4 Outline of Thesis
The remainder of this chapter outlines the legal rules and practices that applied to
marriage in Ireland before the programme of marriage law reform begun in the late
1960s. The purpose of this overview is to provide background information, and to
demonstrate the extent to which the regulation of marriage was considered a domain
outside the remit of politics during the period. Legal rules, inherited from the British,
were accepted without political contest, despite their historical origins in the cannon
law of a church to which the majority of the Irish population did not belong. The rules
for entry into marriage were left largely to the various churches, and although the
property relationship between husband and wife was significantly altered by the
Married Women’s Status Act in 1957, this was seen as a technical rather than a
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substantive reform. The constitutional provisions relating to the rights of the family
were, like other rights-based provisions in that document, treated as foundational
statements of the new nation State, not the basis of entitlements that might contradict
its sovereignty.
In chapter two, I introduce Foucault’s model of juridical power, and explain how
legal scholars have adopted it in analysing marriage and family law. Using the
dichotomies of tradition/modernity, public/private, and male/female, I discuss the
limitations of the juridical formulation of power, and the extent to which legal
scholarship has become embedded in the politics of law reform. In the final section of
the chapter, I consider work that, whilst engaging with the same three dichotomies,
moves beyond the juridical to consider how they are deployed in the regulation
individual lives.
Chapter three begins by outlining Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and
government. His description of political power, its productivity, and connection to
knowledge and truth is explained. The historical formulations of the relationship
between power and knowledge - discipline and bio-power - are described, and a
connection drawn between bio-power and marriage law. The concept of government,
taken to mean ‘the conduct of conducts,’ is offered as an analytical framework for the
analysis of how we are governed by marriage law and its particular efficacy in
considering legislative action identified. The chapter also reviews literature that
attempts to conceptualise ‘law’ in foucauldian terms, concluding that a universal
explanation of what law ‘is,’ is both unnecessary and unhelpful for my purposes.
Rather, a focus on how legal instruments come into being, and have effects within
relationships of power, offers a more fruitful investigative framework. Building on
Foucault’s work and derivative literature, a research framework consisting of five
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specific avenues of investigation relating to the two principle research questions is
constructed.
Chapter four begins by locating my research within Posner’s taxonomy of legal
scholarship, and goes on to set out the specific method employed by reference to the
research framework developed in chapter three. The first research question ‘how are
we governed by marriage law?’ is an empirical one, and foucauldian discourse analysis
and a genealogical approach to history are offered as methodological precepts. This
aspect of the research has two specific foci: the actions and motivations of political
government, and ‘the legal complex.’ The data consulted therefore consisted of
documents produced by or for the use of government and legal instruments, judgments
and reports. The second question, ‘what is the role of marriage law in modern
“government of life?”’ is mainly theoretical and builds upon the initial research output,
to identify the power effects of marriage law within its social, economic and political
context. The research covers the period from 1945 to 2010 and chapter four explains
how it was divided into four intervals. Finally in chapter four, I discuss the efficacy,
and difficulty, of a foucauldian approach by reference to some existing scholarship.
Chapter five identifies the emergence of marriage as a problem for the Irish
government in the 1960s, connecting its political problematisation to a Keynesian shift
in economic policy. A developing centralised welfare system created entitlements to
State services, and the vulnerable deserted wife, left indigent through a failure of male
support, emerged as a deserving recipient of social assistance. A developing
international human rights discourse transformed her into the embodiment of a
woman’s right to be dependent in marriage, and campaigning women’s groups sought
vindication of this right through marriage law. Two legislative enactments in 1976
constructed women as vulnerable dependents and men as morally obligated providers,
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offering relief to the middle class deserted wife whose husband had the means to
support her. The legislature had accepted the morally founded proposition that
marriage was a social good essential to the functioning of society, and had deployed
legal measures to promote and protect it.
Chapter six moves on to the 1980s. Marriage remained central to the administration
of an expanded system of social provision, and government attention turned to the
general problem of ‘marriage breakdown’ that, according to statistical information,
had become more prevalent. Politics sought to address this difficulty by protecting
marriage, an objective supported by a number of decisions of the Superior Courts
during the decade. The courts, from a position of presumed objectivity, connected the
family provisions of the Constitution to natural law, and proffered them as a limit to
State power. A new Law Reform Commission also focused on marriage law,
demonstrating law’s historical involvement with marriage, and the ability of legal
processes to identify and manage marital misbehaviour. The legal complex, by the end
of the decade, had shown its usefulness in supporting the marriage-saving objective of
government. Law’s knowledge supported political understandings of normal
relationship behaviour, and its processes were efficacious in identifying and
containing marital abnormality. In 1989, legislation was enacted to fulfil the political
objective of marriage saving. Its effect was to install a detailed legal machinery around
those whose marriages failed to conform to the lifetime, dependency model, favoured
by government, acting, not to facilitate post-relationship life, but to continue marriage
after the interpersonal relationship at its core had ended.
Chapter seven deals with the period from 1990 to the introduction of divorce in
1997, during which time economic conditions improved considerably. Divorce was
introduced in 1997, with the political objective of saving lifetime dependency
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marriage. A comprehensive machinery was established that included counselling,
mediation and the enforcement of lifetime spousal support obligations. Political
support for marriage, as in earlier decades, drew on dominant morality, but the
superior courts began to adopt more rationalised, scientifically formulated
understanding of marriage, and in managing the social domain government began to
accept non-marriage-based relationships as functionally equivalent to marriage.
Marriage, nonetheless, continued to confer significant financial and social benefits on
individual families. The power effects of regulating marriage with law had become
clear by the end of this period. Two referenda on divorce, requiring reflection on the
importance of marriage by the entire population, emphasised its normative status. The
complex system of marriage law with ancillary services such as counselling,
mediation, adjudication, and legal aid aimed to save marriage, but its effect was to
install a detailed machinery of (self) surveillance around those unable to conform and
a series of techniques designed to re-form their broken relationships in the image of
lifetime marriage.
Chapter eight examines the period following the introduction of divorce during
which the Irish government moved resolutely away from moral conceptualisations of
relationship and family life, calling instead on rational, sociological and statistical
information in its decision making process. This did not, however, result in a devaluing
of marriage, rather it facilitated the re-definition of marriage as a rationally, as opposed
to morally, optimal relationship form. Both marriage and marriage-like practices
became increasingly common at the level of the population, and government, in
recognising the value of stable relationships to social and economic stability, began to
regulate a broader range of relationships. Marriage law was again problematised early
in the new millennium when it came to be seen as the solution to social exclusion and
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marginalisation experienced by non-heterosexual couples. Responding to rights-based
campaigning, government introduced legislation applying marriage law to same-sex
couples, and same and opposite sex cohabitants. This legislation mirrored the terms of
that applying to married couples indicating that other forms of relationships were
acceptable to the extent that they performed marriage. Meanwhile the actual operation
of marriage law in the courts continued to demonstrate the dangers of marriagetransgression. The social importance of marriage had been reaffirmed, and the
government objective of social and hence economic stability had been advanced.
Chapter nine notes how marriage law has played a central role in defining the limits
of social normativity over a forty year period of Irish history. Despite shifting macromentalities of government ranging from economic protectionism to Keynesianism and
neo-liberalism, marriage has remained a central point of exchange between the State
and its citizens. Although we may believe ourselves more free today to exercise
choices in our relationship behaviour than in the past, these choices are in reality
tightly controlled. Those unwilling or unable to perform lifetime monogamy, who
chose, or are required by circumstance, to live their lives outside the marital paradigm
have been, despite their numbers, marginalised by pro-marriage political discourse.
Their position has not been ameliorated by legal expertise or rights based arguments,
rather they have been pushed further into the social and legal shadows.

1.5 Irish Marriage Law before 1970
1.5.1 Law and marriage
On the foundation of the Irish State in 1922, the minimum legal age for entry into
marriage was 12 for girls and 14 for boys,31 the heterosexual age of sexual consent
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The age of majority was 21 until reduced to 18 by the Age of Majority Act 1985, s 2.
Married persons were considered adults upon marriage, regardless of their chronological age.
30

was 16 (for girls),32 and male homosexual activity was a criminal offence.33 In 1935,
the age of consent was raised to 17,34 but the age at which marriage could be contracted
continued to reflect the common law position until 1972. 35 Parental consent to
marriage was not necessary to give legal validity to Catholic child marriages and
marriages between children undoubtedly took place; the 1961 census report for
example has a classification for ‘age at marriage’ that begins at 15 and records a, not
insignificant, number of marriages by women between the ages of 15 and 19.36
This discrepancy between the State’s concern to deter sexual activity with children
in general, and its disinterest in what took place between children (potentially as young
as 12) and any person they might marry, demonstrates the extent to which the Irish
government saw marriage as something beyond State control.37 Until the late 1960s,
the only regulation governing marriage (other than canon law) was common law and
statutory provisions inherited from the British. This rest of this chapter reviews those
rules and how they were applied in the Irish courts, demonstrating the clear division
between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the domain of relationship regulation. The review
begins with a discussion of Article 41 of the 1937 Irish Constitution, which
specifically refers to marriage and the family built upon it, arguing that during this

The offence under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s 6 was ‘defilement,’ and
in relation to a girl between 13 and 16 was a misdemeanour that was not prosecutable more
than three months after the offence. Defilement of a girl under 13 was a felony, punishable by
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33
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Rape within marriage was not criminalised in Ireland until 1990, Criminal Law (Rape)
(Amendment) Act 1990, s 5.
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period Article 41 had no legal implications for the performance of individual
relationships.

1.5.2 Marriage and the Irish Constitution.
On the foundation of the Irish State in 1922, English common law and legislation
enacted by the British parliament remained in force unless found repugnant to the
Constitution.38 For a significant period, therefore, the legal regulation of marriage in
Ireland was based on rules created by a government and legal system that might be
considered ‘foreign.’ The 1937 Constitution contained a pledge that the State would
‘guard with special care the Institution of Marriage upon which the Family is founded’
and prohibited the enactment of legislation facilitating the dissolution of marriage. 39
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The Irish State broke legal ties with the British Parliament in 1922. However, British
legislation and common law continued to apply in Ireland after independence until specifically
repealed or declared unconstitutional. Article 73 of The Constitution of the Irish Free State
(Saorstát Éireann) 1922 provided that:
Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent therewith,
the laws in force in the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) at the date of the coming into
operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or
any of them shall have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas.
Upon enactment of the Constitution of Ireland, Bunreacht Na hÉireann, on the 1st of July 1937
this provision was replaced by Article 50 of the 1937 document:
Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent therewith,
the laws in force in Saorstát Éireann immediately prior to the date of the coming into
operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or
any of them shall have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas.
39
Article 41 Bunreacht na hÉireann– The Family (as enacted in 1937) stated:
1.1° The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group
of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights,
antecedent and superior to all positive law.
1.2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority,
as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and
the State.
2. 1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to
the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
2.2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.
3.1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on
which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.
3.2° No law shall be enacted providing for the dissolution of marriage.
The 1922 Constitution had contained no similar provision.
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The Family, according to the Constitution, was ‘a moral institution,’ ‘the basis of
social order,’ and ‘indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.’
Basil Chubb has argued that the contents of Article 41 were not directly influenced
by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, but the imprint of the Church’s social
teaching is undeniable.40 Article 41.1 partially paraphrases Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo
XIII’s 1891 encyclical letter, which dealt with ‘the Condition of Labor.’ Paragraph 12
states:
No human law can abolish the natural and original right of marriage, nor in any
way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage ordained by God’s authority
from the beginning: “Increase and multiply.” Hence we have the family, the
“society” of a man’s house – a society very small, one must admit, but none the
less a true society, and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and
duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State.41
This extract also encapsulates the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity, an
approach to social policy, which holds that the organisation of society should take
place at the lowest possible level, beginning with the family.42
Article 41.2 echoes paragraph 71 of the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno,
which declares:
Mothers, concentrating on household duties, should work primarily in the home or
in its immediate vicinity. It is an intolerable abuse, and to be abolished at all cost,
for mothers on account of the father's low wage to be forced to engage in gainful
occupations outside the home to the neglect of their proper cares and duties,
especially the training of children.43
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The Catholic view of marriage was thus that husband and wife were bound together
for life in a union of defined gender-roles, husband as breadwinner and wife as mother
and homemaker. This union created family, the basic unit of society existing
separately from the State. When the Irish Constitution was enacted in 1937, the
intention of the framers in relation to social and fundamental rights was not to begin a
process of social improvement but to defend existing truths. Hogan and Whyte note
that when the draft Articles 40 - 44 were published:
no great importance was attached to them and nothing very much was expected
from them – possibly because the framers of the 1937 Constitution expressly
intended them as mere ‘headlines to the legislature’ rather than as an essential part
of the mechanism of a vigorous judicial review.44
The framers of the Irish Constitution were setting out, they believed, self-evident
moral limitations to politics, rather than anticipating present-day restrictions on State
abuses of individual rights.45
Article 41, and its statements in relation to marriage, were neither challenged nor
deployed in any meaningful way by political government in managing the State before
1970. In the courts, the text of the article was accepted as representing common sense
and requiring neither legal vindication nor political re-enforcement. 46 Judicial
interpretations of Article 41 largely accepted that marriage was something beyond
State regulation, which the State should endeavour to protect by non-interference. For

44

Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Tottel
2006), 1245.
45
Samuel Moyn points out that revolutionary era rights, such as those of the French and
American Constitutions, were considered dangerous by the authors of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights in 1948. Rousseau’s claims for the supremacy of the State were
directly linked to the rise of Nazi Germany. Even in 1948, the idea of individualist rights
against the State had not been formulated. The 1948 declaration was not ‘a commitment to the
humanisation of world politics through international law nor affiliation with any movement
of well-meaning agitators (there was yet no such thing). Instead they prompted a recognition
of moral limitations to and on politics.’ Samuel Moyn, ‘The First Historian of Human Rights’
(2011) 116(1) American Historical Review 58, 63.
46
The status of marriage as an institution was not specifically relied upon in the courts
until 1979 when it was raised by the plaintiffs in Murphy v Attorney General [1982] 1 IR 241.
34

example, in 1964, the Supreme Court confirmed that that the ‘family’ attracting
constitutional protection was that based on marriage,47 and in In Re Tilson’s Infants
(decided in 1951) Gavin Duffy J confirmed the moral nature of the marital family:
The cardinal position ascribed to the family by our fundamental law is profoundly
significant; the home is the pivot of our plan of life. The confused philosophy of
law bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century is superseded by articles which
exalt the family by proclaiming and adopting in the text of the Constitution itself
the Christian conception of the place of the family in society and in the State.48
The constitutional text also largely reflected Irish practice at the level of individual
relationships. Marriage was a lifetime relationship, women did not work outside the
home, and sexual relationships outside marriage, although they did occur, were either
rare or well concealed.49 Article 41, like other provisions of the Constitution that, from
today’s perspective, grant legal rights to citizens and limit the activities of government,
was intended as a statement of national identity and sovereignty. The moral nature of
marriage and its existence with the domain of religious regulation was unquestioned,
and it was not anticipated that government should have any role in relation to it.

1.5.3 Legal regulation of marriage - rules for entry
Until 2004, the conditions for, and regulation of, entry into marriage were left largely
to the authority of the various churches and pre-1922 British legislation and common
law.50 The Marriage (Ireland) Act 1870, as amended, contained detailed rules for the
celebration of marriages by non-Catholic churches and the Civil Registrar, governing
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such issues as the publication of banns, lodging of notices, and the form of ceremonial
words required.51 Somewhat bizarrely, the celebration of Roman Catholic marriages,
by far the most common form in Ireland,52 were not governed by statute, beyond a
registration requirement.53 Indeed WH Faloon commented in 1881 that:
[Roman Catholic Marriages] might be celebrated privately or publically, at any
time or place, and in any form or manner the celebrating priest thought proper,
without banns, licence, notice, residence or consent; and insofar as the State is
concerned this seems to be the law.54
Common law, building on the ecclesiastical law of the established church, did set out
minimum requirements for a valid marriage and failure to comply with these could
render a marriage void or voidable. These minimum conditions were governed by the
law of nullity.
1.5.4 Invalidating marriage – the law on nullity
Marriage was easy to contract but difficult to repudiate. Divorce was prohibited by the
1937 Constitution, and although theoretically possible by private Act of the Oireachtas
between 1922 and 1937, no standing orders facilitating the introduction of such Bills
were made.55 A decree of nullity, which had the effect of declaring that a marriage
never existed, was therefore the only escape, save death, from a failed union. The Law
Reform Commission, reporting in 1984, described the law of nullity as ‘being
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concerned with the circumstances in which a marriage will be invalid according to the
law of the State.’56 A void marriage was regarded as never having taken place because
of lack of capacity, non-observance of formalities or the absence of consent. A
voidable marriage, on the other hand, was one that remained valid until repudiated by
one of the spouses, and the only basis upon which it could be declared invalid was the
impotence of either party.57
Before 1970, applications for civil nullity were very rare in Ireland.58 There are
only a handful of Irish reported cases from this period, all heard in the 1930s and
1940s. The most legally influential of these was Griffith v Griffith, followed in the
1971 case Kelly v Kelly. 59 The husband in Griffith applied to have his marriage
annulled on the ground of duress. His wife did not enter a reply to the petition. Haugh
J referred to the duty owed ‘to the public to support marriage’ and confirmed Lord
Penzance’s definition of marriage as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one
woman, to the exclusion of all others.’60 Marriage, in Haugh J’s view, was a ‘peculiar
and unique relationship’ best understood as ‘part of the law of contract.’ 61 As public
policy required that ‘marriages should not be lightly set aside,’ great care and
circumspection was necessary in investigating the circumstances in which an
impugned marriage was contracted.62 Thus, fraudulent misrepresentation by one of the
parties was not enough to void a marriage for lack of consent. Neither was duress or
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intimidation resulting in fear ‘justly imposed.’ Haugh J ultimately granted the
annulment in Griffith on the grounds of absence of consent, but described the case
before him as ‘remarkable’ and ‘unique.’63
Obtaining a decree of nullity on the ground of impotence was likewise difficult. In
two cases, heard together in 1936, Hanna J noted that in such cases ‘there is a great
responsibility on the Court to see that the cases are brought bona fide and are clearly,
unequivocally and beyond doubt established according the legal principles.’64 These
included an investigation as to whether the parties to the marriage were ‘incapable of
the act of generation’ and whether their incapacity could ‘be removed by art or skill’65
In the event, both applicants were unsuccessful because both respondents refused to
repudiate their marriages, and an order would not be given on the basis of the
petitioners’ own incapacity.
1.5.5 Effects of marriage – legal personality and private property
At common law, marriage had significant legal consequences, particularly for women.
Upon marriage, a wife’s legal personality merged with that of her husband,66 and the
doctrine of coverture vested any property she owned in him, including money she
earned or inherited during marriage. In gaining control of his wife’s property and
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earnings, a husband was obliged to financially support her and any children of the
marriage.67 Sir Sydney Bell Smyth, writing in 1859, explained the theoretical basis of
the doctrine:
The law looks to the husband, as head of the family, for the maintenance and
education of its members. This is a duty that he could not perform, if any other had
an equal control with him over the property of the family. It is of necessity,
therefore, that the law has incapacitated the wife during the coverture from doing
any act without the husband’s consent.68
The strict application of these common law principles was modified somewhat by the
equitable doctrine of ‘separate property,’69 which allowed married women to retain
ownership of family property after marriage, but not for their own benefit. The
doctrine was employed by the courts to protect family fortunes from the husbands of
female successors pending the arrival of a male heir.70
In the 1860s, British middle class women began to demand property rights,71 and
secured partial success with the enactment of the Married Women’s Property Acts
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1870 – 1908. This legislation amended the common law position to allow married
women to own their wages and earnings, and certain investments and property
inherited from an intestate next of kin. Nevertheless, these Acts did not give married
women a legal existence separate from their husbands, nor allow them complete power
to acquire and dispose of property.72 Common law rules, as amended by the Acts,
continued to govern the property relationship and legal status of husbands and wives
in Ireland until 1957.73
A number of legal anomalies arose in relation to the operation of the Married
Women’s Property Acts. A married woman injured in a car driven by her husband
could not make a claim against his insurance because the law considered them to be
one person. 74 A third party could not receive property stolen by a wife from her
husband for the same reason.75 The courts could declare that a wife’s property was
hers alone, and that her husband had no interest in it, but would not prevent him from
entering and using the property. 76 In contrast, a husband could maintain an action
against his wife for the recovery of property or ejectment on title.77 A married woman
could not act as next friend to an infant in a tort action because she had no separate
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property against which a cost order could be made,78 nor could she enter an appearance
to a summons in her own name in tort, it had to be entered by her husband as next
friend.79 The legislation did prove useful for the avoidance of debt. In Lowry v Derham
& Ors a wife, ordered to pay costs arising from litigation in which she was the losing
party, successfully defended a claim for payment.80 At the time the costs order was
made she had no separate property, her entitlement as the object of a trust, which made
an annuity payment shortly thereafter, was disregarded. Likewise, in Molony v Harney
the wife was able engage the Acts to avoid payment of a debt incurred before her
marriage.81
These technical legal difficulties led the Irish Government to follow its British
counterpart in separating the legal personalities of married men and women.82 When
enacted, the Married Women’s Status Act 1957 was considered a straightforward
consolidation and administrative measure, designed to clarify the position with regard
to the legal status of married women and remove a husband’s liability for his wife’s
torts and debts.83 The Minister for Justice, James Everett explained the extent of the
legal change to the Seanad:
The Bill makes five important changes in the law. First of all, it makes a married
woman liable personally for her torts, contracts and debts, and it extends liability
in bankruptcy to all married women. Secondly, it allows one spouse to sue the
other in tort. Thirdly, it abolishes restraint on anticipation. Fourthly, it allows a
wife or child to enforce a contract made by the husband for the benefit of the wife
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or child, and similarly, in the case of a contract made by the wife. Finally, it
abolishes a husband's liability for his wife's torts.84
He did not mention what would prove to be the most significant effect of the Act.
Section 5 provided that following commencement ‘[a] husband and wife shall, for all
purposes of acquisition of any property ... be treated as two persons.’ The terms of
section 5 completely and finally removed any remaining legal incidents of coverture,
replacing the community of property doctrine with a separate property regime. The
legal doctrine of coverture had been removed but its practical eradication would prove
more problematic.85
From today’s perspective, the 1957 Act looks like a significant reforming measure,
bringing women out from under their husbands’ cloaks. When enacted, however, the
problems it sought to address were of little consequence to the vast majority of the
Irish population. The impetus for legal reform did not emanate from political concern
with how marriage was practised or its effect on the social status of married women.
The endorsement of the marriage bar in the contemporaneous Civil Service Regulation
Act 1956 confirmed that the form of marriage described by the Constitution reflected
accepted social practice and political understanding. In a memorandum for
government dated 12th October 1956, the Department of the Taoiseach noted, in
relation to rules on Income Tax that taxed a wife’s income as that of her husband, as
follows:
The Minister has no strong views on this one way or the other though it might be
argued that now that married women are financially being ‘set free’ so to speak,
they should be solely responsible for their own income tax. As against this, it can

84

Seanad Deb 16 January 1957, vol 47, col 73.
The editor of the Irish Jurist, writing in 1956, argued that the provisions of Married
Women’s Status Act in relation to property were contrary to partnership or community view
of marriage implicit in the Constitution. ‘The Legal Status of Married Women’ (1956-1957)
21-22 IJ 49, 51.
85

42

be said that the present provision works little hardship in practice and facilitates
the collection of tax.86
1.5.6 Marital obligations - maintenance
At common law, a husband was obliged to maintain his wife and any children of the
marriage, although this duty extended only to the necessaries of life. 87 A wife had no
duty to maintain her husband, and the common law prohibition on suits between
spouses meant that a wife could generally not enforce the obligation.88 In cases of
desertion (by a husband), a wife could pledge his credit for necessaries,89 a useful right
for a wife whose husbands’ standing in society was such that credit would be
extended.90 Failure to support one’s wife was a serious matter and a series of statutes
from the mid-1800s criminalised men whose refusal to maintain their wives and
children left them dependent on public support.91 Adultery by a wife was an absolute
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bar to maintenance, and an effective defence to criminal proceedings for failure to
maintain. An accused husband ‘was entitled upon proof of infidelity to be exonerated
from his liability to maintain his wife.’92
The British, Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act 1886, which
applied in Ireland, amended the common law position to allow a woman deserted by
her husband to apply to a magistrate’s court for an order requiring him to maintain her.
No action lay if the husband was not in desertion,93 and un-condoned adultery by the
wife was a bar to maintenance. As applied in Ireland, this legislation facilitated an
application to the District Court, but enforcement of orders proved problematic and,
without access to legal aid, application to the courts was impossible for most women.94
The Irish Courts took a flexible approach in granting maintenance orders, applying the
principle of ‘constructive desertion’ to cases in which a wife was obliged to leave the
family home as a result of the her husband’s abusive behaviour.95 A wife who simply
no longer wished to cohabit with her husband, without proof of marital offence, had
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no right to maintenance under the 1886 Act.96 This legislation was of little practical
import in Ireland, as the applications were expensive and enforcement difficult. In
1969, just thirty-eight maintenance orders were made in favour of wives. 97 The
financial limit of £4 per week which applied to maintenance orders from 1940 to 1971
was an added disincentive.98

1.5.7 Marital obligations - cohabitation
Marriage could not be legally ended other than by death until 1997,99 and while it
subsisted spouses were obliged to cohabit and provide one and other with marital
services known as ‘conjugal rights.’ 100 They could however agree to live apart by
entering into a separation agreement, which usually contained maintenance
provisions,101 although a wife could agree to a separation without maintenance. 102 In
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the event of desertion by one spouse, the other could apply to the High Court for
restitution of conjugal rights.103 An action for divorce a mensa et thoro, originally an
Ecclesiastical remedy administered by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the established
Church of Ireland,104 allowed suspension of the obligation to cohabit upon proof of
cruelty, adultery or unnatural practices by one of the spouses.105 Relief was temporary;
if at some future time reconciliation took place the decree was discharged and the
obligation to cohabit revived. 106 During the suspension of cohabitation, a wife’s
property remained under the control of her husband and lifetime alimony adequate to
provide for ‘necessaries’ was awarded to the wife if she was not the guilty party.
Alimony was always awarded as periodic payments, never as a lump sum, and the
court could not award a sum for the support of children in the wife’s care. 107 The
amount was calculated as a proportion of the husband’s income, ranging from one
third to one-half, with the amount ‘always more liberal when the husband’s
delinquency stands proved than pending suit.’108 The remedy of divorce a mensa et
thoro was available in Ireland until the enactment of the Judicial Separation and

103

Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870, s 7.
The jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts was transferred to the Court of
Matrimonial Causes and Matters by s 13 of the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law
(Ireland) Amendment Act 1870 and later, under the Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 to the
Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland. For a detailed account of the law relating to divorce
a mensa et thoro see William Duncan and Paula Scully, Marriage Breakdown in Ireland, Law
and Practice (Butterworths 1990). A mensa et thoro is Latin for ‘from bed and board’ the
decree providing the equivalent of a Judicial Separation. A full, and somewhat colourful
account of the law on divorce a mensa et thoro can also be found at Law Reform Commission,
Report on Divorce a Mensa et Thoro (LRC 8 1983). This report is dealt with further in chapter
6.
105
W H Kisby, The Law and Practice of the Court on Matrimonial Causes and Matters
(William McGee 1871). In Ross v Ross [1942] ILTR 83, the court granted order for judicial
separation following a separation agreement. This can be compared with the current position
in which a pre-existing separation agreement acts as a bar to an action for judicial separation
under the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989, F v F [1995] IR 352.
106
Shatter, Family Law in the Republic of Ireland (1977), 115.
107
MB v RB [1989] 1 IR 412, 412, per Walsh J: ‘No Statutory provision has ever been
made in this jurisdiction for the payment of a capital or lump sum for alimony.’
108
Kempe v Kempe [1800] 162 ER 668, 669, per Sir John Nicholl, as cited in Law Reform
Commission, Report on Divorce a Mensa et Thoro and Related Matters, 28.
104

46

Family Law Reform Act 1989. As with the law on maintenance, the remedy was rarely
availed of; just twenty-seven orders for divorce a mensa et thoro were granted by the
Irish Courts between 1946 and 1970.109

1.5.8 The end of marriage - death
Common law rules on succession were complex and based on the distinction between
real property and personalty. Real property (or realty) consisted principally of freehold
interests in urban land; personalty comprised most (Irish) agricultural land, leasehold
property, movable property, and money.110 On the death of a wife, her husband took
the whole of her personal estate, whereas on the death of a husband, the wife took only
one third where there were issue and one-half where there were none. A widower was
entitled to a life estate in the whole of his wife’s realty, subject to conditions.111 A
widow was entitled to a life interest in one third of her husband’s realty, again subject
to conditions.112 All of these rules could be avoided by will or inter vivos settlement.
The common law rules on intestate succession were amended somewhat by the
Intestates’ Estates Act 1954, which applied ‘where a man dies intestate ... leaving a
widow but no issue.’113 In such a case, where the net value of the property did not
exceed £4,000, the property vested in the widow absolutely.114 This small concession
to childless widows was repealed and replaced in 1965 by the more comprehensive
regime of the Succession Act 1965.
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The 1965 Act set aside the common law rules of curtsey and dower, granting
husbands and wives a share in each other’s estate whether or not there was a will or
issue of the marriage.115 The Minister for Justice, Mr Brian Lenihan, on introducing
the Succession Bill 1965 to Dáil Éireann, described freedom of testation as a
‘peculiarly British idea,’116 and defended the limitations introduced by the Act on the
basis that they supported the special place afforded to the family and the mother in the
home by the Constitution:
These principles cannot be reconciled with a system of law, which allows a man
to ignore the mother of his family and to leave his property to strangers. It is no
answer to say that most men do, in fact, provide for their wives and children in
their wills, when, as we know, there are those who do not.117
The purpose of the spouse’s legal right share conferred by the Act was to protect
widows and to recognise ‘the true extent of the responsibilities that, in a civilised
society, husband and wife owe to each other.’118
Government had identified a difficulty with how wives were affected by the death
of their husband, and dealt with it in the course of a comprehensive reform of
succession law. The reform was justified on the basis of a wife’s contribution to
marriage and society:
[i]t may, perhaps, be a platitude to say that the wife and mother is the very
foundation of family and society, but it is, nevertheless, true. She has moral rights
above and superior to any mere right to be maintained in the house.119
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The Act, although representing a significant reform of existing legal rules, like the
Married Women’s Status Act 1957, was not an attempt by government to resolve
problems with the marriage relationship itself. The Succession Act had no effect whilst
marriage continued, and left full power and control over property with the husband
during his lifetime. A husband particularly determined to disinherit his wife could
continue do so through inter vivos disposition.120

1.5.9 Effects of marriage - children
At common law, children of married parents were the property of their father; their
mother had no legal right to guardianship or custody. Equitable rules mitigated this
position somewhat and the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 facilitated a mother in
applying for custody of children until they were 21. Ideas about the primacy of the
father nonetheless prevailed in the Irish courts. Maguire J in Re N.P. an Infant,121
although acknowledging that the principal concern of the court was the welfare of the
child, stated that:
The father is the head of the household and is liable to contribute to the cost of
maintenance of his wife and family. If the circumstances show that he has not
disentitled himself I rather lean in favour of conceding to him a greater claim than
to the mother.122
Cases before the courts concerning guardianship mainly dealt with the moral and
religious education and welfare of the children of mixed-religion marriages.123 In Re
Tilson’s Infants, the Supreme Court held that a principle of equality applied between
married parents in respect of decisions concerning the religious upbringing of children.
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The parties in this case had agreed before marriage that any children would be brought
up in the mother’s faith. This agreement was upheld by the court on the basis that the
Constitution precluded the favouring the religious belief of one parent over the other.
The Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 extended this principle of equality between
married parents to all matters concerning the well-being of children. Fathers and
mothers became joint guardians of their children, and each could apply to the other for
child-maintenance.124 Sole guardianship of illegitimate children was to remain with
their mothers.125 Whilst the responsible Minister acknowledged that the legislation
would be used mainly in ‘the abnormal situation or for the broken home’ 126 the
principle issue it was intended to address was the ‘welfare of the infant,’ 127 not
problems with marriage. In the event, applications under the Act were rare before
1970, available only in the High Court, and prohibitively expensive.128

1.6 Conclusion.
Before the 1970s, there were four principal forms of law potentially regulating
marriage; the 1937 Constitution, statute and case law inherited from the British, Irish
statute law, and Irish case law. Although the Constitution made legal statements about
marriage, these had no real effect at the level of politics and, as they largely reflected
the relationship practices of the majority, represented no more than a rhetorical
affirmation of social behaviour. British law that continued in force did so without
interference from the Irish government. It affected only a wealthy minority, able to
manage their own affairs without interference from the State. Irish reforms of marriage
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law, although effecting significant change from a legal perspective, had little impact
on marriage practices, and were not intended to solve problems with the marriage
relationship itself. The separation of the legal personalities and property of husband
and wife by the Married Women’s Status Act 1957 had no practical effect at the time.
Although the Succession Act 1965 gave spouses a legal right share in each other’s
estate, it simply continued the State’s habit of using marriage as a proxy for
interdependence rather than attempting to regulate it. Matrimonial litigation was rare
in Ireland, and the courts applied British common law and Irish statutory provisions
without political controversy or questioning. Marriage law had not yet become a
technique of interest or use to politics. The institution of marriage itself, and how it
was practised, was considered outside the domain of political government serving only
as a useful signal of interdependence.

51

Two - Marriage Law Literature

Marriage law, and the closely related topic of family law, have generated a large body
of academic literature, particularly since the 1970s, much of it clustered around the
themes of gender, the public/private law divide, and the concepts of tradition and
modernity. This chapter reviews some of this literature in order to elucidate how the
relationship between marriage law and political power has been conceptualised within
the academy. It aims to show how those who critique, analyse, and call for reform of
marriage law, almost universally view law as an instrument of political oppression,
with powerful law existing in opposition to powerless citizens. Somewhat
paradoxically, critics also offer marriage law reform as an exit route from this
relationship of domination, and as a way to achieve a more just society.
Foucault described this formulation of the relationship between power and
powerlessness as the juridical theory of power. He argued that, in political thought,
we are trapped in a monarchical illusion, assuming that power is exercised by an
omnipotent sovereign over a subjugated population; that ‘[i]n political thought and
analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.’ 1 I begin this chapter with an
explanation of Foucault’s assertion by reference to legal and political theory. Next, I
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Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Part I (Robert Hurley
tr, Penguin Books 1998), 88 – 89.
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illustrate how a juridical theory of power has been adopted by legal scholars in
commenting on marriage and family law, focusing on three specific forms of analysis;
the oppositions of tradition and modernity, male and female, public and private.
Within each category, I consider some conceptual difficulties with the oppositional
form adopted. 2 My analysis suggests that academic consideration of marriage and
family law does not describe how law, in fact, regulates our lives, but rather forms part
of the politics of law reform. Authors seek to effect social and legal change in
accordance with specific political perspectives or value positions. Whilst this is not
necessarily problematic, the deployment of dichotomous oppositions reflects an
assumption that legal rules act only as instruments of power, to either oppress or
liberate. Challenging marriage law in this way, authors denounce the power they hope
to exercise, and promise to liberate human relationships from the very rules that give
them political significance.3
In the final section of the chapter, I look at some scholarship that moves beyond
the juridical to consider how power is exercised through law. These studies call into
question the efficacy of standard forms of legal scholarship and suggest that an
alternative approach to the question of power will prove more fruitful in identifying
how we are governed by marriage law.

2.1 Juridical Power
In the 1975 lecture series Society Must Be Defended, Foucault outlines the juridical,
or judico-discursive theory of power:

2

Nikolas Rose notes how critiques of law appear drawn to a concept of the State that
reproduces constitutionalist doctrines. The State is conceptualised as the single site of
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In the case of the classical juridical theory of power, power is regarded as a right
that can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity, and which can
therefore be transferred or alienated, either completely or partly, though a juridical
act or an act that founds a right – it does not matter which, for the moment – thanks
to the surrender of something or thanks to a contract. Power is the concrete power
that an individual can hold, and which he can surrender, either as a whole or in
part, so as to constitute a power or a political sovereignty.4
Juridical power, once vested in the sovereign, is exercised ‘by laying down the rule ...
It speaks and that is the rule.’5 Its effects are largely negative: ‘a power to say no; in
no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti energy.’6
Foucault’s description of juridical power is an amalgamation of social contract
theory (developed by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau), and John Austin’s command
theory of law. Social contract theory conceptualises political power as a possession
traded between individual subjects and a sovereign State. 7 For Hobbes, citizens
surrender power to an unlimited State sovereign, 8 whereas in Locke’s formulation
citizens retain certain ‘natural’ rights. 9 Rousseau also accepts the notion of natural
rights but believes that provided the social contract transfers the will of the people to
the legislature, there can be no question of law infringing rights. 10 In Foucault’s
formulation, once power is transferred to the sovereign, it is exercised in accordance
with Austin’s command theory of law. Law, according to Austin, is the command of
Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 197576 (David Macey tr, Picador 2003), 13.
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through which the individual power of men unites to legitimate the power of the State.
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a political superior or State sovereign supported by sanctions, also established by the
sovereign.11 Austin’s theory of law/power is well illustrated by Foucault’s description
of the torture and death of Damiens in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish,
and generalised as the power of life and death in The Will to Knowledge.12
The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by
refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he
was capable of requiring.13
The sovereign, having the right to command obedience and sanction disobedience, has
absolute power over the life and death of his subjects. The command theory of law
thus conflates law and power – the power of a sovereign is executed by commands
that are always legal.
Juridical power is used by Foucault as the rhetorical foil against which he builds
his description of the productive and dispersed power that operates in the modern
world. Although Foucault demonstrates in his historical studies that power no longer
acts in a solely juridical fashion, he also argues that, in political thought we remain
fixated upon the juridical model, believing that law is the manifestation of political
power. In The Will to Knowledge he argues that ‘[p]ower as a pure limit set on freedom
is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability’14 and ‘the representation
of power has remained under the spell of monarchy.’15 In other words, Foucault does
not believe that the juridical model fully describes the operation of power in
modernity. Rather, he argues that it describes how we think about and represent
law/power in political discourse.
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Juridical conceptualisations of law/power assume that power has a limit, set by the
social contract, moral imperatives, natural law or other claims to truth. Power
exercised within the appropriate boundaries is legitimate. Thus, Foucault points out,
adopting a juridical model of power in political argument allows us to both justify the
actions of those in possession of power and to challenge the legitimacy of its exercise.
Either we do so in order to show the nature of the juridical armoury that invested
royal power, to reveal the monarch as the effective embodiment of sovereignty, to
demonstrate that his power, for all that it was absolute, was exactly that which
befitted his fundamental right. Or by contrast, we do so in order to show the
necessity of imposing limits upon this sovereign power, of submitting it to certain
rules of right, within whose confines it had to be exercised in order for it to remain
legitimate. The essential role of the theory of right, from medieval times onwards,
was to fix the legitimacy of power; that is the major problem around which the
whole theory of right and sovereignty is organised.16
In terms of legal analysis, adopting a juridical model of power allows commentators
to identify a limit to power, and argue that a particular legal provision is either
legitimate/within the limit, or illegitimate/outside the limit. In so doing they act to both
challenge and legitimate the exercise of power.

2.2 Legal Scholarship and Limits to Power
Legal scholars, reflecting on marriage law, almost universally adopt a juridical model
of law/power. Law is equated with the exercise of sovereign/State power and authors
seek to challenge it by reference to power-limiting truths, and, consequently, justify
the exercise of power within those limits. Thinking of law as an instrument of
sovereign power thus leads to the construction of dichotomous oppositions
representing legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power. My review of literature is
organised around three such oppositions commonly deployed in the academy;

Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Michel Foucault, Power Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972 - 1977 (Colin Gordon ed, Colin Gordon and ors trs,
Pantheon Books 1980), 95.
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tradition/modernity; public/private and men/women. For each category, I describe the
nature of the opposition and how it is deployed in reviewing legal provisions. This
analysis demonstrates the extent to which legal analysis, despite advances in
jurisprudence, remains welded to juridical formulations of power. It also suggests a
close relationship between legal scholarship and the politics of law reform; scholars
seek, not to analyse law’s function and effect, but to argue for its reform in accordance
with their particular version of a just society. They argue against specific legal
mechanisms on the basis that an alternative form of law will nullify the need for
politics, because law will then reflect the truth. This does not mean that the criticisms
are not justified, they can be efficacious in exposing the value positions represented
by law. Nonetheless, they do not attack law’s legitimacy, rather they seek to substitute
one value position for another, re-enforcing both the necessity of law, and its position
as a privileged domain within which to contest the ‘truth.’

2.3 Opposing Tradition and Modernity
2.3.1 Introduction
An assumed clash between long established beliefs or customs and contemporary
social practices forms the conceptual starting point for critiques of law engaging the
opposition between tradition and modernity. Law is evaluated against a trajectory of
social change with tradition representing the past, and modernity the present or future.
Legal measures, processes, and interventions are theorised as, alternately, holding
back social progress by protecting traditional values, or operating as potential
instruments of social transformation in supporting modern behaviour. Authors thus
use the words ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ to describe ways of understanding
relationship behaviour and argue that one or other ways of thinking, or ‘truths’
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(depending on their perspective), about relationship practices should determine how
we are governed by law.
Scholars employing this approach adopt a variety of reference points for tradition
and modernity. In the next section, I describe how Irish analysis tends to focus on a
constitutionally based description of tradition, whereas international scholarship
employs definitions fixed by social theory. With the recent growth in socio-legal
research, empirical studies of ‘modern’ relationship behaviour have increasingly been
used to support of legal reform.
2.3.2 Tradition and modernity – an Irish perspective.
The Irish Constitution, at Article 41, provides a convenient definition of traditional
relationship practice. The traditional couple is heterosexual, married, and adopts
distinct gender roles.17 Constitutional marriage is a:
traditional gender contract [which] … reflects a conventional division of labour,
whereby the mother is responsible for childcare while the father, as a wage earner,
is responsible for financial provision.18
Everything else is, thus, ‘modern’ family practice. An All-party Committee on the
Constitution, identifies the ‘traditional family’ as that defined by Article 41 and its
judicial interpretation,19 whilst a Working Group on Domestic Partnership uses the
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upbringing of the children; the children were expected to absorb the values of their parents
and be subservient to them.
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terms ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ repeatedly to describe households consisting
of married and co-habiting couples respectively.20
Whilst the ordinary meaning of ‘tradition’ infers practices handed down from
generation to generation, 21 Irish relationships practices since the foundation of the
State have not consistently followed the constitutional paradigm. The anthropologists
Arensberg and Kimball, in a 1930s study, described a traditional family consisting of
three generations held together by economic necessity. 22 Finola Kennedy, who
describes the disappearance of the intergenerational family between 1950 and 1980,
and its replacement with the nuclear family described in the Constitution, supports
their view of tradition.23 In contrast, Carol Coulter, finds no evidence of a society
centred on the nuclear family, or the intergenerational form, in 1940s and 1950s
Ireland when:
Large numbers of people did not marry at all, and Ireland had one of the lowest,
and latest, marriage rates in Europe, and therefore a very low rate of family
formation … widowhood often brought destitution…children were placed in
orphanages … emigration often divided families [and] the family was then, to a
great extent, a single parent family, with all the responsibility resting on the
mother.24
A 1998 government Commission, noting that ‘[f]or most of this century, Ireland
was unique among western countries with its low marriage rate,’ endorses Coulter’s
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observations.25 The Commission describes Ireland in the 1930s as ‘marriage-averse,’
with marriage rates reaching a peak in 1974, and declining thereafter, falling to 1930s
levels in the 1990s. 26 It appears that when placed within the context of larger
demographic transitions, Irish relationship practices of the past 40 years fall broadly
in line with those of other European jurisdictions, being neither uniquely Irish nor
necessarily inherited from the past.27

2.3.3 Tradition, modernity and law in Ireland.
Despite ambiguity regarding the historical hegemony of gendered, heterosexual,
marriage, Irish legal commentators tend to accept Article 41 of the Constitution as a
statement of traditional practice.28 Anti-divorce commentators argued, in advance of
the 1986 Divorce referendum, that the protection of tradition, in the form of
indissoluble marriage, was necessary to maintain social order. Easy ‘modern’ divorce
would result in soaring rates of family failure and consequent social collapse. 29
Traditional, lifetime, heterosexual, gendered marriage was a safe haven from the
pressures of the modern world. The opposing argument called for law to recognise and
support modern social practice.30 Each side thus deployed the concepts of tradition
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and modernity to describe relationship practices, but also to direct the exercise of
power in accordance with particular value positions or truths. More recently, the
extension of marriage law to non-married couples has been interpreted as an
endorsement of ‘certain values, which might be described as “traditional” albeit in a
reformulated manner.’ 31 Here, the equation of tradition with social conservatism
facilitates a claim for acceptance of more ‘modern’ values. The precise meanings of
tradition and modernity are thus less important than their polemic potential.32
2.3.4 Social theory – tradition and modernity
The marriage-based, gendered, heterosexual relationship of the Irish Constitution
mirrors sociological theories of traditional behaviour. Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim
describes the traditional family as ‘a lifelong officially legitimated community of
father-mother-child, held together through emotion and intimacy.’33The family, she
claims, has been redefined in modernity:
It is no longer possible to pronounce in some binding way what family, marriage,
parenthood, sexuality or love means, what they should or could be; rather these
vary in substance, exceptions, norms and morality from individual to individual
and from relationship to relationship.34
Modern family life is complex, requiring individuals to continually negotiate and renegotiate their intimate lives. 35 The maintenance of relationships is both more
Fergus Ryan, ‘The Mainstreaming of Same-sex couples in Contemporary Legal
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important, and more difficult, now than in the past, because each one must be
individually negotiated rather than simply follow an existing pattern of roles, rights
and responsibilities. Conflicts between husband and wife necessarily reflect conflict
in wider society brought about by structural change and instability. 36 The internal
aspect of these conflicts is emphasised by Anthony Giddens who describes a ‘project
of self’ in which modern individuals must continually remake themselves and their
relationships.37 A relationship is:
entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a
sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is
thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay
within it.38
A dichotomy is thus constructed by social theorists between traditional family units
representing rigidity and defined roles, and modern individualised families, which
facilitate fluidity and personal choice.

2.3.5 Sociological families and legal analysis
References to sociological conceptions of traditional and modern relationship
practices began to appear in legal scholarship in the late 1980s. Permissive divorce
law, introduced in many Western jurisdictions in the 1970s and 1980s, was seen as
representing government and social acceptance that marriage exists for the benefit of
the individuals involved, and rejection of its traditional role as social institution.39

The contradictions between female expectation of equality and the reality of inequality,
and between male slogans of mutual responsibility and the retention of the old role
assignments, are sharpening and will determine the future development in the thoroughly
contradictory variety of their expression in politics and in private…Consciousness has
rushed ahead of conditions.
Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society (Sage 1992), 104.
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Carol Smart mapped British legal change between 1950 and 1990 onto Giddens’
description of ‘the rise of intimacy,’ noting a close congruence between the two. The
facilitation of clean-break divorce, and the equal treatment of men and women in
British law, she argues, corresponds with Giddens’ ideas ‘because divorce law allowed
couples to put their past mistakes behind them and to turn over a fresh sheet to start
again without unpleasant, lingering financial and emotional ties.’ 40 From Smart’s
perspective, the social process of individualisation has shaped both relationship
practice and legal rules. But, Smart also argues, British family policy has recently
reversed this trajectory of modernisation, to equate family change with social
instability and support institutional marriage in order to promote social stability. 41
Politics, she contends, has rejected sociological truth in favour of traditional ideology.

2.3.6 Empirical sociology and law
A movement toward evidence based policy-making, initiated by Tony Blair’s Labour
government in the United Kingdom, generated demand for sociological answers to
political questions.42 According to Wayne Parsons, this represented an opportunity for
social science to exercise ‘influence’ on the policy making process. 43 The British
family law academy has embraced this opportunity, using empirical sociology to
advocate for family law reform. Exploring ‘the messages from research available to
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those seeking to reform cohabitation law,’44 Ann Barlow concludes that abandoning
marriage as a regulatory trigger, in favour of an approach based on functions
performed by relationships, would ‘in theory simplify the law.’ 45 Barlow has also
conducted qualitative, research that, she claims, suggests a preference for assetsharing among unmarried couples with children,46 and a ‘newly-mainstream’ status
for cohabitation. 47 These empirical findings are used to support her argument that
cohabitation produces families that are functionally equivalent to those based on
marriage and, therefore, as a matter of justice and equality, should be regulated in a
similar manner. Law must be reformed to reflect changing social practices ‘if the
functions of family law itself are not to be rendered obsolete.’ 48 Law’s role in
regulating relationships is not disputed by Barlow. Rather, she seeks to give scientific
weight to the argument that law should support modern social practices by regulating
a broader spectrum of relationships. Law is currently oppressing cohabitees through
exclusion, but can liberate them through increased regulation.

2.3.7 Problems with tradition and modernity.
The history of Irish relationship practices provides contradictory accounts of change.
Further, researchers in other jurisdictions have begun to question the sociological
narrative of tradition and modernity, claiming that people entering relationships in the
present do not behave more individualistically than in the past,49 and that commitment
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levels vary within both ‘traditional’ marriage and ‘modern’ cohabitation. 50 Preexisting social structures have not gone away, and although more choice may be
available to individuals, the behavioural assumptions of the individualisation thesis
are not justified. 51 The feelings of obligation or intimacy that underpin intimate
relationships are complex, and do not necessarily correspond with social categories or
definitions.52 Nikolas Rose, rather caustically, describes Beck, Beck-Gernsheim and
Giddens’ work as:
another chapter in the sociological ‘just so story’ of how the human being got his
individuality … a tale in which ‘the individual’ or ‘individualization’ appears as
particularly ‘modern’53
Rose rejects the assumption of human progress from past to present that underlies the
individualization thesis, and the idea that we can discover, through the pursuit of
knowledge, more accurate or reliable information about who we are in the present.
Nonetheless, the individualisation thesis has proved useful to those seeking to direct
the exercise of political power in the regulation of relationships. The manner in which
it is deployed is perhaps more important than whether it actually describes the reality
of modern life.
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2.3.8 Limitations of tradition and modernity as analytical tools
Existing scholarship engaging with the tradition/modernity dichotomy (however those
terms are defined), does not simply analyse legal measures to determine whether they
reflect cultural or sociological understandings of tradition or modernity. Rather,
commentators take a position on whether traditional or modern practices should be
promoted, acknowledged or rejected by legislators. Discussion then centres on
whether politics and law have adopted the protagonists preferred position, or how they
could do so in the future. This type of normative argument is not unusual in legal
scholarship, and is generally intended to influence political debate, and ultimately the
process of law reform. It assumes that power is, and should be, exercised through law
in accordance with either traditional or modern ways of thinking. Opposing tradition
and modernity in legal analysis is thus an attempt to fix the boundaries of juridical
power; it assumes, without interrogation, that law of itself can, and does, promote
either traditional or modern relationship practices.

2.4 Public Law or Private Law.
2.4.1 Introduction
The division between public and private law arises at two levels in marriage law
scholarship. First, family law is generally categorised as part of the private law of a
State, governing the relationships between private individuals.54 Therefore, public law
(such as human rights guarantees) intended to regulate the relationship between the
State and its citizens, has no role in private law disputes. Secondly, the division
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between private and public domains is part of the liberal political philosophy upon
which contemporary Irish and British law are based,55 and acts to designate certain
areas of life as outside the domain of State control. The Irish Constitution, for example,
protects the privacy of the marital family, ostensibly restraining the State from
interfering with decisions made within it.56 There would appear, therefore, to be three
regulatory domains implicated in public/private analysis: the relationship between the
State and its citizens, the relationship between citizens inter se, and the private domain
where the State has no competence. Analysis of family law focusing on the
public/private divide focuses on the appropriate role of the State and its law at each
level. The role of law in regulating the relationship between the State and its citizens
is not usually considered relevant to family law, 57 and authors employing the
public/private divide generally focus on the extent to which the State can permissibly
regulate individual interaction and private life. With respect to marriage, the argument
is rarely libertarian - those deploying the public/private divide as an analytic strategy
usually argue for more State involvement in the ‘private’ family.58
Feminists, particularly second wave feminists, also focus on the role of the State
and the two forms of analysis are closely related. I deal specifically with feminist
analysis in the next section, and thus limit my discussion here to two specific
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arguments that draw upon the public/private divide. First, I review work that
constructs the public/private divide as an ideological mask behind which the State has
evaded responsibility for family violence and privatised the economic costs of
caregiving. Next, I discuss literature that sees the increasing influence of human rights
values on family law as an acknowledgment that the State has an interest in, and should
therefore be concerned with, family disputes. Both positions, therefore, specifically
identify the public/private divide as a falsehood, an ideological mask behind which
the State attempts to divest itself of responsibility. In these arguments, State inaction
creates oppression, non-law is conceptualised as an illegitimate juridical act because
it is the result of limits too narrowly drawn. Opposed to this non-law are positive
juridical acts that cast off the falsity of the public/private in order to liberate the
oppressed.

2.4.2 The public/private divide as an ideological mask.
The public/private divide is often characterised in legal analysis as an ideology, a
system of beliefs without material reality, deployed to justify inaction by the State.
Whilst denying its existence, authors attempt to reveal the hidden power relationships
operating behind its mask. Critics of liberal government thus contend that State
institutions use the concepts of public and private to draw a line dividing the business
of the State from that which is defined as private. 59 Feminists and critical legal
scholars, in particular, argue that this categorisation serves to illegitimately insulate
the private family from the public sphere in which the State has competence. They
claim that notions of family privacy are used to signify a part of life within which the
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government has no competence, acting, for example, to restrain State intervention in
domestic violence and marital rape for most of the twentieth century.60
The public/private divide is also said to legitimise the privatisation of the cost of
inevitable dependency.61 Social policy, for example, generally takes a ‘family first’
approach to financial need, requiring family members to provide for the young,
disabled, unemployed or elderly before a claim can be made against the State.62 In The
Autonomy Myth, Martha Fineman describes family privacy as a ‘meta-narrative’ of
American social policy, which offers to free the family from government intervention
in exchange for its containment of the cost of dependency. Thus, the law enforces
support obligations after a relationship has broken down in order to insulate the State
from the cost of alleviating the resultant poverty. Retaining the privacy of the family,
Fineman claims, traps women in a dependent role, supplicants of a male provider even
after a relationship has ended. In her analysis, the public/private divide is an
ideological construct, symptomatic of a particular liberal belief system. Family
privacy is not real she maintains; it is a mask functioning to legitimate legal measures
which have the effect of giving men power over women and children.63
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Lucinda Ferguson, in a similar vein, calls for the dismantling of the public/private
divide in family law in order that the State’s interest in the outcome of postrelationship disputes might be acknowledged. The State, and not just individual
participants, she asserts, have an interest in the outcome of financial support
applications: if provision is inadequate, the State may be called upon to provide
support. Furthermore, providing public compensation to women who sacrificed the
opportunity of income in order to care for dependents both promotes gender equality
and recognises unpaid care-work, important values which the State should support.64
Using the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, Ferguson shows that the
factors taken into account by courts in making financial awards following relationship
breakdown, go beyond the interpersonal and attempt to redress social inequalities.65
In considering the economic vulnerability of women at the end of an intimate
relationship, the court is not only dealing with a question of a former partner’s
obligation to compensate loss sustained as a result of the relationship, but also for
structural barriers to self-sufficiency. Ferguson contends that debate on the nature of
interpersonal obligations following relationship breakdown must be broadened to take
account of the social obligation to address need, particularly when there are no private
resources available to meet it.66 The public/private divide is conceptualised here as
both unreal and unnecessary - courts already consider public issues in private disputes
- the public/private divide functions only to represent a particular political ideal.
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2.4.3 Public law – human rights
Human and Constitutional rights are considered part of the domain of public law,
mediating the relationship between citizens and the State. They are not generally
implicated in disputes between private citizens, but some family law scholars have
noted the migration of rights-based argument into family law disputes. Alison Diduck,
for example, argues that this is evidence of the convergence of public and private
interests in the outcome of family conflict.67 The influence of rights, she asserts, is not
just through the direct deployment of rights-based argument in family law cases but
also indirectly through the application of rights-based concepts. 68 Diduck uses the
jurisprudence of the English House of Lords to support her contention that the concept
of ‘fairness’ in English divorce law has been extended through cases like White v
White, 69 to include consideration of public law values such as equality and nondiscrimination.70 This movement in the courts, she maintains, indicates a connection
between the private and the political in which the law recognises not only individual
choices but also the moral and social conditions within which those choices are
made.71 Robert Leckey identifies the mixing of public law values with private law
disputes as problematic. Human rights litigation in the area of family law can serve to
insulate legislation from reform. Once a particular family law principle has been given
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the human rights seal of approval, it is unlikely to be subject to political challenge.72
As was the case with White v White, where a fundamental change in the aims of
financial relief on divorce is effected by the courts based on human rights principles,
the usual process of politically informed change can be avoided.

2.4.4 Political power: public law, private families
Critiques based on the public/private divide are somewhat paradoxical. The division
is seen as a creation of the State that supports a particular belief system;73 a false truth
that illegitimately limits the power of the State to regulate familial relationships.
Removing this limitation will, it is argued, liberate individuals and families. Whilst
undoubtedly producing interesting perspectives on family regulation, this type of
analysis is theoretically suspect. Fineman, for example, refers to the public/private
divide as a system of ideas that promises privacy in exchange for caregiving. 74 Yet,
she also argues that there is no real material division between private and public
interests, the dichotomy simply functions to prevent citizens appreciating the real
motivation behind government action.75 If there is no system of ideas separating public
and private, then how can it have any function? In effect, Fineman is arguing that a
unified and omnipotent State has constructed a lie behind which it hides whilst
illegitimately oppressing citizens through inaction.
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2.5 Feminist Approaches.
2.5.1 Introduction
Feminist theory is a hugely broad field of academic investigation, and narrowing the
literature to work dealing specifically with marriage or family law does little to reduce
its scope. In this section, I aim to provide only a brief overview of feminist literature
on the subject of family law in order to illuminate the various ways in which feminist
theory conceptualises the relationship between political power and law. The label
‘feminist’ resists simple definition, but most feminists would accept that their aim is
to challenge the social advantages and positions of power enjoyed by men in western
society by identifying how male dominance acts to disadvantage women. 76 Alison
Diduck and Katherine O’ Donovan have described feminist perspectives on family
law as necessary to illuminate how the regulation of family life is related to social and
political relations. A feminist perspective they argue:
emphasises the personal as political, and, born as it was of feminist activism,
feminist theory is also about the possibility of the transformation or reconstruction
of both.77
At its most basic level, feminist legal theory aims to connect the politics of personal
life to broader systems of domination supported by the State through law, and to
contest and transform those systems. Similar to analysis based on the public/private
divide therefore, feminist analysis often conceptualises the State as a unified entity
capable of acting with a singular purpose, in this case to oppress women.
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In this section, I outline two types of feminist analysis with particular reference to
their use within family law: liberal feminism and second wave feminism. Despite its
diversity, feminist work often focuses on a juridical male/female dyadic representing
power/powerlessness - law enforces male power over powerless females. Feminists
seek to activate the truth that women are equal to men in order to limit law’s power to
oppress.

2.5.2 Liberal Feminism
In many jurisdictions, including Ireland, nineteenth and twentieth century reform of
marriage, and many other areas of law, was initiated by campaigning women’s groups
who challenged the inequities of common law rules. 78 Liberal feminist campaigns
highlighted how women were discriminated against by laws that excluded them from
property ownership, voting rights and many types of work. Improved political and
legal rights were seen as the route to equality between the sexes, and these early
campaigns had many successes including voting rights for women in the nineteenth
century and equal pay for equal work in the twentieth.79 As a result of feminist efforts,
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most statute law is now drafted in sex-neutral language and the proposition that law
should treat men and women equally is generally uncontested.80
This instrumental approach to law remains important for many feminist lawyers
who see law as a useful tool in the fight for gender equality. Advocating broader
understandings of the legal concept of equality, they encourage adoption of more
rigorous equality considerations in family disputes. For example, Simone Wong has
argued that legal instruments should be interpreted to produce substantive rather than
formal equality in the adjudication of family property actions. 81 Family law
adjudication in the courts has begun to take account of these arguments. The English
House of Lords in dividing property following divorce in White v White, 82 approved
a substantive interpretation of equality taking into account the material disadvantages
suffered by women adopting a caregiving role in marriage.83
From a liberal feminist perspective, political power is a resource unequally
distributed between men and women and law is an effective instrument for
redistributing it in a fairer or more equal way. The liberal feminist thus explicitly
adopts a conceptualisation of political power as a commodity or possession that can
be better distributed between men and women. Law is the bearer or enforcer of power,
setting down rules, which the State apparatus will act to enforce.
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2.5.3 Second Wave Feminism
Whilst liberal feminism accepts that law sets standards that can be applied neutrally to
all, second generation feminists like Catharine MacKinnon, developed a critique of
the possibility of neutrality where men and women are concerned. Disillusioned with
the lack of real change effected in women’s lives by legal reforms, second wave
feminists called for ‘a deeper understanding of equality … based not on copying male
norms but on ending the oppression of women.’84 MacKinnon, in the United States
context describes how law was often not enough:
The Equal Rights Amendment, designed to make sex legally irrelevant was lost,
in part through opposition by women. The abortion right, framed as a right to
privacy rather than a right to sex equality, was recognized, only to be taken almost
immediately from women who have least access to it … Women are poor, and pay
is at least as far from being sex-equal as it was before the passage of legislation
guaranteeing pay equality by law.85
Social, cultural and economic practices have a significant impact on the advantages
and disadvantages suffered by men and women, law reform alone cannot counteract
these forces. Feminist approaches to law therefore level a powerful challenge to the
notion of ‘individual rights bearer’ and its assumption of equality before the law. 86
They have the capacity to move beyond an analysis of legal measures in their own
terms by identifying and questioning the gendered assumptions that underpin judicial
reasoning and legal instruments.
Feminists often see the Western cultural concept of family as a reflection of the
patriarchal nature of society. How we think about and ‘do’ family is based on
suppositions about the naturalness of the nuclear heterosexual form, the gender roles
it implies, and its necessary separateness from the public domain. Law re-enforces
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these cultural assumptions through doctrines like family privacy and the production of
specific rules that apply only to familial interactions. Radical feminist like Martha
Fineman have therefore argued that, because of its role in re-enforcing the culturally
entrenched dependency of women, marriage law should be abolished.87
It is unusual for feminist lawyers to suggest such draconian measures as the
abolition of their object of study. More usual is identification of the specific ways in
which patriarchal power is enforced by law. The legal institution of marriage, for
instance, is said to mask the effects of patriarchy on women. This is demonstrated by
the difficulties experienced by women when marriage breaks down, it is only then that
the effects of women’s dependency with marriage are fully revealed.88 The application
of marriage-type law to other relationships is resisted by many second wave feminists
because it risks extending patriarchal assumptions to other relationship types. 89
Rosemary Auchmuty has recently re-iterated this point, and has observed that, in any
event, the institution of marriage has been subverted by women themselves who have
rejected the assumption of a dependent role which it implies.90 Although calling into
question some elements of juridical theories of power, second wave feminists do not
fully step outside its boundaries. Law is not seen as the only instrument of women’s
oppression, but nonetheless, is assumed to offer a route to liberation.
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2.5.4 Feminism: law, power and government.
Liberal feminism conceptualises law as both an instrument of patriarchy and a
pathway to liberation. Second wave feminists see law in a similar manner focusing on
the oppressive potential of law whilst remaining sceptical of its positive role in
improving women’s lives. These types of arguments have proved effective in drawing
attention to how law can operate to disadvantage individuals, either directly or
indirectly. Nonetheless, in the main they remain focused on juridical forms of power,
oppositions between power and powerlessness and the appropriate limits to power.

2.6 Beyond the Juridical
2.6.1 Tradition and modernity as an alternative to tradition versus modernity
Legal commentators have explained differences in how the State regulates individuals
as workers or family members in terms of tradition and modernity. Important in this
work, is the acceptance that the State does not act in a unitary fashion, but applies
different rules to different people in varying contexts. In comparing British and
German regulatory frameworks, Mary Daly and Kirsten Scheiwe find that both
countries are trying to ‘modernise’ their family and employment laws in ways that
draw upon long-standing principles and values, whilst at the same time instituting
profound change. Law and social policy in these jurisdictions, they argue, has
attempted to straddle the gap between tradition and modernity in different ways
depending on its purpose. Individuals are separated from their traditional caring and
relationship responsibilities when seen as workers, but interdependency and mutual
support become more important in managing familial relationships.91 In this analysis,
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tradition is equated with values of inter-family support, and modernity with value-free
marketization of workers. Family law enforces traditional caring, whilst employment
law supports modern individualism. Power thus draws upon different forms of truth
depending on the desired outcomes. Moving toward a more nuanced understanding of
the relationship between sociological expertise and politics, Daly and Scheiwe
appreciate that tradition and modernity do not necessarily oppose each other at the
level of government. Rather, they are concepts that can be deployed to support
different strategic objectives within varying social domains.92 The issue for marriage
law reform suggested by Daly and Scheiwe is how tradition and modernity have been
deployed, by whom, and for what purpose.

2.6.2 The political relevance of tradition and modernity
Ideas about tradition and modernity do not only operate at the level of politics. Alison
Diduck argues that traditional and modern family ideologies shape both relationship
practices and legal interventions. Individual citizens, and legal regulation, must
mediate between these contrasting ideological positions. Diduck contends that, at least
in the British context, law has not attained an effective compromise. As a result, in
aiming to protect traditional marriage, and facilitate modern relationships, law fails to
do justice to real, lived families.93 Diduck’s work draws careful attention to the ways
in which people understand themselves by reference to both traditional and modern
family ideals and how this results in complex relationship behaviour. Similarly, legal
regulation is capable of embodying a range of truth positions, but in Diduck’s view,
has demonstrated its inability to engage with complexity in a way that offers effective
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solutions to families in difficulty.94 Rather, legal instruments and processes construct
a (somewhat conflicted) picture of what constitutes ‘good’ relationship behaviour and
encourage individuals to adopt it.95 Diduck produces a convincing account of how
ideas about tradition and modernity, as well as materialist, care-giving, and gender
concerns can affect familial and political decision-making. She also identifies law’s
constitutive effects – legal rules do not simply regulate reality, they also produce it.96
The relationship between power and powerlessness, she demonstrates, is not
necessarily linear and oppositional
Diduck suggests that legal rules, instruments and processes operate to control
relationship behaviour, not through direct command, but by processes of
subjectivisation and normalisation.97 The political nature of marriage, its importance
within State regulatory systems, and the way in which it connects individual ambitions
to political strategies, are all considered. Although critiquing the ideological role
played by tradition and modernity at the level of government, she accepts that the
concepts have a material existence at the level of the population, as demonstrated by
social theory. This curious dichotomy makes Diduck’s work both compelling and
unsettling, encapsulated in her own ambivalent conclusion that ‘something is
changing’ with family law.98

2.6.3 Beyond the public private divide
A broader understanding of the public/private divide is adopted by Michael Freeman
who sees the family as central to the relationship between the State and society. The
law when regulating family life produces, constitutes, and defines social order: women
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are defined as dependent, children as objects rather than subjects, families as private
domains. Enforcing the public/private distinction through law re-enforces power
structures embedded in the family and, Freeman proposes, is functionally useful to the
State.99 Freeman’s work indicates that the public/private divide is not an ideological
mask but a way of thinking about families that extends beyond State institutions. The
State does not act in a one-dimensional way to regulate the social domain but takes
account of, and utilises, social practices and understandings to secure effective social
management. Freeman draws attention to the role of the public/private divide as a form
of truth present at all levels of society, a shared mode of communication that allows
State institutions to utilise non-State regulatory systems, including citizen’s own ideas
about what is public/regulable and what is private/non-regulable.

2.6.4 Third wave and post-modern feminists; men versus women, remade.
Third wave feminists use the concept of gender, describing not biological sex, but the
quality of being either male or female, to question the assumptions underpinning many
sex-neutral laws.100 Gender is a cultural concept that takes its meaning from social
practices and expectations. Women and men have gendered existences, living
according to cultural norms that affect their opportunities for self-fulfilment. 101
Women are expected, for example, to provide care to others without payment, or
accept low-paid work, and this social understanding of gender, rather than biological
sex establishes their route through life.102 Gender, it is argued, has a greater influence
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on outcomes than legal rules admit and gender-neutral laws can impact men and
women differently.103 The law can also act to construct gender by ascribing normal
status to sex-based division of roles within couple relationships.104
Third wave and post-modern feminism thus moves away from a juridical
formulation of power. Drawing upon Judith Butler’s questioning of the efficacy of
identity politics, feminists have begun to reject the idea that a single explanation of
women’s oppression is possible or that there are specific routes to liberation.105 Butler
advocates a movement away from feminist concerns with the ontology of women and
asks: ‘[w]hat new shape of politics emerges when identity as a common ground no
longer constrains the discourse on feminist politics?’106 The answer is that difference
becomes the key word; women can be whichever type of women, or feminists they
want to be. Gender is not the only disadvantaging factor in society. Black women may
be more oppressed by white women than by black men, poverty or class may produce
more disadvantage than gender. This perspective feeds into the legal academy through
more nuanced concepts of equality. Maleiha Malik, for example, argues that feminist
family lawyers need to take more account of multiculturalism and the differing
experiences of minority women. She describes how British family law remedies can
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produce clashes between ‘sexual and cultural, racial or religious equality.’107 Political
power in these analyses is more dispersed, acting in different ways at different times
on different categories of individual. Law/power is no longer the only source of
oppression, as the relationship between power and powerlessness becomes more
complex.
Despite this clear movement away from a juridical understanding of power,
adoption of a specific feminist stance places gender-politics to the centre of the
analytic frame. Judith Butler argues that:
It is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully represented
in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to understand how the
category of ‘woman,’ the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the
very structures of power through which emancipation is sought.108
Therefore, although feminist theory has the capacity to move beyond juridical
perspectives on the relationship between law and power, it requires a focus on two
specific (socially constructed) categories of legal subject. Legal regulation, however,
generally applies to all, and differences in effect may be related not only to gender but
also to economic status, educational achievement, social class or even individual
factors like location, health status or religious belief. Third wave feminism points out
the non-material, socially constructed nature of the categories male and female, but
continues to deploy them and to place masculinity in a position of power. Female
values are, they contend, marginalised om favour of those of masculinity.

2.6.5 Carol Smart and the power of law
At the end of the 1980s, British sociologist Carol Smart attempted to advance feminist
legal theory by analysing law in terms of its effect as a discourse that disqualifies other
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forms of knowledge, in particular feminist knowledge.109 Smart adopted Foucault’s
description of power as dispersed and productive, but assumed that in equating law
with juridical power, he predicted the decline of law in modernity. 110 Noting that
‘juridical power remains a formidable obstacle to feminism,’ 111 Smart’s principle
purpose in Feminism and the Power of Law was to challenge the idea that law has the
power to right wrongs perpetrated upon women. Law, in her view, is always
oppressive to women, and feminists should resist engagement with it. Instead, they
should focus on the many ways in which women’s lives are shaped outside the law.112
Law, she writes:
is not a free floating entity, it is grounded in patriarchy, as well as class and ethnic
divisions. I am uncertain that we should be searching for a feminist jurisprudence
which we could substitute for this totality.113
Smart argues that issues such as rape and child abuse should not be isolated in
‘law,’ but contextualised in the domain of dominant discourses of heterosexuality.
Law cannot solve these problems, she claims, because ‘it does not hold the key to
unlock patriarchy.’ Rather, patriarchy must be challenged through alternative
‘resistant discourses,’ and law must be decentred.114 Smart’s work demonstrates the
efficacy of a contextual approach to law, she also nonetheless, acknowledges that
feminist jurisprudence attempts to ‘replace one hierarchy of truth with another.’115 In
other words, she accepts that feminists generally operate within a juridical conception
of power, attempting to replace one set of limits to power with another.116
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The difficulty with Smart’s work is that, although acknowledging the limitations
of law in solving social problems, and its effect as a discourse of truth, she
characterises it as a vehicle of patriarchy. ‘Law’ is unified in its efforts to oppress
women; it always accepts and implements patriarchy. The contingency inherent in
Foucault’s work is lost in Smart’s determination to challenge men’s power over
women.

2.7 Conclusion
Academic analysis of marriage and family law often focuses on the conceptual
oppositions of tradition and modernity, public and private, male and female. Law, in
these accounts, is envisaged as the instrument of a juridical power that can both
oppress and liberate. Traditional values are imposed upon modern families, the
public/private divide is used to release the State from the economic cost of inevitable
dependency, and patriarchal law oppresses women. In each case law is also seen as
the route to liberation: law reform can redress the imbalance between tradition and
modern value positions, recognise the public interest in public lives, and free women
from male power.
These analyses offer important insights into how our intimate lives are affected by
legal rules. Law, they demonstrate, imposes obligations, promises emancipation, and
endorses particular ways of thinking about intimate life. Nonetheless, their reliance on
predetermined theories to explain how State power is applied through law reflects a
juridical understanding of law/power, a perspective that obscures the various struggles
and conflicts that have produced the regime of rules that govern our familial
relationships.
Governments generally initiate programs of law reform in response to difficulties
that arise at particular points in time. Marriage law reform in Ireland, for example,
85

began as a response to an activist campaign that posed problems relating to vulnerable
women.117 Its aims were not functional to the State, and the rules that resulted were
developed within particular contexts, on the basis of assumptions, conditions,
contestations and ideological positions holding sway at a particular historical moment.
Therefore, approaches to critique and analysis based on dichotomous distinctions risk
producing an over-simplified analysis of the law reform process.
Some legal scholarship has begun to move beyond the juridical to consider how
power is exercised through law. Authors like Mary Daly, Kirsten Scheiwe, and Alison
Diduck suggest that a focus on how concepts like tradition and modernity are
deployed, by whom, and to what effect, can lead to a fuller understanding of the power
relationships operating between government and individual citizens. Post-modern
feminists like Judith Butler and Carol Smart identify the power of law to construct
social meaning, as well as regulate social practice. Smart also draws attention to law’s
role as a source of information that acts to disqualify other ways of knowing. The
connection between how we are governed by State institutions, and how we govern
our own lives is suggested by Michael Freeman in his analysis of the role of the
public/private divide. In moving beyond dichotomy, therefore, we can begin to
consider how we are, in fact, governed by marriage law and the role played by legal
instruments, categories and processes in regulating and constructing individual lives.
Foucault brings these observations on the relationship between power and
knowledge, politics and individual ethical capacities, together in his description of bio-
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power and government. In the next chapter I explain these concepts and how they can
facilitate a diagnosis of how we are, in fact, governed by marriage law.
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Three - Theoretical Framework

Foucault maintains that power is not exerted by a unified entity called ‘the State,’ but
through a network of mobile relationships between varied authorities in strategies
intended to govern diverse aspects of economic activity, social life and individual
conduct.1 To exercise power is not to place constraints upon citizens, but to produce
citizens capable of exercising a type of regulated freedom; 2 individuals are not the
subjects of power but play an important role in its operation. 3 In calling into question
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how power is exercised through legal instruments and processes, therefore, an
approach moving beyond dichotomous oppositions of power and powerlessness is
necessary. In this chapter, I explain how Foucault conceptualises power, and how he
connects his theory of power to the functioning of modern government. I describe how
legal scholars have interpreted his ideas, and build upon this work to develop a
theoretical framework for analysis of Irish marriage law.

3.1 Foucault and Power
3.1.1 Power is not a commodity
Foucault conceptualises power, not a commodity that some possess and others do not,
but as a relationship of force instigated for a purpose. Purposive relationships of
power, involving a variety of actors are, he argues, replicated across both institutional
and non-institutional settings, ensuring that ‘relationships of power traverse
characterise and constitute the social body.’4
Power functions. Power is exercised through networks and individuals do not
simply circulate in those networks, they are in a position to both submit to and
exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they
are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not
applied to them.5
Individuals are not subjected by power, they are subjectified within relationships of
power, they facilitate its exercise and are essential to its functioning.

Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that
functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in
the hands of some and is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can
be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks and individuals
do not simply circulate in those networks, they are in a position to both submit to and
exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are
always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to
them.
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3.1.2 The State does not have a monopoly on power
If power relationships exist throughout the social body, then the State is neither the
source of all power, nor does it have a monopoly on power. This is not to deny that
relationships of power can coalesce in institutional form, or that the State as a concept
is unimportant. In the lecture course Security, Territory, Population, Foucault
investigates ‘the history of the State and the way in which the institutions of the State
actually crystalized.’6 In undertaking this analysis, he cautions that:
We cannot speak of the State-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of
itself and imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic
mechanism. The State is a practice. The State is inseparable from the set of
practices by which the State actually became a way of governing, a way of doing
things, and a way too of relating to government.7
The State, therefore, is not a source of power, but an effect of power relations. Its very
existence relies on a network of power relationships operating at every level of society:
[R]elations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them,
necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State. In two senses: first of all because
the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses is far from being able to occupy
the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only
operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. … I would say that
the State consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which
render its functioning possible.8
The authority we tend to invest in the State does not emanate from a stockpile of power
supporting its institutions. Rather, ‘the State’ is a site at which multiple relationships
of power coalesce.

3.1.3 Power is not repressive but productive.
Power, when thought of as a repressive force, takes on a fundamentally negative
character. It acts ‘to say no; [it is] in no condition to produce, capable only of posting
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limits, it is basically anti-energy.’9 When reformulated as a relationship, power takes
on a completely different character, it becomes productive,10 and its efficacy depends
upon its ability to produce what we accept as reality. In The Will to Knowledge,
Foucault shows how sexuality, rather than being repressed by a power that forbids,
has, since the seventeenth century, been created and defined by multiple relationships
of power. For example, we might assume that children’s sexuality was generally
unacknowledged until Freud. 11 However, Foucault reports that eighteenth century
books on pedagogy and child medicine spoke of children’s sex constantly ‘and in
every possible context.’ 12 The intention of these texts may have been to quell
children’s sexuality, but their effect was to communicate to parents that their child’s
sexuality ‘constituted a fundamental problem in terms of their parental educational
responsibilities.’13 Further, children were led to believe that ‘their relationship with
their own bodies and their own sex was to be a fundamental problem.’14 As a result,
the bodies of children became sexualised, parents became vigilant in surveillance of
the peril of infantile sexuality, and the whole domain of the family and household
became sexualised.15 ‘In appearance, we are dealing with a barrier system; but in fact
all around the child, indefinite lines of penetration were exposed.’16 ‘Sexuality’ is,
therefore, ‘a far more positive product of power than power was ever a repression of
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sexuality.’ 17 It is not repressed by juridical power, but constructed and controlled
within more insidious and effective networks of power.
Viewing power as productive and dispersed focuses attention how subjects and
objects are formed within relationships of power. This is quite a different approach to
that based on repressive notions of power that tend to presuppose the existence of
social meanings and phenomena. Like childhood sexuality, our affective and
relationship lives are not simply repressed by traditional ideology or patriarchy, but
are shaped, constructed, and penetrated by a dense network of power relationships, not
easily dispersed by unitary claims for liberation.

3.1.4 Power does not stand apart from knowledge
A central theme of Foucault’s analysis of power relationships is how they are related
to, and affected by, scientific knowledge. In his view, mechanisms of power produce
forms of knowledge, which, in turn, both produce new mechanisms of power and reenforce its exercise. He urges rejection of the ‘great myth’ that:
If there is knowledge it must renounce power. Where knowledge and science are
found in their pure truth there can no longer be any political power.18
Knowledge, from Foucault’s perspective, is never separate from the need that created
it; it does not float above as a manifestation of pure reason and never functions
separately from power. We must admit, he urges:
that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it
serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge
directly imply one another; that there is no power relations without the correlative
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constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose
and constitute at the same time power relations.19
Foucault demonstrates in his historical studies that the pursuit of knowledge is
always driven by specific aims formulated within power relationships. Once acquired,
knowledge is applied for purposes fixed upon by mechanisms of power. For example
in The Will to Knowledge, Foucault identifies two domains within which knowledge
about sex was sought in the nineteenth century, ‘a biology of reproduction’ and ‘a
medicine of sex.’20 Medical practice aimed to ensure ‘the physical vigour and moral
cleanliness of the social body’ and ‘to eliminate defective individuals, degenerate and
bastardized populations.’ 21 In pursuit of this aim, medicine ‘established an entire
pornography of the morbid’ 22 concerning itself with ‘aberrations, perversions,
exceptional oddities.’23 Under cover of scientific language, medical knowledge linked
sex to the transmission of ‘an imaginary dynasty of evils destined to be passed on for
generations,’ 24 subordinating itself to the imperatives of a dominant morality.
Biological explanations of plant and animal reproduction, on the other hand,
developed according to scientific normativity, but were ignored by medics. Biology
presented one version of reality, but medicine, chose, or constructed a picture of
‘reality’ that reflected the moral concerns of the time. Whilst not disputing that it is
possible to produce objective statements about social phenomena, Foucault believes
that it is necessary to pay attention to how these facts are both created and deployed
within relationships of power. For example, empirical sociology has increasingly been
used by lawyers to ground claims for legal change, a number of such studies were
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discussed in chapter two. These attempt to direct the exercise of political power
according to sociological ‘truths,’ but the empirical studies are often carried out with
particular aims. Questioning married and cohabiting people about whether they are
satisfied with their relationships presupposes a politically useful answer.25
Reconceptualising law within productive networks of power draws attention to its
value as a form of knowledge, which can present itself as objective and beyond power.
The judicial reasoning paradigm assumes that an objective outcome is possible to any
given legal question,26 and this veneer of objectivity is often assumed by other forms
of legal knowledge, such as the opinions of prominent lawyers, or Law Reform
Commissions.27 Legislators, somewhat paradoxically, often defer to legal expertise. It
is important therefore to examine how, why, and by whom legal knowledge is
produced, how it asserts its authority, and its potential for disqualifying other forms of
knowledge or expertise. In chapter six, I discuss how legal constructions of marriage
were formulated in response to political campaigns, and deployed by government in
identifying ‘marriage saving’ as a political objective. Legal expertise supported
political objectives, and acted to both construct and provide solutions to social
problems.
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3.1.5 Power, knowledge and truth.
Knowledge is a claim to truth, psychiatrists claim to speak the truth about mental
illness, medicine makes truth claims about human physiology, and religion aims to
speak wider truths. Foucault called these types of claim ‘discourses of truth,’28 noting
how power is not limited by social contract or legal limitations, but by these discourses
of truth that both produce, and are produced, by power. Relationships of power are
entered into and exercised on the basis of a set of common assumptions and beliefs,
power cannot function without truth, and truth cannot exist without power:
After all, we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks, and destined to live
and die in certain ways by discourses that are true, and which bring with them
specific truth effects.29
In other words, within every relationship of power there must be, at some level, a
common understanding of the issues at stake. These common understandings form the
boundaries to power that both depend upon and re-inscribe common beliefs and
assumptions.
In a society such as ours multiple relations of power traverse, characterise and
constitute the social body; they are indissociable from a discourse of truth and they
can neither be established nor function unless a true discourse it produced,
accumulated, put into circulation and set to work.30
Knowledge production thus aims to expand the boundaries to power by adding to the
stock of true discourses available to relationships of power, and power seeks to expand
discourses on truth by seeking new forms of knowledge. The question of truth, and its
pursuit, is therefore the essence of the connection between power and knowledge.
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3.2 Power/Knowledge Configurations
Foucault suggests two specific historical configurations of the relationship between
power and knowledge that have acted to produce domains of intervention and methods
for exercising power. They emerge in sequence, both in his writing and in historical
time, and, he contends, have gradually eclipsed the importance of juridical ‘powerover’ in the modern State. He calls these modes of power, disciplinary power and biopower, although he sometimes describes the former as a pole or part of the latter.31

3.2.1 Disciplinary Power
Foucault’s work on the penal system, Discipline and Punish, contains his most
comprehensive exposition of disciplinary power and the ‘disciplinary society’ it
supports. 32 Discipline and Punish is an historical investigation of the ‘forms of
knowledge from which the power to punish derived its basis, justification and rules.’33
Rather than explaining the historical movement from punishment by torture and public
display to (comparatively) benign imprisonment in terms of the development of a more
humane and civilised society,34 Foucault finds that prison replaced torture because its
systems of confinement and discipline corresponded with the relationship between
power and knowledge that existed within an emerging ‘disciplinary society.’35
With the expansion of scientific knowledge, criminals became more than their
crime, and were judged not only on their actions, but ‘by all of those notions that have
circulated between medicine and jurisprudence since the nineteenth century.’ 36
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Clinical diagnoses served to define an individual, to take hold of an offender’s soul,
transposing a transgression of the legal code into a criminal identity.37 It was no longer
enough to ask whether a criminal act had been committed and was punishable. Rather,
the causal process that produced it, the origin of the perpetrator, the appropriate
response, and the possibility of rehabilitation all required examination. ‘A whole set
of assessing (sic), diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments concerning the
criminal [became] lodged in the framework of penal judgment.’38 The result was that:
Today, criminal justice functions and justifies itself only by this perpetual
reference to something other than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in nonjuridical systems. Its fate is to be redefined by knowledge.39
As knowledge defined the criminal individual, power sought to re-form him
through incarceration and disciplinary techniques, techniques designed by the social
and psychological sciences. Similar systems of training and control were deployed by
the military, in schools, monasteries, and workplaces, where they aimed to produce
efficiency and practised, ‘docile’ bodies.

40

Disciplinary techniques acted on

individuals, requiring them to perform in specific, scientifically determined ways.41
They were ordered into classrooms, battalions, factory floors; they were time-tabled,
marched in rhythm, directed as to correct deportment. Soldiers and schoolchildren,
like prisoners were not only required to follow programs of behaviour, they were
obliged to internalise specific modes of being.
Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards
individual both as objects and instruments of its exercise.42
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A further important element of power in the disciplinary mode is that it necessitates
surveillance, it:
presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in
which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in
which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied
clearly visible.43
The ‘perfect disciplinary apparatus … would make it possible for a single gaze to see
everything constantly.’44 Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison in which all prisoners
could be observed from a central tower, but would not know whether or not they were
being observed (thus ensuring maximum effect with minimum prison manpower) is
offered by Foucault as an example of the pursuit of maximum efficiency in
observation.45 It also served as a metaphor for the operation of disciplinary power:
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of
power…Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and
unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall
outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate
must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be
sure that he may always be so.46
Disciplinary technologies spread throughout society at the end of the eighteenth
century, with existing institutions and pre-existing authorities deploying them for
particular ends. Eventually, disciplinary mechanisms were adopted ‘by State
apparatuses who’s major, if not exclusive function is to assure that discipline reigns
over society as a whole.’47 Thus, a ‘disciplinary society’ was formed when disciplinary
techniques escaped from enclosed domains into ‘an indefinitely generalizable
mechanism of “panopticism”’48
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Power in its disciplinary mode is thus productive, informed by expertise and put
into effect by specific techniques, themselves informed by, and productive of,
scientific knowledge. Methods of social control are designed to achieve specific
outcomes, and compliance is ensured through systems of surveillance that aim for
automatic docility leading to perfect social order. This disciplinary utopia was never
achieved, but neither were disciplinary techniques discarded, and Foucault’s
observations regarding the dangers of a surveillance society remain relevant today.49

3.2.2 Bio-power
In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault begins to draw connections between mechanisms
of power operating on individuals, and those operating at a society-wide level. He uses
the term ‘bio-power’ to describe power relationships that aim both to administer
individual bodies, and to strategically manage life itself.50 Bio-power connects forms
of power exercised over individuals to political concerns, drawing attention to how
individual conduct is related to issues of national policy. 51 Foucault maintains that
with increased scientific knowledge about how life could be optimised using better
agricultural techniques, improved public health, and control of sexuality, ‘methods of
power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to
control and modify them.’52 Life itself became the subject of political strategies, and

Foucault’s own work however moved on. He remarked in 1978 in relation to discipline:
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modern man became ‘an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being
in question.’53
Foucault develops the connection between individual life and the concerns of
politics in the lecture course, Security Territory Population.54 He notes that, in the
sixteenth century, population was a measure of a State’s strength; a large population
produced a large army, busy markets and populated towns. By the eighteenth century,
with the increased use of censuses and other forms of statistical information gathering,
the population attained a density, no longer a collection of individuals, but a set of
phenomena displaying patterns and trends that were responsive to social, economic,
and physical circumstance. These phenomena (birth rates, death rates, the occurrence
of famines and epidemics), despite a degree of circumstantial variation, were shown
through statistical analysis, to have their own regularities or ‘natural’ characteristics.
In order to govern populations, as opposed to sovereign territories, it became necessary
to manage and optimise this regularity or ‘naturalness:’
If one says to a population ‘do this,’ there is not only no guarantee that it will do
it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it.55
The objective of those responsible for government shifted, from commanding the
obedience of individuals in the sixteenth century, to managing the regularity of groups
in the eighteenth.
[T]he population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as a
collection of subject wills who must obey the sovereign’s will through the
intermediary of regulations laws, edicts, and so on. It will be considered as a set
of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these
processes.56
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Choices must be made regarding how ‘naturalness’ is measured, the type of data
gathered and how it is to be analysed; choices that depend on social and scientific
knowledge, moral imperatives, and on occasion pure chance. Once information is
gathered and analysed, conclusions can be drawn about what is ‘normal’ for the
phenomenon in question. The primary objective of government then becomes the
maximisation of this normality: ‘[t]he normal comes first and the norm is deduced
from it.’57
Foucault’s lecture course, Society Must be Defended, focuses on this objective: the
attainment of ‘an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole
[population] from internal dangers.’58 Bio-political mechanisms aim to:
establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and
compensate for variations with this general population and its aleatory field. In a
word security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element
inherent in a population so as to optimize a state of life.59
Bio-politics takes control of life and the biological processes of man, ‘ensuring that
they are not disciplined, but regularized.’60 This is not a straightforward objective: it
requires information, a method for identifying ‘normality’ and a set of ‘techniques and
procedures for directing human behaviour.’ 61 Power and knowledge remain intertwined, as in a disciplinary society, but new methods of control become necessary.
Sovereign command is inadequate, so too are spatially limited disciplinary
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mechanisms.62 Securing normalising aims within a population requires techniques that
are ‘enlightened, reflective, analytical, calculated and calculating.’63

3.2.3 Bio-power and marriage
Marriage is a social practice that has meaning for individuals. This meaning is
constructed, not only by the legal concept ‘marriage,’ but also through a network of
power relationships involving family, religious, economic, and emotional concerns.64
Its position at the centre of a network of social power relationships means that when
government wants to obtain something from the population, it looks to the marital
couple and its correlate, the marriage-based family.65 The State does not enforce the
performance of marriage; rather marriage is a point of transfer between individual and
political interests. Thus in Ireland following independence, marriage was used as a
relay for government, and social and other government services were mediated
through it. Marriage was largely taken for granted as a social institution.
Beginning in the 1960s, following an expansion in social services, problems with
marriage began to emerge. Available knowledge that constructed marriage as the
foundation of a stable society, led politics to become concerned with protecting it.66
Later, scientific knowledge was produced which supported this objective, and offered
methods for achieving it, such as counselling, mediation, and legal regulation. 67
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Methods of power and knowledge thus assumed responsibility for the relationship
practices of the population, and undertook to control and modify them.
Foucault contends that once the population becomes the object of political strategy
and human processes its subject, government becomes a process of managing the
regularity of groups. In order to achieve this, choices must be made regarding what is
natural or normal social behaviour, and the objective of government becomes the
maximisation of this normality. Marriage, accepted as normal social behaviour for
centuries, and representing the dominant form of family formation in Ireland, therefore
became the target of strategies designed to maximise its performance. This required
the implementation of techniques at the level of the whole population, and the State
apparatus become an inevitable part of its mode of operation. My question in relation
to marriage is, what role does law play in this process, how does law further the
objectives of politics? Foucault poses the problem of implementation, not in terms of
the State, but as a matter for ‘government.’

3.3 Securing Bio-political objectives - Government
In the lecture course Security, Territory, Population, Foucault uses the term
‘government,’ as it was understood in the sixteenth century, to describe the ways in
which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed.
There is the general problem of the government of oneself, for example ... There
is also the problem of the government of souls and of conduct ... There is the
problem of the government of children ... And then, perhaps only the last of these
problems, there is that of the government of the State by the prince. How to govern,
how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be the best
possible governor? 68
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Foucault synthesises these various forms in his definition of government as ‘the
conduct of conducts’69 using the equivocal nature of the term ‘conduct’ to express the
specificity of power relations.70 ‘Conduct’ is at the same time ‘to lead’ and way of
behaving within an open field of possibilities. The exercise of power is both ‘the
conduct of conducts’ and the management of possibilities.

71

This notion of

government thus encompasses the many ways in which the behaviour of individuals
or groups might be directed, and draws attention to the relationship between political
government, the regulatory capacities of non-State actors and institutions, and the
capacity of individual citizens to govern themselves. 72 Foucault is particularly
interested in the relationship between the different levels of government, and in his
later work focused on ethics and self-government. 73 Of interest for my purpose,
however, is how political government directs, leads, or guides the behaviour of those
for whom it takes responsibility. I am interested in how our affective lives are managed
by political and legal techniques, how our relationship behaviour is conducted by
dispersed, yet penetrating, forms of power, and how they connect with our capacity to
govern our own behaviour.
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3.3.1 The effects of power
The analyses of family and marriage law discussed in the previous chapter consider
the exercise of power and authority through legal instruments to be problematic and
requiring careful examination, a perspective shared by this thesis. Most employ a
vocabulary of critique built upon oppositions between the State and civil society that
equate legal instruments and processes with the unilateral exercise of power by a
sovereign body over a subjugated populace. Within this frame, marriage law and the
obligations and processes it creates is a mechanism of social control imposed by a
calculating and controlling State upon its resistant, but in the end largely submissive
citizens. Power is conceptualised as something above or beyond familial relationships,
a mechanism that aims to modify or disturb them. Foucault’s concepts of bio-power
and government provide a more nuanced characterisation of the way in which power
actually functions to order individual lives.74
Foucault is not simply concerned with descriptions of how power operates. He
seeks, like the authors discussed in chapter two, to critique its exercise. His 1974-75
lecture course, Abnormal, focuses on the power effects of discipline and bio-power
and their implications for individual lives.75 These positive forms of power supersede
‘the mode of exclusion’ and its implication of repression:
We pass from a technology of power that drives out, excludes, banishes
marginalizes, and represses, to a fundamentally positive power that fashions,
observes, knows, and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects.76

Foucault remarks ‘There are not family type relationships and then, over and above
them, mechanisms of power; there are not sexual relationships with, in addition, mechanisms
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76
Michel Foucault, Abnormal, 48.
74

105

‘Repression is only a lateral and secondary effect of this positive power, a power put
in place, in its modern form, by apparatuses of “discipline-normalisation.”’77 Thus,
Foucault does not deny that individuals and groups can be opressed by normalising or
bio-political forms of power. Nonetheless, this is not their primary mode of operation.
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows how expert knowledge created the
criminal individual. In Abnormal he focuses on how expertise aimed ‘to show how the
individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it.’78 Using the figure
of the masturbating child to represent the object of normalising power, Foucualt shows
how this abnormal individual is constructed and then controlled by relationships of
power. Extensive systems of surveillance are required to identify the deviant
individual and techniques of power are deployed to contain her deviance. A division
in made between normality and abnormality creating, not exclusion, but a justification
for intervention. 79 In the domain of relationship behaviour, the deployment of
normalising power might therefore be expected to create ‘abnormal’ individuals,
generate justifications for intervening in their lives, and techniques intended to identify
and modify them. This power effect is exemplified by the history of Irish marriage
law. The 1980s and 1990s political aim of ‘marriage saving’ both produced, and was
produced by, knowledge identifying (lifetime, heterosexual, monogamous, gendered)
marriage as normal relationship behaviour. In identifying normal behaviour, a picture
of abnormality also emerged. The abnormal were not excluded, rather their
abnormality provided a justification for intervention, and the creation of techniques
designed to modify their behaviour. Thus, divorce law was intended to facilitate the
rehabilitation of those who failed at marriage, so that they might enter new, more
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successful, marriages.

80

Counselling and mediation were deployed to assist

individuals in difficulty so that they could either save or reconstruct normality
following the failure of their interpersonal relationships. Central to these techniques
was the facility for individuals to measure and modify their own behaviour, connecting
their aspirations with those of government. In constructing a picture of normality,
power also installed a network of mechanisms designed, like the panoptican, to
facilitate self- regulation in accordance with the objectives of government.

3.3.2 Government, bio-power, and the legislative process
If the State is not a source of power, and power is not a commodity, it follows that
legislative instruments, produced by State institutions, are neither a source, nor an
instrument, of power. They are, rather, an effect, a manifestation, of the coalescence
of relationships of power. Legislative instruments cannot be fully described by
reference to juridical theories of power because, although a particular law may act to
oppress a particular category of persons at a particular time, this oppression could not
exist without a multitude of power relationships, operating at all levels of society to
sustain it. The process by which legislation is produced, and its effects, are the primary
focus of this thesis. Foucault’s concepts of bio-bower and government suggest an
analytic strategy focused on diagnosing the power relationships within which law
reform occurs. His description of abnormality focuses attention on the potential effects
of the deployment of normalising or bio-political forms of power.
Before considering how the process of marriage law reform in Ireland might be
analysed through the lens of Foucault’s bio-politics and government, I review some
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literature that discusses the relationship between Foucault’s work and ‘law,’ and some
work pointing towards a methodological approach to the analysis of legal phenomena.

3.4 ‘Law’ and Foucault.
Initial attempts to explore the relationship between Foucault’s work and law led to the
conclusion that he expels the law from modernity. Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham
claim that:
the primary theme that emerges from Foucault’s treatment of the origins of the
modern State and disciplinary society is one which casts law into the role of a premodern harbinger of absolutism.81
Their view is based on Foucault’s use of the word ‘law’ to describe juridical forms of
power. As discussed in chapter two, it was not Foucault’s intention to equate the
concepts ‘juridical’ and ‘law.’ The term ‘juridical power’ refers to a theory of
law/power approximating to that of John Austin.82 Although Hunt and Wickham do
recognise that Foucault occasionally posits a more complex view of legal mechanisms,
drawing ‘attention to the interaction of disciplinary practices and their legal
framework,’ 83 their analysis is of little assistance in exploring the path of Irish
marriage law reform. More recently, there have been two substantive attempts to
construct a foucauldian jurisprudence, or theory of law. Francis Ewald defines law in
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terms of ‘the norm,’84 and Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick describe a responsive, and
ultimately content-less, law.85
3.4.1 Law and ‘the norm’
Ewald begins with Foucault’s, very brief, equation of law with the norm in The Will
to Knowledge. Foucault remarks that:
Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the growing
importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical
system of the law.86
Using this statement as a starting point Ewald asks; ‘what is the place of law? Is a
theory or practice of law articulated around the norm possible?’ The norm, he explains,
is ‘a measurement and a means of producing a common standard,’87 and whilst in a
disciplinary society it acts locally, with the development of modern forms of social
government it operates at the level of the population as a whole.
Ewald explains his understanding of the norm, and the concept of normalisation,
by reference to techniques of insurance, or risk-management. Insurance, he notes, is
necessarily concerned with norms; it is only from an appreciation of what is normal
that risk can be ascertained. A risk is not simply a specific event that has occurred or
might occur, rather, it is a way of dealing with certain events that might affect
particular groups of people. Risk is produced by naming it, making it visible and
comprehensible where an individual might otherwise only see the hazards of their
particular existence. Risk gives objective status to otherwise personally experienced
events by giving them a statistical reality. Statistics that plot the normal, and the events
outside its parameters, give individual reality to misfortunes that happen to someone
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else. This reality does not need to call on a more comprehensive system of
understanding or interpreting the world; it can rely on its own materiality, and the more
often a particular event occurs, the more real it becomes. Thus, Ewald argues, in a
statistically measured population the characteristics of a particular individual are lost
in the standard measurements that possess a pool of numerically real human qualities.
The average, or normal person, then ‘is not an individual whose place in society is
indeterminate or uncertain; rather he is society as it sees itself objectified in the mirror
of probability and statistics.’ 88 The notion of risk allows a group to make social
judgments about itself without reference to metaphysics or morality, judgments that
reflect how society is. Risk is a social and calculable phenomenon, and insurance
socialises risk, transforming each individual into a part of the whole. Insurance is not
simply something that spreads out the cost of misfortune among a large group; it is a
justification for such distribution, based not on morality, but on a rule of justice or law.
Legal judgments traditionally attempted to discover the cause of damage and attribute
it to a particular person who would then be required to pay for it. The concepts of
insurance and risk, on the other hand, impose a new rule of justice that refers back to
the group, to a social rule that society can determine for itself.
The growth of the insurance industry in the nineteenth century corresponded, in
the industrialised world, with the expansion of social insurance and large-scale welfare
systems, creating an insurance society in which the norm takes on a function similar
to that in the insurance industry. A new relationship of power-knowledge is thus
created corresponding to Foucault’s description of bio-power, and it operates through
a process of normalisation that requires a social understanding of what is normal, a
method for measurement of normality and a set of rules of judgment. ‘Normalization
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produces not objects but procedures that will lead to some general consensus regarding
the choice of norms and standards,’89 and is essential for the creation of ‘the perfect
common language of pure communication required by industrialised society.’90 This
common language is not created by the State, but presupposes the creation of social
systems that can create a set of common standards.
Ewald’s observation regarding the correspondence between expanding social
security systems and the emergence of bio-political modes of power, is reflected in
my examination of Irish marriage law reform. Until the 1970s, the social practice of
marriage was largely considered outside the domain of politics. With the adoption by
the Irish State of a welfarist approach to government, individual risks, such as
relationship failure became social risks. As the phenomenon of spousal desertion
became statistically measurable, it took on a material reality, and the risk of its
occurrence (for women) was socialised through the social insurance system. Desertion
was no longer a misfortune that happened to someone else, it was something that could
happen to any married women, and as a result came to be seen as a socially insurable
risk. The ‘normal’ status of lifetime marriage, within which women were dependent,
was not created by the State, but government intervention in relation to desertion
presupposed its existence.91
There is one further point of particular interest raised by Ewald regarding how a
social norm might operate to influence individual behaviour. He argues that the norm
asks us to see ourselves as different from others, yet affirms our equivalence despite
infinite individual differences. Normative equality makes us all comparable but also

Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law,’ 148.
ibid, 151.
91
See chapter five,
89
90

111

allows us to make claims based on our individuality and to lead our own particular
lives:
However, despite the strength of various individual claims, no one of them can
escape the common standard. The norm is not the totality of groups forcing
constraints on individuals; rather, it is a unit of measurement, a pure relationship
without any other supports.92
Ewald is echoing Foucault’s definition of government as ‘the conduct of conduct,’ to
explain how a social law, drawing its validity from the norm, operates to manage the
behaviour of a population. Each individual, although not individually commanded,
measures herself against the norm, and although capable of acting outside it, is always
drawn to submit to its requirements. A regulatory instrument therefore, in reflecting
social judgments, provides a measure against which individuals can judge their own
behaviour. It manages their freedom by allowing transgressions that most individuals
will actively choose to avoid. This characteristic emerges clearly from my analysis of
Irish Marriage Law. Individuals are free to ignore the law, to shun marriage, to
abandon relationships at will, but social norms, reflected in legal rules, provide a
standard against which they can measure their behaviour. 93 The mere existence of
these standards means that only the most intransigent will oppose or resist them.
3.4.2 Foucault’s content-less law
Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick imagine Foucault’s law as modern substitute for
traditional notions of transcendent power.94 The task of jurisprudence is to describe
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both what law is and what it should be, often producing universal descriptions of the
phenomenon known as ‘law.’ Golder and Fitzpatrick adopt this universalist approach
setting law apart, outside or antecedent to the operation of power, 95 imputing to
Foucault a ‘general theory of ethics, alterity, and justice.’ 96 Although ostensibly
operating within the philosophical register, Golder and Fitzpatrick, like Hunt and
Wickham, accept Foucault’s work as a sociological description of modernity. In their
version of Foucault’s modernity, law fills the space left by the modern lack of sacred
or transcendent grounds upon which absolute claims to truth and justice can be made.97
The rules of the modern game are set by law following a process of negotiation, which
includes accounting for ‘an as yet unimagined and unimaginable future, with new
ways of being, of being otherwise.’98 Law has become a necessary part of the modern,
contingent social world.
Foucault’s law, through its futural opening to and for society, through its
responsiveness, is the truth of the social bond ... law as the truth of the social bond,
or our being-with each other, must be a mobile and contingent truth.99
Golder and Fitzpatrick echo Ewald’s claim for a social law with no necessary content
that is open to the normalising forces at work in society. However, they also touch
upon the privileged position of law as a site for social contestation. Law, and in
particular the politics of law reform, provides a forum around which juridical
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oppositions or political positions can be articulated.100 The potential mobility of law’s
truth makes its continual contestation both necessary and inevitable, embedding law
deep within the politics of truth.
Legal formulations are central to how we contest the conditions of our social
existence in the present. Human rights-based claims are the discursive paradigm of
choice for most present-day activist campaigns. Law, constitutional and human rights
law in particular, is undoubtedly represented as ‘the truth of our social bond’ at the
level of politics.101 Golder and Fitzpatrick’s analysis is therefore useful in its account
of the continued importance of the juridical form in the modern State, but like Ewald,
in universalising ‘law’ as a transcendent phenomenon, provide little of assistance in
identifying the role of legal rules, institutions, and processes in bio-political systems
of governance. Indeed, early in their text they reject the possibility that law takes any
part in the process of government, stating that such an idea conceptualises law as ‘the
pliant instrument of a tactical administration.’102

3.4.3 Governing through law – focus on method
Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde use Foucault’s definition of government, in
combination with his methodological approach, to develop potential forms of legal
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intelligibility outside the juridical framework. They begin by rejecting the notion that
‘law’ has a fixed or identifiable meaning, arguing that there is:
no such thing as “The Law.” Law, as a unified phenomenon governed by certain
principles is a fiction. This fiction is the creation of the legal discipline of legal
textbooks, of jurisprudence itself, which is forever seeking the differentia specifica
that will unify and rationalize the empirical diversity of legal sites, legal concepts,
legal criteria of judgement, legal personnel, legal discourses, legal objects and
objectives.103
The place of ‘law’ in Foucault’s work is therefore, in a very foucauldian manner,
neatly sidestepped. The question, they contend, is not ‘what is law?’ but ‘how is
law.’ 104 The unity of law cannot be assumed nor can its power or role in society.
Rather, the ‘legal complex’ must be investigated in terms of the role it plays in
strategies of regulation.
Rose and Valverde suggest that the concepts of bio-power and government can
facilitate an analysis that decentres and fragments law. Focus can then shift to the
relationships of power within which the legal complex is embedded, or more precisely
it becomes possible to adopt:
an analytical focus upon the formulation and functioning of rationalized and selfconscious strategies that seek to achieve objectives or avert dangers by acting in a
calculated manner upon the individual and collective conduct of persons.105
They propose the use of history, in particular the history of problematisations - the
ways ‘experience is offered to thought in the form of a problem requiring attention,’106
- to investigate the legal complex from the perspective of government. Such an

Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde ‘Governed by Law?’ (1998) (7) Social and Legal
Studies 541, 544.
104
Recalling Foucault’s retort to Noam Chomsky’s question, ‘Why are you interested in
Politics?’ He replied ‘I refused to answer because it seems evident to me, but perhaps your
question was, how am I interested in it?’ The exchange took place during a televised debate
between the two in 1971. Chomsky has provided a transcription of the debate on his website
at <http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm> Last accessed 8 June 2014. The debate
is available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8> last accessed 8 June
2014.
105
Rose and Valverde ‘Governed by Law?’ 544.
106
ibid, 545.
103

115

investigation would analyse the role of legal mechanisms in strategies of regulation,
removing law’s privilege and the power attributed to law by constitutional theory.107
This form of analysis also facilitates exploration of how law functions within a
network of normalizing power relationships, and in particular how it produces and reenforces social rules of inclusion and exclusion.108
Focusing their attention on how non-legal forms of knowledge can infiltrate legal
processes, Rose and Valverde examine the ‘plurality of different forms of expertise
have attached themselves to the institutions and procedures of the law.’ 109 My
exploration of Irish marriage law, however, suggests that legal expertise and
categories have permeated deep into non-legal domains, influencing social policy,
healthcare, employment practices and how we view our own relationships. In 1970s
Ireland, the legal status ‘married’ had far-reaching implications and this remains the
case today.110 Marital status affects an individual’s progress through life, but it is also
how that progress is measured and translated into expertise by sociologists,
government agencies, psychologists and the medical profession. The exercise of
power through the ‘legal complex’ therefore involves the assimilation of non-legal
knowledge into legal processes, and the deployment of legal knowledge within other
modes of social control.
A methodologically orientated approach to law is also suggested by Hugh
Baxter.111 Like Rose and Valverde, he draws attention to the importance of expertise
in the process of constituting and transforming power relationships, but he also notes
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that law both produces, and is a product of, power relationships. Of particular interest
in Baxter’s analysis is his observation that viewing law through a foucauldian lens
facilitates an analysis of legal rules and processes, but also of how law is deployed
politically as a form of expertise. 112 This observation is of particular relevance in
relation to the deployment of human-rights or constitutionally based, juridical,
arguments by those who seek to extend the boundaries of what is considered ‘normal’
in our society. Baxter does not develop this point, but it is carefully made by Samuel
Moyn in relation to international human rights discourse.113
Moyn notes that human rights have come to imply ‘an agenda for improving the
world, and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each individual will enjoy
secure international protection.’114 This is an unmistakably juridical/legal discourse, a
calling in aid of an international legal order that commands the world to provide a
better life for the victimised. ‘Human rights in this sense have come to define the most
elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities – State and
interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.’115 As Moyn points out in relation to
the global position, the rights discourse, as we know it today, was born, not at some
point in ancient history, but in the 1970s.116 At a European level, rights were recast as
entitlements that might challenge the sovereign nation State, in contrast to their earlier
formulation, reflected in the Irish Constitution, as central to the construction of the
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nation State.117 The emergence of an understanding of human rights transcending the
power of the State emerged in Ireland, as in the rest of the western world, in the 1970s
and became one element of the ‘legalisation’ of interpersonal relationships. The
imperative to assert the right to equality, to freedom of conscience, the rights of the
child, inevitably cast marriage and the family into a legal mould, setting the paradigm
for management of relationship behaviour. This privileged legal knowledge created
the need for power to attend to women, children, and failed relationships in order to
protect individual rights. In this sense law in its internationalised human rights mode,
acts as a form of knowledge, like risk in the insurance industry identifying and making
real the categories of persons whose rights are liable to violation – the vulnerable
dependent woman, or the child victim of marriage breakdown. It also, like risk,
provides a justification for intervention, based not on morality but on a rule of justice
or law.
3.4.4 Exploding Foucault’s law?
An approach to analysis capable of identifying the various ways in which ‘law’ is
implicated in the government of lives is thus necessary – the category ‘law’ must be
exploded and decentred in order to fully interrogate how our relationships practices
are governed and the role played by marriage law. Five principle theoretical precepts
or directions can be drawn from Foucault’s work and explorations of the relationship
between it and ‘the legal complex.’ First, it is necessary to shift focus from ‘the Law’
to the history of problems in order that the role of ‘the legal complex’ in strategies of
governmental regulation can be investigated. Foucault holds that power is a
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relationship instigated for a purpose. If we wish to understand its operation, therefore,
we need to focus on how, and for what purpose, its deployment becomes necessary.
Law reform is generally a response to social problems. In order to identify how
legislation is implicated in relationships of power, we must begin with the impetus for
reform. The first move in analysing marriage law, therefore, is to examine how social
(marriage) behaviour was categorised as problematic. Once a problem has been
identified, those responsible for government will attempt to find solutions. In relation
to marriage, the problems were not always legal, but the responses often were. By
examining why particular solutions were chosen

and the networks of

power/knowledge that made them possible, we can begin to identify ways of thinking
and knowing about marriage at particular moments in time. The second question for
consideration is, therefore, how solutions to social difficulties are formulated at the
level of government.
Foucault argues that, in the modern State, social behaviour is controlled, not by
command, but through techniques intended to lead or guide the conduct of the
population. By focusing on these techniques, including legal techniques, we can begin
to see law’s role in achieving the bio-political objectives of government. The third
focus of investigation is therefore on the techniques, including legal techniques
deployed to manage social behaviour. Social policy plays a significant role in shaping
the possibilities available to individuals in making choices about how they live. Before
1970, married women were excluded from the workforce, and the regulation of the
social domain was mediated through marriage. Women’s relationship choices were
therefore severely restricted as post-marriage life was, from a practical perspective,
impossible. It is important, therefore, to examine other political techniques that shape
the choices available to individuals in order to determine the effect of legal rules.
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Political techniques, when deployed in pursuit of normalising objectives, operate
both to construct normality and to identify abnormality. Foucault contends that in so
doing, political mechanisms install a detailed machinery around those unable to
conform to the normative position, acting not to compel the performance of ‘normal’
relationships, but to observe, know, and potentially re-form non-standard behaviours.
In ascertaining the political strategies in which marriage law is implicated, therefore,
it is necessary to examine the effects of marriage law, both in constructing normality
and managing abnormality.
Social and economic context is crucial to understanding how problems arise,
solutions are formulated, and how specific operations of government are connected to
wider strategies of regulation. The actual effect of marriage law depends on the social
context within which it is deployed, and its strategic purpose is often connected to
political objectives that are largely unrelated to the problems of individual citizens.
The final, fifth, area of investigation is therefore the contextual environment within
which marriage law reform occurred. In the next section I relate these five avenues of
investigation to the principle research objectives introduced in chapter one.

3.5 Analysing Marriage Law
3.5.1 Objective one – governed by marriage law?
Foucault’s work offers a potential system of intelligibility for how we are governed
by marriage law. One objective of this research is to challenge the systems of thought
that assume that the legal regulation of relationship behaviour can bring about social
equality and justice. In order to achieve this, Foucault’s concepts of bio-power and
government are employed to describe how we are, in fact, governed by marriage law.
This involves an examination, as set out above, of:
(a) How relationship behaviour is identified as a problem for politics.
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(b) How solutions are formulated to these problems at the level of government.
(c) The techniques deployed in their solution, including legal and other
strategies that act upon the self-governing capacities of individuals and
groups.
(d) The power effects of these strategies.
(e) The social and economic conditions, and policy frameworks, within which
legal reforms are enacted and implemented.
The research period (1945 – 2010) is divided into four temporal divisions within which
each of these questions are addressed. The choice of temporal divisions and data is
explained in chapter four.
3.5.2 Objective two – the role of marriage law
I also aim to question our taken for granted assumptions about the role of ‘the legal
complex’ in our intimate and familial lives by suggesting that marriage law is a
political technique that supports the normalising objectives of government by
conducting conformity in relationship behaviour. This theoretical position is drawn
from Foucault’s work, and the normalising objective of marriage law is well supported
by the empirical examination detailed above. Less obvious at the outset, was the
connection between the path of marriage law reform and shifts in how the process of
government was rationalised over the research period. My conclusions in relation to
the second question thus emerged from the broad contextualisation of how the social
domain was governed over the research period.
Keynesian economic policy, adopted by Ireland in the late 1950s, 118 aimed to
produce economic growth predicated on social stability. European monetarist policies,
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adopted in the 1990s,119 had a similar objective, but the accompanying social inclusion
policies were more comprehensive and interventionist. As social practice moved away
from marriage, government acted to ensure social stability through the promotion of
stable, but not necessarily marriage-based, families. Social science supported this
objective by identifying other ways of living, and their capacity to form the basis of
productive family life. The promotion of social, and hence, economic stability was
achieved through the ‘conduct of conduct,’ positing an optimal social outcome and
leading or guiding individual citizens toward it. In the Irish context, the normalising
strategy of government in respect of marriage was clear throughout the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, when the stated political objective of marriage law was to save marriage
(in its Constitutional form). The objective was less clear in the 2000s, but the effect of
marriage law was the same – an optimal relationship form was identified and a detailed
apparatus installed with the purpose of bringing as many people as possible as close
as possible to it. Further, as predicted by Foucault, the existence of a normative form
of relationship produced a justification for intervention in the lives of those unable or
unwilling to conform, and the development of a set of modification techniques
intended to re-form them. The role of marriage law in managing the Irish population
over the research period thus emerges as conducting conformity in relationship
behaviour for the purpose of promoting social, and hence economic, stability.

3.6 Conclusion
Foucault, unlike most legal scholars, conceptualises power as a relationship of force
instigated for a purpose. He contends that power does not reside in the State but at all
levels of society acting to both shape and produce reality. Knowledge, whether legal
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or scientific, does not stand outside power but is integral to its exercise, acting to create
common assumptions and beliefs that facilitate power’s operation. This formulation
of power has significant implications for how we conceptualise the exercise of
political power through legal mechanisms. It is no longer adequate to say that we are
oppressed by a stockpile of power residing in the State. We must look at how
relationships of power arise, the forms of knowledge sought and deployed, and in
particular, how those subjected by power are also implicated in its exercise.
Foucault draws attention to a number of specific historical configurations of the
relationship between power and knowledge. His description of bio-power is of most
relevance to my investigation of marriage law. Bio-power, the principle form of power
exercised in the modern State, aims to take control of life, attempting to regularise it
using available knowledge and techniques that are ‘enlightened, reflective, analytical,
calculated and calculating.’120 Marriage as a social practice has existed for millennia,
carrying social meaning and acting as a point of transfer between individual interests
and those of the State. It is therefore to be expected that power would attempt to
regularise its practice. Foucault’s work suggests that this occurs at the level of the
State through a process of government understood as ‘the conduct of conduct.’
Individuals are not commanded to behave in particular ways; rather they are directed
and guided by techniques that act on their freedom, connecting with their selfgoverning capacities. This process of government is problematic because it constructs
a picture of optimal behaviour in accordance with available knowledge and seeks to
bring as many people as possible as close as possible to this optimal or normative
position. In so doing, it also constructs abnormal individuals and behaviours,
providing justifications for intervention and the installing of mechanisms of control
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around those unable or unwilling to conform. The ability of individuals to regulate
their own social behaviour in accordance with social norms is also implicated.
Using the concepts of bio-power and government to examine legislative reform of
the legal rules governing marriage involves consideration of how legal rules and
mechanisms are implicated in conducting social behaviour. It is inadequate to say that
we are commanded by law to behave in particular ways; rather the relationships of
power within which legal rules emerge and are implemented must be examined to
ascertain how they operate to govern social behaviour. The next chapter sets out how
this is achieved using a genealogical approach to history and foucauldian discourse
analysis. As this methodology differs significantly from that generally adopted within
the legal academy, the chapter begins by locating my approach within a wider
taxonomy of legal research.
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Four - Method

More than thirty years ago, Richard Posner described three main types of legal
scholarship.1 His first classification, doctrinal analysis, involves the clarification of
legal doctrine in its own terms. This traditional approach:
involves the careful reading and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to
identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases,
developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the
characteristic skills of legal analysis.2
In order to carry out this form of research, lawyers do not need to know any other
discipline, and the research output is valid once well-reasoned, and in accordance with
legal doctrine. The second type of scholarship identified by Posner is positive analysis
of law according to the methods of social science, including history. This includes
economic analysis of law, and the application of methods drawn from sociology,
political science, or history to explain features of the legal system. 3 Posner’s final
category, ‘the new normativism,’4 uses the social sciences and humanities, particularly
philosophy, to evaluate legal doctrine, making suggestions for how it can be improved.
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Posner surmises that other than doctrinal scholarship, this is perhaps the most
comfortable for lawyers, because the identification of anomalies and matters in need
of reform is an integral part of the doctrinal system taught at universities.5 It differs
from doctrinal research, however, in that it reaches outside the legal system for new
issues to analyse. In this category, Posner places advocates of natural law, Marxists,
and those working on:
discrimination, including reverse discrimination, the ethical basis of contract and
tort law, just compensation in eminent domain cases, causation and intent in tort
and criminal law, and many others (references omitted).6
Within Posner’s taxonomy, many of the scholars discussed in chapter two fall into the
third category, seeking justifications for legal reform from outside the legal system. 7
Normative legal arguments based on insights from other disciplines often exploit
the ‘scientific’ aspect of social science to support their position. For example, Ann
Barlow’s deployment of empirical sociology to argue for more relationship law uses
the presumed objectivity of social research.8 In focusing on the legitimacy of political
action by reference to the external truth of sociology, her work converges with political
argument, becoming part of how law reform occurs, rather than a way to evaluate it.
In pursuing a normative objective, legal scholars engaging with other disciplines, or
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ways of thinking about social phenomena, thus, become an integral part of the
workings of politics.9
My objective is to discover how we are governed by marriage law and to identify
the role it plays in modern government This objective falls within Posner’s second
category: I aim to examine law from the perspective of another discipline. 10 In
contemporary language, this is as an objective that might fall within the disciplinary
orientation of sociology of law in that I assume law to be a social construct that must
be examined contextually.11 However, the choice of Foucault’s work as a theoretical
framework, although causing little difficulty for Posner’s categories, places my
pursuit, at best, in the margins of legal sociology.12 Sociologists in the main, seek to
produce objective findings. Although sociological researchers often hold political
perspectives that cause them to see the world differently from one and other, it is
usually accepted that the difference arises from their different viewpoints.13 Foucault’s
work, on the other hand, questions the potential for objectivity, pointing out that the
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categories upon which social science relies are in themselves representative of
particular was of thinking.
In terms of categorising my approach, therefore, I make no claim beyond Posner’s
second classification. I aim to examine law (in its broadest sense) from a foucauldian
perspective. Foucault, in remaining sceptical about the possibility of absolute truth or
objectivity, nonetheless developed a distinctive approach to examination of social
phenomena, and in this chapter, I build upon the theoretical framework developed in
chapter three to explain his methodological orientation and its relevance to Irish
marriage law. I begin by setting out my specific methodological approach in terms of
the research objectives, and explain the concepts of genealogy and discourse deployed
in analysis of source material. To complete the chapter, I discuss some other work that
has used foucauldian approaches to examine law and other social phenomena.

4.1 A Methodological Approach
4.1.1 Research aims and methods
As already discussed, my research has two principle aims:
1. To unsettle the assumption that the legal regulation of relationship behaviour
can bring about social justice and equality in the present.
2. To show that marriage law is a political technique that supports the normalising
objectives of modern government, in particular by conducting conformity in
relationship behaviour.
The first of these is an empirical objective, involving the use of historical material to
challenge present day assumptions. It is achieved by identifying how we have been
governed by marriage law in the past, demonstrating the contingent nature of marriage
and the law that regulates. I identify four historical periodizations and within each
period pose three specific questions:
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(a) How is relationship behaviour identified as a problem for politics?
(b) How are solutions formulated to those problems at the level of government?
(c) What strategies are deployed in their solution, including legal and other
strategies that act on the self-governing capacities of individuals and groups.
Two methodological tools are employed to answer these questions:
(d) Genealogy, an approach to history concerned with power.
(e) Discourse analysis, a methodological approach to research material that
determines the choice of data and how it is analysed.
The periodization was determined by the methodology deployed, therefore I explain
how the research period was divided into four intervals, following an exposition of the
methodological processes of genealogy and discourse analysis.
The second aim is theoretically driven in that it develops the findings from the
initial analysis to theorise the role of marriage law in modern forms of government. In
order to achieve this, I focus on the social and economic conditions within which law
reform took place over the research period, and the specific techniques deployed in
governing relationship life, in order to describe the power effects of marriage law. In
each historical period, therefore, I outline:
(f) The power effects of strategies (including legal strategies) deployed by
government in formulating solutions to social problems.
(g) The social and economic conditions, and policy frameworks, within which
legal reforms were enacted and implemented.
This aspect of my research is largely interpretative and therefore necessarily
subjective. I do not claim that the homogenisation of social behaviour is the sole
political rationale for the regulation of relationships, only that it is a possibility to
consider. Whilst current political discourse is pre-occupied with the potential
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exclusionary effect of heteronormative marriage law, the oppression of women or the
privatisation of care, it is worth considering that other ways to exercise control and
seek freedom are possible. Marriage law, like so many other regulatory systems, is not
inevitably bad, but it is dangerous.14

4.2 Genealogy, an Historical Methodology
4.2.1 Objective
Foucault uses history as a tool with which to question the political relevance of the
past to our understanding of the present. We generally assume that the present builds
upon the past in a linear and progressive fashion, and that past events shape the
potential of the present. Foucault’s historical studies, on the other hand, demonstrate
the contingency of both past events and present understandings, identifying the present
as ‘a time like any other time, or rather, a time which is never quite like any other.’15
Colin Gordon describes the objective of Foucault’s historical approach as the placing
of our present-day values and taken for granted assumptions on display, opening them
up to scrutiny to produce ‘a jarring account of our present as seen from elsewhere.’16
In The Will to Knowledge for example, Foucault asks how we have come to think
about sexuality in terms of categories of personages creating ‘an entire pornography
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of the morbid.’17 He demonstrates that classifications of individuals - the homosexual,
the legitimate procreative couple, and the sexual child - have no material reality but
are created by the power/knowledge relationships within which we are embedded.
History, he contends, can be used to break down the claims to truth of any system of
thought, and to demonstrate the limitations of particular ways of thinking or
institutional practices.18
Foucault uses a number of terms to describe his approach to history, archaeology,
genealogy, problematisation, history of the present. It is during his genealogical period
that he is most concerned with questions of power. In ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’
he outlines the aim of genealogy:
Nothing in man, not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis of
self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for
constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient
and continuous development must be systematically dismantled.19
Genealogy does not assume that words keep their meaning, that aims point in a single
direction or that ideas retain their logic.20 The focus of the genealogist is not on events
or progression through time, but on how meanings are produced and attached to social
subjects and objects.

4.2.3 Focus on problems
A genealogical investigation begins with specific problems that arose the past and
continue to cause difficulties in the present. Foucault uses the term ‘problematisation’
to describe the apparently a-historical phenomena investigated, and employs history
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to demonstrate their temporality and contingency. Beginning with their emergence, he
investigates how:
an unproblematic field of experience or set of practices which were accepted
without question, which were familiar and ‘silent’ out of discussion, becomes a
problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis
in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions.21
The emphasis is on how people become anxious about, and seek to act upon, particular
areas of life. Connecting this concern to the concept of government as ‘the conduct of
conduct’ provides a starting position for analysis. 22 At specific points in time,
particular problems are offered to politics for solution. Those responsible for
governing the population become aware of a new regulable domain and categories of
citizen requiring their attention. The activity of governing is called into question in
relation to a specific area of social life.23
The problematisation of marriage and the law regulating it forms the starting
position for my analysis. As discussed in chapter one, marriage was considered a social
practice outside the domain of politics in Ireland until the late 1960s. In beginning
with its emergence as a problem for government, its contingency as an object of legal
regulation becomes apparent. In 1960s Ireland, Married women, despite their separate
legal personality,24 were seen only in terms of their relationship to their husbands. The
financial difficulties experienced by women following marriage breakdown were,
therefore, assumed to result from their husbands’ acts of desertion. Their dependent
role in marriage, exclusion from the workforce, and large families were not considered
factors contributing to their indigence. In resolving the problem of female post-
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relationship poverty, government focused on a husband’s obligation to maintain his
wife, and enacted legislation providing for a legally enforceable spousal support
obligation. Marriage, therefore, emerged as a problem for the Irish government, and
marriage law as the solution to that problem because of how women’s role in
relationships was conceptualised at that particular moment in time.

4.2.4 Focus on power
Perhaps the most important element of Foucault’s approach to history for my purposes
is his concern with power. A genealogical approach to history requires careful
examination of the relationships of power that produce reality at specific points in
time. By focusing on the power/knowledge relationships that sustain hegemonic truths
it is possible to identify ‘what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in
which we think and act with regard to the “conducting” of our lives and those of
others.’25 In clarifying the taken-for-granted relationships of power within which we
are embedded, the possibility of re-imagining our present emerges free from the
assumption that the present must necessarily build upon the past. Current campaigns,
calling for the extension of marriage law to a broader range of relationships, seek to
achieve freedom for traditionally marginalised groups by building on existing
regulatory paradigms. In making clear the relationships of power that have,
historically, acted to offer marriage law as a solution to social problems, a space can
be opened within which to consider the efficacy of marriage law in solving problems
in the present.
Queer theorists adopt a similar perspective in their analysis of government action
in relation to same-sex relationships. Carl Stychin, for example, argues that the British
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Civil Partnership Act 2004, in facilitating legal recognition of same-sex relationships,
‘falls back on a traditional conception of relationships, dependence and privatisation,’
and as such is ‘an act of legal violence that delegitimises and shames that which it does
not recognise.’26 By focusing on the specific relationships of power within which the
2004 Act became the solution to the political problem of same-sex relationships,
Stychin is able to disrupt the progressive narrative associated with this type of
legislation. A similar critical stance is rarely adopted in relation to the wider
categorisation and regulation of individual relationship behaviour, although the
exclusionary effects of legal rules reach beyond the experiences of same-sex couples.
Many individuals are disadvantaged, marginalised, excluded, shamed and disciplined
by relationship regulation that aims to govern individual lives according to objectives
formulated within dominating and dominant power relationships.

4.3 Analysing Power Relationships
4.3.1 Discourse
The basic tool employed by Foucault is discourse analysis. The term ‘discourse’ in
common usage simply means speech or language, and perhaps more specifically,
conversation.

27

Discourse in foucauldian terms, however, is any concrete

manifestation of the relationship between power and knowledge existing at a particular
point in time. In order to identify power relationships it is necessary to engage in an
analysis and description of discourse. This raises three specific questions: what does
Foucault mean by the term ‘discourse’? What research material or data constitute
‘discourse’? How should collected data be analysed?
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4.3.2 What is discourse?
Discourse is used in a technical sense within a range of academic traditions. Positivists
and empiricists, for example, conceptualise discourse as the way groups present their
arguments for change or stasis. Thus, ‘traditionalists’ might frame an argument against
divorce in terms of traditional values and the protection of children. In analysing this
type of discourse, a researcher looks at how effective the particular discourse has been
in shaping social practices and government action. Realists attach material reality to
discourses as sources of power, discourse analysis then looks at how language gets its
power and transforms the material world. In Marxist theory, discourse is an ideological
system of meaning which masks the uneven distribution of wealth and power in
capitalist societies, and the aim of analysis becomes the revelation of hidden
mechanisms of power. Critical discourse analysis is also concerned with power,
examining how discourse is used by the powerful to deceive and oppress the
powerless. All of these approaches assume or argue that an objective reality exists and
that the purpose of discourse is to affect this reality in some way.28 Actions and spoken
or written words are treated as signifiers of something beyond and it is presumed:
that all that discourse happens to put into words is already found situated in that
half silence which precedes it, which continues to run obstinately underneath it,
but which it uncovers and renders quiet.29
For Foucault discourse does not describe reality, it produces reality. Discourse is
not simply a linguistic or descriptive phenomenon; it is the set of statements and
practices that systematically form the objects around which our experience of reality
is built. Discourse can therefore take the form of texts, words and speech, but action

For a comprehensive discussion of Foucault’s approach to discourse and how it differs
from other sociological and critical approaches see David Howarth, Discourse (Open
University Press 2000).
29
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306.
28
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is also discursive. How we behave and the acts we perform are concrete manifestations
of the relationships of power/knowledge within which we are embedded. In examining
the discourse on sexuality or punishment, Foucault did not look at what people said
about them in order to diagnose their meaning. Rather, he examined the language and
social practices that gave ‘sexuality’ and ‘punishment’ meaning at particular historical
moments. His aim was to understand and interpret socially produced meaning rather
than to produce objective causal explanations for social phenomena. In Foucault’s
scheme therefore, discourse is something that happens at a particular point in time, it
is an event.30
4.3.3 What research material or data constitute ‘discourse’?
Discourse is the data from which a genealogical account is constructed. In practical
terms, discursive events are texts, speech acts, and social practices that take place
within specific, temporally limited economic and political contexts. The objective of
foucauldian discourse analysis is the production of novel interpretations of events and
practices through clarification of their meaning. It achieves this by analysing how
people take decisions and articulate hegemonic projects for change.
The first objective of this research is to describe how we are governed by marriage
law. As noted in chapter two, government is ‘the conduct of conduct’ or as precisely
defined by Mitchell Dean:
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and
forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires,
aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends
and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and
outcomes.31
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In order to discover how we are governed, therefore, it is necessary to examine the
aims, objectives and practices of those responsible for governing, and to ask how they
aim to shape and work through the relationship aspirations and needs of individual
citizens. This involves the identification of regulatory categories and how they are
deployed in pursuit of political objectives, how problems and solutions are formulated
at the level of politics, and the forms of knowledge and expertise sought and utilised
in formulating regulatory strategies. The investigation therefore takes place at the level
of politics, and the material of relevance is speech acts, documentary sources and
practices of government concerned with the construction of regulatory categories, the
identification of regulable problems, and the formulation of solutions to those
problems.
The material examined, therefore includes, but is not limited to:


Oireachtas debates relating to the regulation of marriage and other
relationships.



Documents produced by or for the assistance of political government, such
as departmental reports, Law Reform Commission reports, and reports by
or for government agencies.



Policy documents produced by Government and individual political parties



Statutes and statutory instruments directly implicated in the regulation of
relationships



Statutes, statutory instruments and reports for the assistance of government
in regulatory domains that use legal relationship categories.



Government files relating to marriage law and associated domains of
government available under the 40 year rule



Judgments of the Superior Courts on marriage-related issues.
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Court’s Service of Ireland, and sociological reports analysing the family
business of the lower courts.



International treaties and conventions.



Legal textbooks and journals.



Practitioner manuals.

4.3.4 Analysing discourse.
Discourse encodes the relationship between power and knowledge that led to the
production or performance of a discursive act. For example, a public speech in
parliament by a public representative, may communicate a particular message that
could be interpreted in ideological terms. It will, however, also communicate what it
is politically possible to say at the moment it is spoken. In analysing discourse, the
researcher does not focus on the individual, and how they came to hold particular
political beliefs, but on the totality of what it is possible to say. By engaging in a pure
description of the facts of discourse, it becomes possible to identify how particular
statements or practices appear at particular times rather than others in their place.32
Discursive events represents a particular relationship between power and
knowledge, they are also subject to, and constitutive of, both power and knowledge.
The production of discourse is controlled by rules of inclusion and exclusion that
define what can be talked about and done, how and by whom. The production of
knowledge in turn affects the content of these rules, and discourse, in applying or
challenging procedures of inclusion or exclusion, reproduces both knowledge and
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power. Foucault refers to a triangle; power, knowledge, discourse in constant motion,
now re-inscribing, now effacing, constantly constructing and deconstructing. 33
For example, in 1970s Ireland, politicians in the Oireachtas spoke, often and
continuously, about the deserted wife and her vulnerability. It was both possible and
necessary for those responsible for government to conceptualise her as a financially
dependent mother in the home. This discourse on deserted wives was made possible
by the uncontested cultural knowledge (supported by powerful legal and religious
constructions of the marriage relationship) that women whose husbands’ deserted and
failed to maintain them were vulnerable. As political attention focused on these
women, government objectives were formulated using the ways of knowing about
marriage and women available at the time. These objectives focused on poverty relief,
and in turn, had power effects, re-inscribing women’s dependency, men’s role in
relation to them, and the State’s role in relieving female poverty and regulating
marriage.
Once relevant materials were assembled for the research period, I reviewed them
a number of times for the purpose of identifying themes, objects of discourse,
categorisations, problems considered and solutions offered. The relationships between
different forms of discourse were noted, how legal and political discourse were related,
how categories overlapped or diverged, the extent to which legal knowledge
influenced or shaped political concerns. The strategic objectives and practical effects
of social policy in general, and marriage law reform in particular were diagnosed from
the speech acts, legal and policy actions of those responsible for government.
Absences and silences were also noted - those issues that might be expected to feature

Michel Foucault ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’ in Graham Burchell, Colin
Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester
Wheatsheaf 1991), 56.
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in discussion but were absent. For example, the position of children was barely
considered in the 1970s and 1980s, but became increasingly important, particularly in
the 2000s.
Whilst this general direction or intention of analysis was established at the outset
and data was viewed through the lens of marriage law, the actual research output is
the result of a dynamic process of interpretation, description and reinterpretation.
Unexpected linkages emerging from the data were pursued and ideas about marriage,
women, men, children, divorce and equality were interrogated as they materialised.
The level of connectivity between discourses and the extent to which ideas about
objects and people cohered around similar ideas was quite striking. Shifts in the nature
of discourse were also relatively dramatic, and following an initial examination of the
research data four temporal divisions were made based on significant shifts in how
marriage and laws role in regulating it were attended to by politics.

4.3.5 Temporal divisions
In treating discourse as an event, rather than as a representation of something beyond,
the temporality of source material becomes very important. Discourse codes the
relationship between power and knowledge at particular points in time and a
genealogical investigation acknowledges this element in focusing on change and stasis
over time. The Irish government began making specific marriage law in the 1970s and
a major piece of marriage law reform has taken place in each of the three successive
decades, with further proposed reform mooted for 2015. I initially divided the research
data into four decades, each with a major legislative reform. However, it transpired
that although a natural division emerged at the end of the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s
were more problematic, as a major conceptual shift occurred following the
introduction of divorce. A chapter division is made, therefore, at 1997, and the final
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empirical chapter deals with the period to 2010. Chapter five examines the emergence
of marriage as a problem for government, focusing on the discursive environment
within which the decision to reform marriage law was made, and the form of
legislation enacted. Chapter six deals with the 1980s, when an attempt was made to
reform the Constitution to facilitate divorce and, following this political failure, the
Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 was enacted in order to regulate
marital breakdown. Chapter seven, investigates the period from 1990 to 1997, and
chapter eight completes the empirical section with the enactment of the Civil
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act in 2010.

4.3.6 Limitations to Data set.
I have attempted to examine all publically available documentation produced for or on
behalf of the Irish government on the subject of marriage law reform over the research
period. This was relatively straightforward for the 1960s and 1970s, when very little
was produced, but became considerably more challenging with the proliferation of
government agencies and interventions thereafter. I have not consulted documentation
produced outside Ireland, save where directly referenced in Irish material.34 In relation
to policy and law-making beyond specific marriage law, I have focused on the areas
of employment, social welfare and taxation. Thus, my analysis has an economic
emphasis that tends to diminish the effects of other policy areas, as well as the
subjective experiences of those availing of, or subject to marriage law.
Marriage and family law adjudication takes place in private,35 and most disputes
are settled without formal adjudication. I have, however, examined all publically
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The in camera rule provides that certain proceedings must be held in private. Section
45 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, provided that matrimonial causes or
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available marriage law decisions of the Irish Courts between 1970 and 2010. This, of
necessity, represents only a tiny fraction of marriage law experience. Nonetheless, my
purpose is not to fully describe the process of adjudication but to identify, from these
formal documents, intended for public consumption, what could or could not be said
or done at particular points in time. I have made significantly more use of newspaper
reports in the earlier decades, mainly because of the dearth of other material, but also
because some of these reports occurred when the in camera rule was either not used
or not enforced.36 In relation to Oireachtas debates, I have read all debates relating to
marriage law Bills introduced to both houses of the Oireachtas as well as relevant
sections and debates relating to social welfare, taxation and employment law
legislation. Marriage, and its potential for creating political and social difficulties, was
also discussed in debate in other legislative enactments, and I have used the search
facility on the Oireachtas website to identify as many of these as possible within the
research period.37
It is important to emphasise that my focus is on the actions of political government,
those institutions and agencies implicated in the law making process. When I assert,

matters and cases relating to minors may held in private. More recent legislation; the Family
Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Family Home Protection Act 1976,
the Status of Children Act 1987, The Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989,
the Maintenance Act 1994, the Family Law Act 1995, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996
and the Domestic Violence Act 1996, required proceedings to be held otherwise than in public.
Section 40 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, relaxed the rule to allow limited
reporting by barristers, solicitors and other approved persons, with identifying information
redacted. The Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 allows bona fide
representatives of the press to attend family law cases and to publish reports, again identifying
information must not be reported.
36
I discovered a number of cases widely reported in newspapers, with names, in the 1960s
and early 1970s indicating that the provisions of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act
1961 were either not applied by presiding judges or ignored by the media. For example in
1970, the Irish Independent provided regular updates on a divorce a mensa et thoro case, with
jury, between Mrs Bradley ‘a former B.E.A. air hostess and model’ and her husband Mr
Thomas Bradley, ‘a supermarket owner.’ ‘Judgment on divorce case costs reserved’ Irish
Independent (Dublin, 23 December 1970).
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therefore, that the regulation of marriage was not considered necessary before 1970 or
that same-sex marriage/divorce were not considered possible, I am referring to the
position among those in a position to effect law reform. I do not mean to deny that
political activists or individual members the Oireachtas did not have contrary
perspectives. Similarly, I do not mean to say that particular action was not legally or
practically possible, only that it was not politically possible.
The research output does not contain a full account of all documentation examined.
Often many documents were searched to confirm the silence of Oireachtas debates on
particular issues. In other situations sample, or exemplary, sources are referred to in
the narrative when a great deal more sources both exist, and were reviewed. This
generally occurs in discussions of specific phenomena. I have, for example, focused
on the deserted wife in chapter five, because she appeared in a wide range of political
and media discussion during that period. The sources used to confirm her importance
as an object of political attention are those that I have judged to be most useful in
communicating how she was constructed within political discourse. My description of
the discourse on marriage law reform over the research period is, therefore, necessarily
subjective, both in relation to the materials chosen for analysis and those actually
included in the thesis. I have attempted to produce a plausible interpretation of
historical events based on the preponderance of ideas at particular points in time.

4.4 Doing Genealogy and Discourse analysis
4.4.1 Genealogy and social phenomena
The effectiveness of genealogy and discourse analysis in producing novel
interpretations of past events is demonstrated by Foucault’s own historical work.
Others have used his approach to investigate the social phenomena of
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unemployment,38 poverty,39 dependency,40 empowerment41 and the family.42 Jacques
Donzelot and William Walters use a case-study method, focusing on specific subdomains of the phenomena in question in their respective studies of family and
unemployment. Donzelot use a number of examples, including the juvenile justice
system, to show that the taken for granted place of families in the social domain is not
fixed, but has been moulded to specific functions by State intervention.43 The family,
he argues, holds a central position in ‘mythical representations that sustain …
hegemonic discourses.’44 This mythical family is also a practical solution to problems
with morality, health and procreation and has been used as a vehicle for the
implementation of programmes based on powerful knowledge about public and
private hygiene, education and the protection of individuals. Walter’s genealogy of
unemployment challenges the social scientific treatment of unemployment as a selfevident phenomenon. Again using a case-study approach, Walters contends that
unemployment is not self-evident or natural, but designates a particular way of acting
on populations.45 Genealogy thus offers a way to call into question the centrality of
marriage in particular, and conjugal relationships in general, in regulating the lives of
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individuals. Irish marriage law offers a particularly useful case study because of the
relatively short time-frame during which marriage has been legally regulated in this
jurisdiction, representing a telescoping of the changes in law that have occurred in
other jurisdictions.

4.4.2 Genealogy, Foucault and legal topics
Although Foucault’s work is rarely used to evaluate legal doctrine or processes, 46
where used it has produced interesting alternative perspectives on doctrinal law. There
are two particularly interesting examples, Kendall Thomas’s examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Bowers v Hardwick,47 and Reva Siegel’s historical account
of legislation limiting the availability abortion in the United States. 48 Interestingly,
both use Foucault’s work within a largely doctrinal context, using his perspectives on
power to suggest alternative interpretations of legal texts. Within Posner’s typography,
therefore, they sit between type one (doctrinal) and type two (examining law from the
perspective of another discipline). Both suggest other ways of reasoning within the
doctrinal paradigm.
Thomas relies on Foucault’s description of power networks to argue that antisodomy legislation acts to legitimate private (not State ordered) violence against gay
men.49 This being the case, he argues that the legislation impugned in the United States

I have consciously omitted literature falling within the domain of ‘governmentality
studies,’ which often focuses on legal and policy issues. This approach might be described as
‘post-foucauldian,’ in that it builds upon Foucault’s work to produce an analytical perspective
not directly indicated by him. Mitchell Dean is perhaps the best known proponent of this
approach and his text Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society a detailed guide
to governmentality studies.
47
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Supreme Court decision in Bowers v Hardwick does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of privacy, but the Eighth Amendment prohibition against ‘cruel and
unusual punishment.’50 He uses insights derived from Foucault’s work to describe the
power effects produced or supported by powerful (legal) knowledge that identifies
sodomy with perversion and illegality. By focusing on the actual experiences of a
defendant subject to identification, surveillance and ultimately prosecution under antisodomy legislation, Thomas identifies how legal regulation produces, not just a
criminal act, but also a criminal individual. This productive aspect of law’s power,
legitimates the persecution of gay men by non-State actors, and this maltreatment
constitutes State-mandated cruel in contravention of the Constitution.
Reva Siegel history of abortion law focuses on the deployment of medical
knowledge about women’s bodies in the legal reasoning in the United States Supreme
Court decision of Rowe v Wade. 51 Similar knowledge, she contends, grounded
campaigns leading to the abortion-restrictive legislation challenged in Rowe. Siegel,
in a careful historical analysis, identifies the assumptions about gender roles that
underpin both abortion-restrictive legislation and constitutional jurisprudence dealing
with pregnancy. Her topic and historical approach fit comfortably with Foucault’s
notions of bio-power and genealogy and her analysis effectively demonstrates the
usefulness of a foucauldian framework. Siegel points out the impossibility of
objectivity in the judicial reasoning paradigm, and how legal processes are deeply
embedded with dense networks of power/knowledge. Both Seigel and Thomas might
be criticised for accepting that constitutional provisions act as a juridical limit on State
‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.’ United States Constitution, amendment VIII.
51
[1973] 410 US 113. Rowe v Wade is a decision of the US Supreme Court which, by
declaring a Texas Statute prohibiting abortion to be unconstitutional, effectively legalised
limited abortion in the United States. The Court held that the legislation infringed the
plaintiff’s Fourteenth amendment right to privacy.
50
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power. 52 Nonetheless, their use of Foucault’s work to suggest alternative ways of
thinking about constitutional interpretations is effective in challenging the taken-forgranted objectivity of the judicial reasoning paradigm without attributing
universalized ideological motivations to the legal process.

4.4.3 Problems with genealogy
A specific difficulty with the genealogical approach is the possibility of convergence
with critical theory or ideology critique. Mitchell Dean contrasts Fraser and Gordon’s
genealogy of dependency53 with Cruickshank’s study of empowerment to illustrate
this difficulty.54 Fraser and Gordon, in their analysis of United States social policy,
describe how ‘dependency’ has been used as an ideological keyword masking ‘real
relations of subordination,’ 55 rather than asking what the use of language makes
possible at specific points in time. Foucauldian concerns with power and the language
of genealogy are employed without sufficient regard to Foucault’s understanding that
words and actions have the character of events rather than signifiers of hidden power
relationships. In contrast, Cruickshank’s genealogy of ‘empowerment’ describes how
the language of empowerment allowed the United States Federal government to
engage with the self-governing capacities of the population in a programme of
regulation. 56 Activists in disadvantaged communities had developed, over a long
period, voluntary ‘empowerment’ programmes designed to support individuals in
improving their lives. These programmes proved very successful in accessing

Hugh Baxter, critiques Siegel’s work on this basis, Hugh Baxter, ‘Bringing Foucault
into Law and Law into Foucault’ (1992) 48(2) Stanford Law Review 449, 476.
53
Fraser and Gordon, ‘A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the US
Welfare State.’
54
Cruickshank, ‘The Will to Empower: Technologies of Citizenship and the War on
Poverty.’
55
Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 79.
56
Cruickshank, ‘The Will to Empower: Technologies of Citizenship and the War on
Poverty,’ 29.
52

147

individuals who were reluctant to get involved with government services and workactivation programmes. By developing connections with activist groups through the
provision of funding, government was able to reach and regulate the individuals
participating in the community programmes.
The contrasting approach of these two studies draws attention to the dangers of
adopting the language of genealogy without sufficient regard to its critical
possibilities. The history of Irish marriage law is closely connected to the history of
women’s social exclusion and disadvantage. I have therefore been alert to the danger
of drawing ideological conclusions from specific, or indeed accumulating, instances
of domination. A conclusion that Irish women have been oppressed by both
government and law, particularly before the 1990s, is relatively easy to support with
the data I have collected. Nonetheless, what might be considered oppressive to women
today, was not necessarily seen that way in the past, nor do oppressive effects
necessarily correspond with oppressive intention. With regard to the process of
government, therefore we need to look at how knowledge about women and other
subject of law is deployed and how it facilitate action, rather than view the vocabulary
of government or law as systems of ideological keywords. My investigation is
therefore careful to focus on how truths about women and other social categories have
been created by mechanisms of power, and the constraints that operate to limit what
we take to be true about the categories of persons governed by marriage law.

4.5 Building the Analysis
As already discussed, my research focuses on two specific questions; how are we
governed by marriage law? and what is the role of marriage law in modern forms of
government? The purpose of asking these questions is first, to demonstrate the
contingency of legal regulation of marriage, and secondly, to challenge contemporary
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characterisations of marriage law as a route to social justice and equality by
demonstrating its role as a political strategy intended to support the economic
objectives of government. Whilst in this, and the previous chapter, I have broken down
these objectives into a series of five specific tasks; the research output does not
slavishly follow the divisions between these jobs.
The work for each chapter began with an examination of social, political, and
economic context, and this therefore appears at the beginning. Social meaning is
intimately connected to its historical contexts and it is impossible to fully understand
the meaning and import of political discussion without having a grasp of the
environment within which it arises. Following collection of the contextual material, I
began gathering and analysing political discourse, documents produced for and on
behalf of government, and legal materials, in accordance with the precepts of discourse
analysis. This analysis, which looks at how government identified relationship
behaviour as problem, how solutions were formulated and the strategies deployed,
thus constitutes the second part of each empirical chapter. Next, I examined the effects
of the strategies deployed by government in resolving the problems with relationship
behaviour. Where issues arose during a particular period that, although discussed, had
no political effect until a later period, these are mentioned to avoid an implication that,
for example, gender equality was a political unknown.57 Theoretical considerations
are considered where they arise throughout the chapters. Finally, in each chapter, I
return to the central questions, drawing together the empirical findings. The question
of how we are governed by marriage law, includes the issue of how we are subjectified
by, and within, ‘the legal complex.’ The role of marriage law arises both at the level
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As was the case in the 1970s where gender equality was relevant political knowledge
but was not applied to the relationship between husband and wife.
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of how we are governed – it creates social categories, acts upon our self-regulatory
capacities and provides expert knowledge - and the level of the population as a whole.
Each of these levels is thus dealt with separately, within the analysis and in the
concluding comments. Chapter five contains an additional section dealing with the
transformation of marriage from a fully social practice to an issue of political concern
in the 1970s.

4.6 Conclusion.
Legal scholarship, particularly in the family law academy, tends to adopt a normative
stance, using non-legal augments to support legal reform. This thesis, however aims
to examine law from a foucauldian perspective in order to discover how we are
governed by marriage law. It has two principle avenues of investigation, one mainly
empirical and the other building on the empirical output to theorise the role of marriage
law in modern government. The research period is divided in to four temporal
divisions broadly corresponding to major legal reforms, and within each period,
political and legal discourse is subjected to analysis. As the primary focus is the power
effects of marriage law, Foucault’s genealogical approach to history is deployed to
examine how relationships of power produce reality at particular points in time.
Contextual material relating to social, economic and political conditions is then
overlaid, and the two elements are interpreted in terms of Foucault’s description of the
nature of government in the modern State. In this way, a critical, and necessarily
subjective, analysis of the process and effect of Irish marriage law reform over the
research period is constructed.
The next chapter begins the empirical section of the thesis with the emergence of
marriage law as problem for government, and a solution to problems, at the end of the
1960s in Ireland. It connects the problematisation of marriage with a shift of economic
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policy that favoured a Keynesian approach to social and economic management.
Marriage law was deployed to address the financial problems experienced by married
women deserted by their husbands, whilst the expanding welfare system re-enforced
the necessity for stable lifetime marriage. Politics took control of the relationship
practices of individual citizens and began to regulate them in accordance with
available sources of knowledge, focusing on the social importance of marriage.
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Five – Desertion and Maintenance
1945 - 1976

The need for State institutions and ‘the legal complex’ to regulate relationships in the
present is largely uncontested, but marriage was not always considered an appropriate
domain for political intervention. In Ireland, between the foundation of the State and
the 1960s, politics accepted marriage as ‘an unproblematic field of experience or set
of practices …, which were familiar and ‘silent’ out of discussion.’1 By the end of the
1960s, however, marriage as a social practice had become a problem. It raised political
discussion and debate, incited new reactions, and induced a crisis in previously silent
behaviour, habits, and practices.2 The legal regulation of marriage came to be seen as
both a problem in itself, and as a solution to social problems. Those responsible for
governing the population become aware of marriage as a regulable domain and began
to identify categories of citizen that required their attention. The activity of governing
was called into question in relation to the social practice of marriage, and politics
became concerned with how the social practice marriage might be directed.3
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Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech (Joseph Pearson ed, Semiotext(e) 2001), 74.
Foucault, Fearless Speech, 74.
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Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, (2nd edn, London,
Sage Publications 2010), 38. Dean proposes the analysis of ‘regimes of government’ as way
to deploy Foucault’s work in critiquing the actions of political government and his work is
central to ‘governmentality studies.’ Whilst his text is a useful guide to Foucault’s work he
2

152

This chapter begins by sketching the social and economic conditions pertaining in
Ireland after the Second World War, outlining political understandings of marriage
during that period and demonstrating the extent to which the social practice of
marriage was considered outside politics. It then identifies a shift in how government
was rationalised at the end of the 1950s, the consequent expansion of social services,
and the emergence of marriage as a problem for government. Between the foundation
of the State and the 1960s, marriage had been considered an unproblematic social
institution and a relay for government. Labour market and welfare policies were
mediated through marriage, relying on local networks of power that held men
responsible for the well-being of their wives and children. With the development of
centralised systems of social provision, and a mode of government that began to accept
responsibility for the wellbeing of the population, vulnerable individuals in need of
assistance were identified and categorised. One particular category, the deserted wife,
personified the problems with marriage. Left indigent through the failure of male
support, and championed by an emerging feminist movement focused on the
promotion of women’s interests through the vindication of rights, her needs initiated
the program of marriage law reform that began in the 1970s.
Strategies of reform constructed the deserted wife as the embodiment of a social
right to be dependent and focused on legal measures to vindicate this right. My
analysis of the political discourse surrounding marriage law reform, and the resultant
statutory measures reveals their actual power effects. Marriage law did not provide
justice for the deserted wife; rather it supported existing social understanding of the
nature of marriage, further entrenching her dependency. The chapter ends by

has little to say on the subject of law reform and I have found it more useful to focus on
Foucault’s concepts rather than the derivative form they take in Dean’s work.
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identifying two emerging sources of knowledge about relationships and their
regulation: equality imperatives emanating from the European Economic Community,
and the judicial review jurisdiction of the Superior Courts.

5.1 Marriage as an Unproblematic Field of Experience.
5.1.1 Economic conditions after ‘the Emergency’4 (1945 – 1960)
Ireland remained neutral during the Second World War, and the bombing of Dublin’s
North Strand in 1941 was the only imposition on the country’s relative tranquillity.5
The country was spared military destruction, but self-sufficiency, necessitated by
neutrality, eroded its capital reserves.6 Whilst the rest of Europe enjoyed a post-war
economic boom, 7 Ireland was ‘a clear underachiever throughout the post-1950
period.’8 Ireland in the 1940s and 1950s was a mainly rural economy with more than
half of working men, and a quarter of working women employed in agriculture. Total
employment declined in the 1950s, and remained on a low plateau through much of
the 1960s. 9 Income-earning was largely restricted to men. Male labour force
participation between 1946 and 1966 was consistently above 80%, the corresponding
figure for women was 30%.10 Poor economic conditions at home combined with rapid

‘The Emergency’ was a political euphemism for the war in Ireland. The country
remained neutral throughout but a state of emergency was declared on 2 September 1939, and
the Emergency Powers Act 1939 enacted the following day. ‘The Emergency’ was not
officially rescinded until 1976.
5
Diarmaid Ferriter, The Transformation of Ireland 1900 – 2000 (Profile Books 2004),
387.
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Cormac Ó Gráda and Kevin O’Rourke, ‘Irish Economic Growth, 1945 – 1988’ in
Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, eds, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, 400.
7
Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, ‘Postwar Growth: an Overview’ in Nicholas Crafts
and Gianni Toniolo, eds, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge University
Press 1996), 2.
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Cormac Ó Gráda and Kevin O’Rourke, ‘Irish Economic Growth, 1945 – 1988,’ 395.
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Central Statistics Office, That was then and this is now: Change in Ireland 1949 to 1999
(Pn 8084, Stationery Office 2000), 107-8.
10
Central Statistics Office, Census 2011, Commentary (Stationery Office 2011).
Comparative table at page 12.
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improvement in living conditions in neighbouring industrialised countries, led to
increasing emigration. 11 In the decade between 1951 and 1961, 412,000 people
emigrated, 12 and standards of living for those who remained were low.13 Diarmaid
Ferriter writes of the period:
In 1949, Ireland still had the highest rates of infant and maternal mortality in
Europe. Poverty was still endemic; during the great freeze of 1946-7 the
Archbishop of Dublin granted a dispensation from Lenten fasting to his diocese
owing to its under-nourishment. While Dublin Corporation made efforts to begin
housing programmes on the outskirts of the city … 80,000 people in Ireland still
lived in one-roomed dwellings.14
5.1.2 The social practice of marriage in the post-war years (1945 – 1960)
Marriage, in statistical terms, was a minority practice during this period; a
Commission on Population reported in 1954 that Ireland had ‘one of the lowest
marriage rates in the world.’15 In 1951, 42.2 percent of urban and 68 percent of rural
men were unmarried at age 30 – 34. The corresponding figures for women were 37
percent and 35.9 percent respectively. 16 The low rate of marriage did not imply
widespread practice of other forms of intimate relationship, or alternative methods of
family formation. Illegitimacy rates were relatively low, with an average of 1,900 nonmarital births registered each year between 1923 and 1970, a tiny percentage of the
total births.17 Non-marital births did not suggest the establishment of families; more
than 80 percent of unmarried mothers had their babies adopted.18 Yet people did not
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155

live alone, just 13 percent of Irish households consisted of one person in 1966, 20 per
cent of two, the remaining two thirds had more than three persons.19
Those who did marry tended to adopt gender-based roles. Married women cared
for children and the home, and were financially supported by their husbands. Just 6
per cent of married women were employed in 1966.20 Children were an inevitable
consequence of marriage, and large families common.21 The fertility rate for married
women in 1960 was almost four children per woman, 22 and family sizes were
‘extremely large by the standards of virtually all other western countries.’ 23 Catriona
Clear, in her analysis of public discourse on women in the home in the 1940s and
1950s, notes that women, and in particular wives, were expected to fulfil a domestic
role. 24 Clear notes a gathering opposition to this position, but concludes that the
generally held view was that ‘the sex-based division of labour was natural.’25
Marriage was also considered a lifetime commitment, a view shaped by the
religious beliefs of the vast majority of the Irish population, 26 who accepted
Catholicism as the essence of their identity and their county’s ethos.27 The ‘Maynooth
Catechism’ of 1951 set out Catholic teaching on marriage at the time in simple
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language. This handsomely illustrated text was intended to support rote learning of
church doctrine in Catholic primary schools, using a characteristic question and
answer format:
What is Matrimony?
Matrimony is the sacrament by which man and woman become husband and wife,
and receive the graces to live happily together and to fulfil the duties of the married
state.
Can the bond of marriage be ever broken?
When baptised persons have been validly married and have lived together as
husband and wife, the bond of their marriage cannot be broken, except by the death
of either party.
Can the State break the bond of a valid marriage?
The State has no power to break the bond of a valid marriage and hence civil laws
authorising divorce are null and void.28
Confirming that marriage, as practiced, fulfilled the Catholic aspirations is a difficult
task, largely dependent on how one defines ‘marriage.’ Validly contracted legal or
religious marriages could not be ended,29 but that did not imply that the interpersonal
relationship between spouses lasted for life. 30 Nonetheless, widespread social
acceptance of the lifetime nature of the marriage bond can be inferred from the absence
of the concepts of ‘marital breakdown’ and ‘divorce’ from social, cultural, and
political discourse during the period.31 Further, as discussed in the next section, the
lifetime nature of marriage was assumed by public institutions in administering State
services, with no provision being made for the support of married women other than
through their husbands.

28

Joannes Carolus (ed), A Catechism of Catholic Doctrine: Approved by the Archbishops
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The concept of ‘legal separation’ further complicates the issue in that it indicates the
end of the interpersonal relationship, but not the marriage. Marriage breakdown began to
emerge as a socio/political issue in the 1960s in the guise of ‘desertion.’
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5.1.3 Marriage and State administration (1945 – 1960) – social welfare
In the post-war years, Ireland had a fragmented system of social welfare involving
private insurance schemes, 32 locally administered social assistance, 33 and means
tested payments intended to address specific contingencies such as unemployment,34
disability 35 and old age. 36 The Social Welfare Act 1952 initiated limited reform,
consolidating the conditions of eligibility for the various welfare schemes into a single
piece of legislation.37 The social insurance and social assistance schemes, governed
by the 1952 Act, assumed a dependency model of marriage in which husbands earned
money and wives engaged in home duties. These roles were also encouraged by a
substantial ‘marriage benefit’ paid to employed women if they had sufficient
contributions,38 regardless of whether they continued in employment or not. Those
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The National Insurance Act 1911 introduced the first compulsory social insurance
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who did remain in employment were penalised with higher compulsory rates of
contribution, and reduced entitlements.39
The qualified dependent rules in social welfare legislation assumed specific roles
in marriage. A married man could claim a dependent payment for a cohabiting wife,
even if she were working,40 and a single man or widower could claim a dependent
allowance for a woman over 16 ‘having the care of one or more than one qualified
child who normally resides with him.’41 A married woman, on the other hand could
only claim a dependent’s increase if her husband was unable, due to infirmity, to
support himself.42 Provision was made for married women to apply for unemployment
assistance and benefit,43 however, I have been unable to locate any data suggesting
that married women (whether separated or living with their husbands) actually
succeeded in obtaining the payments. 44 In a further acknowledgment of defined
spousal roles, contributory and non-contributory pensions were available to widows,
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but not widowers.45 Children’s Allowance, a universal payment made to families with
three or more children introduced in 1944, was paid to husbands as the person
‘responsible for the maintenance’ of children.46
5.1.4 Marriage and State administration (1945 – 1960) – labour market and taxation
Married women’s domestic role was both reflected in, and re-enforced by, statutory
and informal marriage bars that required women to resign their employment upon
marriage.47 Further, civil service rates of pay depended on marital status, with married
men being paid considerably more than single men, who in turn were paid more than
single women.48 Married women who continued to work, mainly teachers to whom
the marriage bar did not apply, were paid at the single woman rate. Married men,
working in the civil service, but not married women, received an additional payment
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in respect of children under 16, or under 21 if in full time education. 49 Tax-free
allowances were also allocated to husbands, and a wife’s income was automatically
taxed as that of her co-habiting husband. 50 State administration therefore used
marriage, understood as a lifetime, heterosexual union in which spouses undertook
specific gender-based roles (the dependency model), as a relay in providing welfare
services, regulating the labour market, and collecting of tax.

5.1.5 Marriage as a fully social domain
Government accepted the dependency model of marriage as a social institution and an
appropriate relay for public administration. The marriage relationship itself, and the
internal workings of the family it supported, was, nonetheless, considered outside the
remit of State regulation. This purely social understanding of marriage is illustrated
by the 1954 Report of the Commission on Emigration and Population Problems. The
First Interparty Government appointed the Commission ‘a motley group of 16 that
included civil servants, workers’ and women’s organisations, clerics, rural activists
and economists,’51 to investigate the causes and consequences of ‘the present level and
trend in population.’ 52 The principle motivation for the report was the rate of
emigration, which, although a way of life since the famine, increased dramatically
during the 1940s and 1950s. The Commission concluded that, whilst an improvement
in economic conditions in Ireland might reduce emigration, the decision to leave was
largely a personal one.53 A similarly non-interventionist conclusion was reached in
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relation to the low marriage rate in Ireland.54 Although acknowledged as a grave social
problem, few concrete suggestions were made as to how it could be addressed. The
overall impression given by the report is that the problems of population were largely
social – there was little government could do to either halt emigration or increase the
rate of marriage, although improved economic conditions (an issue not necessarily
within government control) would help.
Limited reform of the legal effects of marriage, brought about by the Married
Women’s Status Act 1957, and the Succession Act 1965, had no implications, given
the context within which they were enacted, for the actual social practice of marriage.55
Marriage was, nonetheless, a useful relay for social provision and labour market
policy. It signalled interdependency and familial connections, and allowed
government services to assume that married men could, and would, support their wives
and children. Marriage also signalled social stability, the Commission on Emigration
reported that:
Where the proportion of people unmarried is high, there is a risk that the
community’s sense of responsibility will be insufficiently developed, or that its
realisation of the value and importance of the basic unit of society – the family –
will be inadequate and that, as a result, its attitude to life may be unprogressive.
This may be aggravated by the smaller need for the qualities of hard work and
enterprise, Unmarried people are, of course, often active and even leaders in many
spheres, but married people generally take a keener interest in the more serious
social and economic matters affecting the general well-being.56
5.1.6 Marriage as a relay for government
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault argues that a shift from the family as a
model of government, to the family as an instrument of government, signals the release
of a new art of government focused on managing social behaviour at the level of life
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itself.57 In the Irish context, before the 1970s a particular form of marriage and family
was assumed by the State in administering social welfare, taxation and labour market
policies. The family, in accordance with Foucault’s scheme, was a model, rather than
an instrument of government. Distribution of welfare and the management of the
labour market based on dependency marriage was intended to relieve abject poverty,
not to obtain anything beyond basic existence from the population.58 Local discretion
remained in the administration of means-tested schemes, and central government had
no oversight role.59 The proper role of government in relation to poverty is clearly
expressed by James MacElligott, a senior Civil Servant in the 1940s and 1950s, in
response to a proposal to introduce universal child allowances:
The principle has not been generally accepted that the State has responsibility for
the relief of poverty in all its degrees - the principle underlying any social measures
undertaken by the State in this country up to the present is that the State’s
responsibility is limited to the relief of destitution i.e. extreme cases where
employment and the minimum necessities of existence are lacking 60 (my
emphasis).
Séan MacEntee, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, in a 1940 memo to the
Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, on the subject of child allowances, set out the potential
dangers of state intervention in the family:
If the state subsidises parents to have children, it will be but a step to regulate the
number of children, then to lay down who shall be permitted to have children and
57
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who shall not, how the subsidised children are to be brought up, to what purposes
they are to devote their lives, what physical and mental characteristics are to be
encouraged by subsidised breeding, who shall be bred to labour and who to govern,
etc. etc., until we shall have traversed the whole ground between the initiation of
a State system of family allowances and the servile State.61
In the early years of the State, therefore, marriage and the family were used to
administer government services, but not to obtain anything from the population as a
whole. Marriage was neither a problem nor a solution to problems; it was simply a
convenient mechanism through which to administer poverty relief. The State relied on
relationships of power already existing within society to achieve its objectives, and
politics made no attempt to modify them.

5.2 Governing the Social – Problematising Marriage
5.2.1 Shifting economic policy.
Economist Patrick O’Sullivan reports that Irish economic policy took a significant
change of direction in 1958 when protectionism gave way to an emphasis on
industrialisation through the importation of foreign capital. He writes that:
Beginning in 1958 in an effort to shock the Irish economy from its protracted
somnolence, the government shifted its development strategy from a highly
protectionist import substitution policy to export-orientated trade policy with
foreign direct investment occupying the pivotal role. The aim of this and
subsequent economic plans was to use imported private capital and technology to
establish an extensive and sophisticated industrial base, having a high export to
sales ratio (to minimise competition for domestic market shares with local firms),
which would absorb some of the surplus labour, reduce emigration, utilise natural
resources more efficiently, augment capital formation, stimulate economic growth,
diversify merchandise exports, and more generally, to provide the impetus for the
transformation of the Irish economy from its excessive reliance on the agriculture
and service sectors to a more vigorous and expanding industrial base.62
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This change of direction was followed in the 1960s by a sustained period of economic
growth, a halting of emigration, a dramatic increase in government revenues, and an
expanded system of social provision.63 Government policy, as recorded in the First
and Second Programmes for National Expansion, published in 1958 and 1964
respectively, was to improve social welfare services ‘in line with improvements in
national production and prosperity.’64 The Third Programme for Economic and Social
Development, published in 1969, set out an extensive list of promised reforms
including the introduction of pay-related social insurance benefits and retirement and
invalidity benefits.65 Mel Cousins notes that ‘this period [1965 – 1979] corresponded
with a significant expansion in the social welfare scheme.’66

5.2.2 Expanding social services - health
A white paper on healthcare, published in 1966, announced the government’s intention
to introduce a system of socialised medical care.67 Although a dedicated Department
of Health had been in existence since 1947,68 health services continued to be delivered
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locally by private general practitioners, local authority dispensaries, and voluntary
hospitals.69 Hospitals were funded by a hospital sweepstakes, 70 and user charges.71
General practitioner and public health services were funded equally between the
exchequer and local government, and administered at local level.72 Free services were
provided only to the very poor, most of the population paid for care.
The Health Act 1970 introduced a general medical scheme administered by health
boards under the direct control of the Department of Health. The Act therefore, moved
responsibility for provision of, and access to, healthcare to central government, a
dramatic shift from the position in 1954, when an attempt to introduce State-funded,
free, maternity and child health services created a political maelstrom. 73 Noncontributory discretionary payments under the Home Assistance scheme were also
removed from local control, transferring to Health Boards in 1970, and then to a
centralised system in 1975.74
5.2.3 Expanding social services – social security.
In the 1960s, less than 30% of all social welfare payments were means-tested, the
balance distributed through a contribution-based social insurance scheme. New social
insurance schemes, introduced in the 1960s and 1970s provided enhanced contributory

69

A complex eligibility system divided the population into high middle and low income
groups with different services provided free or at a reduced cost at different levels. Some
services were also paid for through a social insurance scheme. Department of Health, The
Health Services and their Further Development, 16
70
Lee, Ireland 1912 – 1985, 315.
71
The white paper noted that about 30% of the population was covered by the general
medical scheme, that is, general practitioner services. Hospital services were provided free of
charge to a broader section of society. Department of Health, The Health Services and their
Further Development, 15.
72
ibid, 11.
73
Lee describes the controversy surrounding Minister Noel Browne’s Mother and Child
Scheme as ‘one of the great cause célèbres of Irish Politics.’ Lee, Ireland 1912 – 1985, 313.
74
Social Welfare (Supplementary Welfare Allowances) Act, 1975. This legislation
provided for a legal right to a minimum payment, a right of appeal and a more standardised
centralised system for awarding allowances.
166

old age pensions, 75 an improved occupational injuries scheme, 76 deserted wives
benefits,77 invalidity pensions,78 pay related unemployment and disability benefits.79
Most of these schemes continued to use the dependency model of marriage to
determining eligibility and rates of payment. Payments were made to men in respect
of dependent wives and children, and the continuing low rate of employment among
married women meant that few such women were in a position to make contributions
in their own right.80 Non-contributory, means tested schemes were also expanded to
cover unmarried mothers, and deserted wives.81

5.2.4 Social practices and government services
Marriage as practiced in Ireland during the 1960s and 1970s continued to follow the
dependency model adopted in earlier decades. In 1960, 5.2 percent of Irish married
women worked outside the home, rising to just 7.5 percent in 1970.82 Fertility rates
also remained high, reaching almost four children per woman in 1970,83 with only four
percent of children born to non-married parents in 1978.84 Marriage also became more
popular; the rate of marriage (per 1000 persons per year) increased from 5.4 in 1961
to 7.1 in 1970. 85 In mediating public services through the dependency model of
marriage, government was not imposing a particular version of family morality; it was
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reflecting, and re-enforcing, social practices within the Irish population. When social
services amounted to little more than the relief of abject poverty, using marriage as a
relay for government caused few difficulties. Expectations were low, and, as suggested
by the Commission on Emigration, disgruntled individuals could exercise their
personal choice to leave the jurisdiction. 86 As economic conditions in Ireland
improved and social services expanded, offering entitlements rather than discretionary
payments, 87 the limitations of dependency marriage as a model for social families
became apparent.

5.3 The Deserted Wife
5.3.1 ‘Desertion’ and poverty
Women had long had a legal right to financial support from their husbands in the event
of ‘desertion,’ defined in the Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act
1886 as the wilful abandonment and failure to maintain a wife and/or children. Access
to the courts was, however, expensive, and the maximum weekly amount that could
be awarded in the District Court was €4 per week, making an application to court
largely futile.88 Nonetheless, before 1970, court ordered maintenance was the only
alternative to home assistance for women whose husbands failed to provide support.89
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During the 1960’s the issue of ‘desertion’ began to surface in newspaper reports
and parliamentary debate. Deputy Eileen Desmond complained about the £4 limit on
court ordered maintenance in a question to the Minister for Justice in 1965,90 and in
debate on the 1967 budget, Brigid Hogan O’Higgins highlighted the position of
deserted wives:
there are not a large number of them, thanks be to goodness, but they are there …
These people are faced with the mental strain and hardship of being deserted. God
knows, it is bad enough to be deserted and left with four or five, or sometimes
more, small children, but to have to bear extra financial worries because of this
desertion is worse. The State could bring in some scheme whereby these people
would be treated as widows. As to all intents and purposes they are widows. They
have been deserted and are getting no maintenance and are neglected. As I said,
there are not many of them but I have found in my own constituency a couple of
cases where there is tremendous hardship. These people are eligible for social
welfare assistance but it is very little, and I think if they were considered and
treated as widows are, it would relieve a great deal of hardship for this limited
number who still are there.91
The Irish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children claimed in 1969 that there
were over 2,000 cases of desertion in Ireland each year, and reported that a large
proportion of these involved men who simply left their families to work in Britain. 92
Deserted wives were a numerically small93 but politically significant group.94 These
unsupported women were presented in political discourse as fully entitled to
differentiation from the general mass of indigents who relied on public assistance.95
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5.3.2 Desertion and social welfare
The initial response of government to the problem of desertion was to address, not the
fact of desertion itself, but the resulting poverty of married women. The Minister for
Social Welfare, Seamus Brennan in introducing the Social Welfare Bill 1970 to Dáil
Éireann set out the aim of a proposed means-tested deserted wives allowance:
The new social assistance scheme of allowances for deserted wives is designed to
deal with one aspect of the problem of deserted wives. Deputies are no doubt aware
that this problem has aroused much interest during the past few years and the
aspect of it which this Department is attempting to deal with is that of the hardship
caused in the long term to the wife and children where the husband has deserted
them and has failed to contribute to their maintenance … it is felt that the long
term situation should be dealt with on a more permanent basis.96
The allowance was available to married women, deserted by their husbands, under 50
years of age with dependent children, or over the age of 50 without dependent
children. 97 Payment was made until the woman reached retirement age, when she
could receive the old age pension. It was therefore envisaged that deserted wives
without means would be supported by the State for their lifetime. In order to receive
the allowance a wife needed to show that she had no means of support, that her
husband had deserted her, and that she had made attempts to obtain maintenance from
him.98
A social insurance based deserted wives benefit was introduced in 1973.99 Again,
this payment was potentially lifetime, but payable without the presence of children
from the age of 40 rather than 50. There was no restriction on deserted wives in receipt
of this payment earning money, and no limit on the capital assets that they could
own.100 A woman was considered as having been deserted if her husband had left ‘of
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his own volition’ and had wilfully refused or neglected to contribute to the support of
his wife and children. 101 The wife was obliged to ‘make reasonable efforts … to
prevail on [her husband] to resume living with her or to contribute to the support and
maintenance of her and her children.’102
In using the expanding social welfare system to address the difficulties suffered by
deserted wives, the Irish government continued its practice of using marriage as a relay
for government. In providing a State benefit, government became a substitute husband
in a lifetime dependency marriage. The poverty of wives and children was relieved
with the same motivation as the imposition of the marriage bar – ensuring an income
for families.103 There was no suggestion that government or politics required anything
from these women; no attempt was made to address the causes of their poverty.
Although the deserted wives payments adopted and re-enforced the social practice of
lifetime dependency marriage, they were directed to the effects of its failure, and not
the causes (whether social or interpersonal). The relationship practices of the
population had become a cause for concern at the level of government only to the
extent that they occasionally created hardship for women left without male support. A
similar poverty relief impetus can be seen in the introduction of an unmarried mother’s
allowance in 1973.104 Like deserted wives, unmarried mothers were women for whom
the State would become a substitute husband. The payments were not however,
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lifetime, lasting only as long as the woman had a dependent child living with her, 105
and removed if ‘she and any person are cohabiting as man and wife.’ 106 Although
morally laden in their definition, lone woman payments did not attempt to shape the
contours of marriage, rather they aimed to relieve socio-economic deprivation.

5.3.3 Desertion– the role of law.
As government became involved in providing social assistance to deserted wives and
gathered statistics that demonstrated the extent of the problem, 107 it also became
concerned with the limitations of existing private law rules, in particular the nonenforceability of Irish maintenance orders in Britain. 108 The potential for collusion
between spouses was raised in debate on the Social Welfare Bill 1970. A husband
could agree to ‘disappear’ to Britain in order that his wife could obtain a deserted
wife’s payment. 109 The Minister for Justice George Colley indicated that the
Department would take steps to ensure that such collusion did not occur but recognised
that difficulties did exist in relation to enforcement of maintenance orders.
As deputies will appreciate, there is a danger of collusion in these cases. In such
cases I think it would not be unreasonable that the Department should insist that
the wife should obtain a maintenance order and see if it could be enforced. If it
cannot, the Department should step in. Where it is quite clear that this would be a
useless exercise the Department would not insist on that.110
105
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Women’s groups also focused on men’s legal obligations to their wives. The
A.I.M. (Action Information Motivation) group, established in 1972, sought the
enactment of a statutory right to family maintenance and effective enforcement
mechanisms.

111

Their position was supported by the government-appointed

Commission on the Status of Women, which, in 1973, produced a comprehensive
report on the disadvantages suffered by Irish women. The Irish Commission was one
of a number established throughout Europe following the 1967 United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (DEDAW).112 The
Declaration emphasised the equal status of women and men, called for the removal of
distinctions between women based on marital status, and for the promotion of equal
status and property rights within marriage.113 The Irish Commission was rigorous in
identifying how the tax and social welfare systems disadvantaged women, and
government later implemented many of its recommendations. In relation to married
women, however, the Convention’s requirement to promote the status of women was
subjugated to Article 41 of the Irish Constitution and dominant views on the role of
women in marriage, and expressed as a need to protect the dependent status of married
women.
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Article 41 recognised the family as the fundamental unit group of society, and the
Supreme Court had defined this family as that based on marriage.114 The Constitution
also provided that the State ‘shall endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.’115
The Commission, noting that ‘a woman should have the right to choose between
different life patterns,’ and that ‘society has a responsibility to support that choice,’116
constructed from Article 41 a legal right to adopt a dependent role in marriage.
Although the Commission couched its spousal support recommendations in genderneutral terms,117 it is clear from the general tenor of the report that women, but not
men, had a right, and perhaps even an obligation to be dependent. 118 More than
poverty-relief for deserted wives was required to secure this right, women were

114

State (Nicolau) v An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567.
Article 41.2, the Irish Constitution.
116
Commission on the Status of Women, Report to the Minister for Finance, 13.
117
The Commission recommended that both husbands and wives should have an
obligation to support their family and that the courts should decide, in case of dispute, how
household income and assets should be divided between spouses. It also recommended that a
non-owing spouse should have a veto right over the sale of the family home and that a system
of co-ownership and community of property should be investigated. ibid, 237 – 238.
118
The Commission focused in particular on the position of married women, for example
acknowledging that their participation in the public life of society was possible only ‘in a
“third phase” of … life when … responsibilities in the home have lessened.’ A woman had
‘the right equally with a man to enter employment’ but ‘there must be a real attempt made to
view and provide for a woman’s working life as a unit, broken for a time by marriage and
childcare.’ Women should be encouraged to join trade unions so that ‘attention [can be] paid
to their special requirements’ and the payment of marriage gratuities should continue to be
paid to women but not men because they act as an encouragement for married women to stay
in employment (13). The Commission expressed sympathy with the view that married women
taking up employment displaced jobs for unmarried women and noted that a married woman
can set about looking for employment at a ‘reasonably leisurely pace’ (128). Calling for an
increase in employment opportunities for married women, the Commission stated that:
The availability of suitable part-time work, enabling a woman to cope more easily with
her home duties and her employment is an important consideration influencing the
decision whether or not to work (128).
Child care was a last resort for the married woman; women need childcare as a result of
being forced to work due to economic necessity or because they are ill. The Commission was:
unanimous in the opinion that very young children, at least up to 3 years of age, should,
if at all possible, be cared for by the mother at home and that as far as re-entry to
employment is concerned the provision of day care for such children must be viewed as a
solution to the problems of the mother who has particularly strong reasons to resume
employment (130).
115

174

entitled to a share in their husbands’ wealth, and legal mechanisms were necessary to
ensure effective sharing of marital resources.

5.3.4 The deployment of legal rights
Article 41 was rarely raised in political discourse before the 1970s. As discussed in
chapter one, when drafted the ‘rights’ set out in the Constitution were understood as
statements of national identity and solidarity, not as justiciable limits to State power.
Judicial review was an alien concept that gained currency in Ireland only in the late
1960s. 119 In articulating the position of the dependent housewife in terms of legal
rights, the Commission on the Status of Women adopted the rhetoric of an
internationalised human rights movement gaining currency throughout Europe at the
time. Samuel Moyn refers to this new articulation of rights as:
the central event in human rights history … the recasting of rights as entitlements
that might contradict the sovereign nation state from above and outside, rather than
serve as its foundation.120
The rights rhetoric of the Commission, widely supported by politicians and the general
public, directed attention away from relief of poverty and towards the act of desertion
itself.121 This did not involve an investigation of the social and economic conditions
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that prevented women from supporting themselves. Rather, it shifted attention to their
husbands. Whereas previously desertion had been dealt with by relieving its effects,
the pursuit of legal rights focused attention on its immediate cause - failure of male
support.

5.3.5 Problematising marriage law.
On its introduction, the Department of Social Welfare estimated that 1,000 women
would avail of the deserted wives allowance. Within a year it was supporting 1,635
women and 2,309 dependent children.122 The problem of dependent women deserted
by their husbands became a statistical reality; a formerly uncounted category took on
a material density that could not be ignored. The initial legal response by government
was to increase the level of maintenance payable under the Married Women
(Maintenance in case of Desertion) Act 1886 from £4 per week to £15 per week for a
wife and £5 per week for a child in the District Court.123 The next step was to make
maintenance orders enforceable in Britain, and following negotiations reciprocal
legislation was introduced in both jurisdictions.124 Neither of these measures required
substantive law reform, they simply built upon existing pre-independence marriage
law framework.
Problematisation of marriage law at the level of government, its identification as a
problem, and as a solution to the problem of desertion, began in 1973 with the
appointment of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure, an assembly of
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government appointed lawyers.125 The Committee was asked to ‘to examine and make
recommendations on the substantive law as to the desertion of wives and children, the
attachment of wages and the desirability of establishing special family tribunals’
together with a list of other family related issues.126 However, due to the ‘urgency’ of
the situation the Committee focused on the ‘pressing social evil’ of desertion, which
was ‘on the increase.’127
The Committee identified deserted women as the victims of ‘abandonment,’ and
‘ill treatment,’128 and existing marriage legislation as inadequate to meet their needs.
Following the taking of evidence, the Committee found that there was ‘a real need for
radical change in the legal provisions relating to the provision of maintenance for
deserted spouses and families,’ and that the District Court ‘should continue to be the
principal forum to which the complaining spouse may have resort.’129 An action for
family default was recommended, providing relief upon proof of abandonment, ill
treatment or ‘the failure of the spouse who is responsible for the support of the family
to provide a reasonable standard of living for them having regard to the means and
earnings of that spouse.’130 Within a legal framework, the obligation of spouses was
extended beyond the problem of desertion to a more general responsibility to provide
for one’s family according to one’s means. The committee suggested two further new
forms of legal redress. The registration of a maintenance order as a lis pendens on the
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family home to prevent it from being sold without the maintenance creditors consent,
and an order prohibiting the defaulting spouse from entering or attempting to enter the
family home if the other spouse had reasonable grounds for believing that the safety
or welfare of the family required it. 131 Similar recommendations were by the
Commission on the Status of Women and A.I.M, and with the seal of approval by a
Committee composed of Judges and lawyers seemed certain to be implemented.

5.3.6 The bio-politics of marriage law.
In the early 1970s, three factors came together to make it both possible and necessary
to legally regulate marriage. First, the Irish government adopted a Keynesian model
of economic management that identified the welfare of the population as an essential
component of political economy. Managing the economy entailed managing the
population, ensuring that it could perform its role in creating ‘producers and consumer,
owners and non-owners, those who create profit and those who take it.’132 Secondly,
the welfarist aspect of Keynesianism required improved social provision. This was
achieved through programmes to relieve poverty and promote health, and involved the
identification of vulnerable subjects in need of assistance. Once identified, these
subjects, like the vulnerable dependent wife, became real and countable. Thirdly, the
emergence of an internationalised human rights movement, that reconfigured
statements of nationalist aspiration as limits to State power, cast the problems with
marriage in a legal mould and activated the power-limiting potential of Article 41 of
the Constitution. The vulnerable dependent housewife was no longer simply poor, her
protected status as a dependent wife had been compromised, and the appropriate
means of redress was legal.
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The emergence of the problem of desertion indicated that all was not well with
lifetime dependency marriage, and this had significant implications for a political
system heavily reliant on marriage performance. The Irish government, deeply
involved in regulating the social domain, inevitably became concerned with the
functioning of marriage. The rights-talk of political campaigners and legal experts
offered marriage law as the solution to the problem of women’s poverty caused by the
failure of male support. Juridico/legal formulations focused political attention on
marriage law as a solution, despite providing a wholly inadequate description of how
the problems associated with desertion arose. The difficulties of desertion came about
within a dense network of power relationships operating between State, Religion,
social practice and individual conscience. Desertion created poverty, not only because
men failed to provide support, but because the entire State apparatus was mediated
through dependency marriage, and social, legal and religious structures created
significant barriers to female self-sufficiency. Arguments in favour of legal change
were an easy way to stand on the side of right without having to answer the more
complex questions posed by the practice of dependency marriage.

5.4 Reforming Marriage Law
5.4.1 Parameters for reform – lifetime marriage
Marriage was legally indissoluble in Ireland until 1997,133 but the impossibility of
terminating marriage was not only an issue of law; that marriage could be ended other
than through death, and its disabilities and incidents thus removed, was simply not
considered politically possible in the 1970s.134 An all-party Oireachtas Committee on
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the Constitution did recommend in 1967 that Article 41 of the Constitution be
amended to facilitate divorce for those who did not oppose it on religious grounds,135
but the suggestion was vigorously opposed by the Catholic Church and the
government. In response to the Committee’s report, Dr Cathal Daly Archbishop of
Dublin declared that divorce was not a matter of individual conscience, and that the
State had a positive obligation to protect marriage.136 The Taoiseach, Jack Lynch also
responded negatively to the report announcing to the Dáil that ‘the Government have
no responsibility for that committee, or for its report … we have no responsibility for
its observations.’137
The reform of divorce laws taking place in Britain at the end of the 1960s was
widely reported in the Irish media.138 The British parliament enacted divorce reform
legislation in 1969 following prolonged consultation, and eventual compromise,
between the Church of England and the British Law Commission.139 The Catholic
Church in Ireland, anxious to respond to these British developments, made its views
clear in a 1969 joint Lenten Pastoral of the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland.
Centred on the theme of ‘Christian Marriage,’ the pastoral emphasised the lifetime
nature and procreative function of marriage.140
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The ultimate purpose and the normal effect of Christian marriage is to bring
children into the world for the worship of God, in time and in eternity; in other
words, the supreme privilege of marriage is to increase the Eucharistic Community
… Indeed, God made marriage indissoluble of its very nature from the beginning
… The doctrine of indissolubility of marriage is the greatest protection of human
love against its own inherent weaknesses.141
Promoting Christian marriage was presented by the Bishops as imperative; ‘[a]ll those
who are working to create economic and social conditions more favourable to
marriage … are performing a Christian and patriotic service of the first importance.’142
The principle of indissolubility reflected both political assumptions and the objectives
of the principle religious body in the country. The issue of divorce was firmly off the
political agenda, and any attempts to address the problem of desertion would take
place on the basis that marriage ended only on death.

5.4.2 Marriage as an instrument of government
By 1975, political discussion of the problems with marriage had been colonised by
legal formulations of marriage and its obligations. The Committee on Court Practice
and the Commission on the Status of Women formulated proposed solutions in legal
terms, and Article 41 of the Constitution acquired a new prominence. The Minster for
Justice, Patrick Cooney, in introducing a Bill to reform the rules on spousal
maintenance therefore felt it necessary to reference Article 41, in particular its
marriage protection imperative (‘The State pledges itself to guard with special care the
institution of Marriage’).143 The Family Law (Maintenance of Spouse and Children)
Bill 1975 adopted the Committee on Court Practice’s formulation of inter-spousal
obligation - an application for maintenance under the Bill did not require proof that
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either husband or wife had left the marital home; failure to maintain was the only prerequisite. The Minister reasoned that the Bill would therefore:
strengthen marriages by no longer obliging wives who have been badly neglected
by their husbands to leave the home … the widely held view nowadays is that …
indeed such an action could possibly be a factor that would save a family
relationship.144
Ideas about the horror of desertion, the legal rights of women and their vulnerability,
the obligations of men, and the indissolubility of marriage came together in a political
drive to save marriages.
Saving dependency model marriage would at once eradicate desertion, vindicate
women’s right to be dependent, and remove any possibility of divorce. It was a
beautifully simple objective with the capacity to solve a range of social and political
difficulties. Furthermore, it reflected the social aspirations and moral code of citizens;
no one entered marriage in 1970s expecting it to fail. In pursuing a marriage-saving
agenda, the Irish government had identified relationship practice as a transfer point
between individual and political interests. It was no longer simply a relay for
government, it had become a regulable category; the relationship practices of
individuals were now a matter of political concern. Clearly, it was not possible to save
marriage through prohibition of failure, it was necessary to deploy methods of power
‘capable of optimising forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time
making them more difficult to govern.’145
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5.4.3 Techniques for managing life.
Political concern to support the moral concerns of the population is manifest in how
the 1975 Bill was presented to the Oireachtas. The mutual support obligation in section
5 was necessary because ‘[s]pouses look naturally to one another for support and the
law should underwrite their obligations to each other.’ 146 Spousal support was a
‘moral’ duty that ‘most people accept,’ and which must be translated into ‘an
enforceable legal obligation.’ 147 The jurisdiction of the court in maintenance
applications was discretionary, because judicial decisions are ‘in effect value
judgments’ and ‘the possibility of differing value judgments must be accepted as
inherent in the proposals.’148 Although expressing some discomfort with the notion
that wives could be responsible for maintaining their families, the Minister ultimately
accepted that the courts’ obligation (in s 5(4)) to take account of caring responsibilities
would prevent a wife from being ‘required to leave her home and take up work.’149
Maintenance orders, reflecting the lifetime nature of marriage, could be granted ‘for
such period during the lifetime of the applicant spouse, of such amount and at such
times, as the Court may consider proper,’150 but the court had jurisdiction to refuse an
order in the event of the desertion or uncondoned adultery of the applicant spouse.151
The Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976 (the 1976 Act), as
enacted, thus attempted to legally enforce social understandings of the nature of
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marriage. Marriage, as practiced, was, in the main, a lifetime, dependency relationship.
The Catholic Church, whose doctrine mapped out the moral code of the majority of
the population, supported dependency marriage, and the moral obligation of men to
provide for their wives and children. It was both possible and necessary for politicians
formulating legal rules to refer to, and endorse, the moral nature of marriage. The 1976
Act supported and re-inscribed the social construction of marriage as a morally
informed, lifetime relationship of dependency, to which monogamy and financial
support were central. This picture of marriage did not only reflect social
understanding, it also supported the assumptions upon which the entire machinery of
Irish social policy was built. Government needed to save marriage in order to achieve
its regulatory ambitions within the social domain.

5.4.4 Protecting the marital home
The Commission of the Status of Women identified the vulnerablity of married women
in relation to homes owned by their husbands. It drew attention to the ability of a
husband to dispose of the matrimonial home ‘without his wife’s knowledge or consent
and his wife may find, without any notice whatsoever, that she and any children have
no longer any place to live.’152 It recommended that neither spouse should have the
power to sell their home without the consent of the other, and this recommendation
was put into effect by the Family Home Protection Act 1976 (the FHPA),153 which
gave non-owing spouses a veto over the sale or mortgage of their family home.154 The
legislation was couched in gender-neutral terms but the political objective was to
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protect dependent wives from ‘vindictive’ 155 husbands. The Minister for Justice
Patrick Cooney sums up its effect:
Under the Bill, if a man wishes to sell the family home, he will have to obtain the
written consent of his wife before doing so.156
David Andrews from the opposition benches spells out its objective:
We should not engage in any pretence that spouses, effectively, are the wives of
marriages, the women, in the context of this Bill. The Minister, whether
intentionally or otherwise, averted to this in his opening speech. This Bill is about
the protection of the wives and children in the final analysis.157
By removing land registration fees on transfers of family homes between spouses the
Act also purported to encourage the placing of homes in joint names.158 The FHPA
required a non-owning spouse to consent to the sale or mortgage of a ‘family home’159
and obliged a lending institution or landlord to receive loan or rent payments from a
spouse not included in the mortgage or tenancy agreement. 160 There was no
mechanism in the Act for the allocation of any proprietary interest to the non-owning
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spouse.161 The principle legal technique in the Act was to render void any purported
conveyance of an interest in a family home without the prior written consent of the
spouse of the registered owner.162
The institutional, or sacramental, nature of the marriage relationship propounded
by Catholic social teaching formed the conceptual foundation for both the 1976 Act
and the FPHA. They assumed that lifetime, dependency marriage reflected the natural
order. Women lived in homes owned by their husbands, because it was men’s role to
provide for women. The grant of a legal right to object to the sale or mortgage of a
family home was a vindication of rights, without implication for the interpersonal
relationship between the spouses. Applications to court to waive spousal consent
would similarly not disturb it.163 A man’s failure to pay rent or mortgage on a home
owned by him would impose a financial burden to his wife, but not trouble the spousal
relationship. Marriage, in its institutional form, was believed to transcend any
interpersonal disputes or difficulties that might arise between the spouses. The
obligation to house and maintain one’s spouse was only set aside in the event of moral
transgression such as desertion or adultery.164

5.5 The Power Effects of Marriage Law Reform
5.5.1 Marriage as an instrument of politics
Marriage, in the years following the foundation of the State was a social practice
guided by religious and cultural forces. Among the majority Catholic population it
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was a religious sacrament, a moral institution that could not be renounced, and
dependency marriage with distinct gender roles was assumed to reflect the natural
order. Politics had no role in the relationship between husband and wife, and
retrospective registration was the only civil requirement.165 Marriage was a model and
relay for government, chiefly used as an administrative convenience.
The enactment of maintenance and family home protection legislation in 1976
marked a transformation in the relationship between politics and marriage. Politics
wanted something from the marriage relationship itself. The emerging problem of
dependent wives, left unsupported following their husband’s departure, created a
political and economic difficulty. The Irish government initially chose to address the
problem through direct poverty relief, and when this proved inadequate a marriage
protection objective that encoded existing socio/moral understandings of the nature of
marriage was adopted. The Irish government needed its citizens to perform lifetime
dependent marriage because it was central to how social management, a central
element of the Keynesian economic model, was achieved.
These two pieces of legislation, within a juridical model of power, are assumed to
vindicate the rights of women.166 Foucault’s description of the bio-political process of
government as ‘the conduct of conducts’ provides a more nuanced perspective.167 By
imposing a lifetime mutual support obligation on spouses, those responsible for
government aimed to solve the problem of desertion through engagement with existing
moral understandings of the nature and social supremacy of marriage. The legal
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support obligation relied upon, supported, and re-enforced pre-existing social
structures and modes of control. Similarly, allowing spouses to veto the sale of their
family home did not vindicate the rights of married women; it acted to support their
dependency in marriage. A barring order jurisdiction, also introduced by the Family
Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, likewise emphasised women’s
vulnerability in the home and their need for protection.168

5.5.2 Power effects at the level of the population
The Family Home Protection Act assumed and supported female dependency. It also
had significant practical effect in making relationship status and history relevant to the
sale or mortgage of all land in Ireland. The status and state of individual marriages
became a legitimate subject of title investigation. The Act provided that a purported
conveyance of a family home was void without spousal consent. Therefore, every
conveyancing transaction since 1976 has necessitated a sworn declaration of marital
status (with appropriate certificates of marriage, divorce or nullity appended) to
ascertain, first whether or not the seller has a spouse, and secondly whether the correct
person has provided consent.169
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The legal annexation of the problems of deserted wives, the ‘privatisation’ of the
support obligation, masked the structural issues that created and maintained their
dependency - systematic exclusion from the workforce, from education, from access
to contraception or childcare.170 Although many women accepted, and indeed coveted
a dependent role, others did not have that luxury. 171 Spousal maintenance laws, in
practice, are useful only to the relatively well off. A woman whose husband is either
unemployed, or in low paid work, will do no better under a maintenance regime, and
may be better off receiving welfare and social housing. A middle class woman, on the
other hand, will have a better standard of living if she receives weekly maintenance
payments from her husband, and the right to live in housing provided by him. 172
Political campaigners sought justice and equality through law reform, but in effect,
legal maintenance rules simply perpetuated existing inequalities.173
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5.5.3 Relationship practice as an appropriate domain of political intervention
Marriage law reforms of the 1970s affirmed law’s role in regulating relationship
practice. The problems of marriage and female post-relationship poverty were seen
only in terms of marriage law, and the provisions of Article 41 acquired the status of
political and social truth. The discretion-based paradigm of judicial decision making
instigated by the new maintenance provisions was repeated in all subsequent marriage
legislation, and the lifetime nature of support obligations accepted without question,
even following the grant of a decree of divorce.174 Marriage law was politically useful
because it connected economic concerns with the welfare of the population to
individual aspirations for intimate relationships. The marriage-saving doctrine aimed
to maintain marriage as the centre of social administration, but it also succeeded in
producing techniques of power capable of optimising social behaviour through the
support of individual moral beliefs. What it failed to do, however, was address the
problem of desertion, which continued to cause political difficulty.

5.5.4 The normalising power of marriage law?
Foucault, in referring to bio-political mechanisms notes how they act:
as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence …
guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony.175
Later he reflects further on the normalising effects of bio-power:
we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of
normality, and the operation of normalization consists … [in] acting to bring the
most unfavourable in line with the more favourable. … These distributions will
serve as the norm. The norm is an interplay of different normalities.176
Francois Ewald argues that Foucault’s norm is a means of producing a common
standard without reference to transcendent truths about the world. He further claims
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that law in the modern state is the norm, that is, it is a method of judgment that does
not rely on anything outside itself.177
However, focusing on Foucault’s formulations, the effect and objective of law in
systems of normalising power comes to the fore, rather than its ontological
characteristics. The effect of the reformed legal rules governing marriage in 1970s
Ireland was to support social understandings of ‘normal’ relationship behaviour and
its political objective was to save marriage. Government accepted that marriage had
difficulties; the problems with marriage were the motivation for political action.
Nonetheless, it also sought to solve those problems by encouraging, but not
mandating, ‘normal’ relationship practice – lifetime dependency model marriage. As
time progressed these attempts at normalising a particular form of relationship,
practice installed a ‘field of visibility’ around marriage.178 In other words, government
acted to establish a set of processes around marriage that would measure its
characteristics and intervene to direct its performance. Following observation and
investigation, the problem with marriage was no longer desertion, a moral failure that
suddenly afflicts, but does not end marriage. Rather, marital difficulties would become
something permanent, a constant danger that gnawed at the solidity of marriage,
weakening it status as a social institution.179
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5.6 New Sources of Political Knowledge
5.6.1 Gender equality
At end of the 1960s, men and women in marriage had separate legal personalities and
separate property but were legally bound together for life in gendered marital roles.
As demonstrated by the Married Women’s Status Act 1957, however, notions of
formal equality had begun to permeate the legislative process. The Guardianship of
Infants Act 1964 made both parents guardians of marital children and liable for their
support.180 The Succession Act 1965, moving away from common law sex-based rules
of curtsey and dower, gave gender-neutral succession rights to spouses.
The equality imperative was accelerated in the early 1970s by Ireland’s impending
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC)181 governed by the Treaty
of Rome,182 which required that signatory states ensure that men and women receive
equal pay for equal work.183 The Commission on the Status of Women’s initial report
had recommended the phasing-in of equal pay in the public service but made no
recommendations regarding equal pay in the private sector, considered outside the
remit of government. However, EEC membership meant that equal pay in both public
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and private employment became a policy imperative. The Anti-discrimination Pay Act
1974 became law on the 31st December 1975, and required that men and women
carrying out the same work be paid at the same rate. In a remarkable departure from
the discourse on marriage law, in relation to equal pay, married women become
women workers. The Minister for Labour, Michael O’ Leary states that:
It is our objective as an administration to allow women to play a full part in the
life of the State and to eliminate those barriers which prevent them from doing so.
Whilst it is true that the majority of women may not wish to see their family role
basically altered, it must not be forgotten that women are going out to work in far
greater numbers or are returning to work at an earlier age after their children have
gone to school.184
Women were a unified gender in debate on equal pay, with no differentiation based
on marital status. Equal pay was an ‘honest endeavour towards the improvement of
the status of women,’185 not as wives and mothers but as workers. The marriage bar,
which required women to retire from public service on marriage, had been removed
in 1973,186 and the economic narrative that dominated debate on entry into the EEC
had begun to permeate discussion of women in the context of employment.187

5.6.2 Equality and marriage law.
Yvonne Galligan, wrote in 1998 that during the 1970s and 1980s family law came to
mean the abolition of discrimination against married women.188 This is not wholly
accurate. Certainly family law was very much seen a women’s issue, but it connoted
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not the eradication of discrimination against married women, but the protection of
women’s status as dependent home-makers. Economic policy, particularly within the
context of the EEC, 189 had begun to shift towards a view of women as potential
workers, and although equality and the gender-neutral imposition of obligation were
accepted, there was no real expectation that the 1976 Acts would apply equally to both
husbands and wives. It was expected, and indeed seen as normal and desirable, that
the respective spouses would have clearly defined gender-based roles within their
lifetime marriage. Dependency marriage continued to represent dominant social
practice until well into the 1990s. Legal equality and employment rights had little
impact on other social, economic and religious forces that acted to support the social
construction of married women as dependent homemakers.

5.6.3 Adjudicating marriage in the courts
Marriages rarely presented themselves to the courts in the 1960s and 1970s, and when
they did judicial decision-making tended to reflect the accepted social and political
picture of marriage. In 1966, the Supreme Court held that the family referred to in the
Constitution was that based on marriage190 and in 1976, that the wife and mother was
the appropriate person to care for children of ‘tender years.’191 The 1973 Supreme
Court decision of McGee v The Attorney General and The Revenue Commissioners192
found that Article 40 of the Constitution protected an unenumerated right to privacy
in marriage. Although the identification of a right to privacy was a radical departure
in legal terms, it was fully consonant, in relation to marriage, with the subsidiarity
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doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church and the politics of the 1950s:193 a decision on
family planning should be made at the lowest possible level, the family, and not by
the State. Walsh J, in striking down post-independence legislation that prohibited the
importation of contraceptives, noted that:
the fact that the use of contraceptives may offend against the moral code of the
majority of the citizens of the State would not, per se, justify an intervention by
the State to prohibit their use within marriage. The private morality of its citizens
does not justify intervention by the State into the activities of those citizens unless
and until the common good requires it.194
The use of contraceptives did indeed offend against the moral code of the majority;
legislation facilitating their sale was not introduced in Ireland until 1978.195

5.7 Conclusion.
5.7.1 Governed by marriage law.
Between the foundation of the State and the 1960s, the Irish government had accepted
dependency marriage as an unproblematic social institution, and used it as a relay for
poverty-relief measures and other (limited) social services. The adoption of a
Keynesian economic model in the late 1950s focused political attention on the welfare
of the Irish population, making social support an essential objective of government.
Social services, remade as entitlements rather than discretionary relief of abject
poverty, became the focus of campaigning women’s groups who sought support for
women left indigent by the failure of marriage. The emerging international human
rights discourse of the 1970s transformed these women into the embodiment of
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women’s social right to adopt a dependent role in marriage. In seeking vindication of
that right, a new mode of governing marriage was identified – the legal regulation of
spousal obligations.
There was no question of the State imposing a patriarchal or religious vision of
marriage on a resisting population. Rather government relied upon existing social
understandings of the nature of marriage in identifying a problematic individual, the
deserted wife, and formulating solutions that relied upon the lifetime dependency
nature of social marriage. Legal knowledge, in the form of international human rights,
re-articulated to reflect Irish sensibilities, supported both political and social
objectives. Marriage had long been used as a relay for government and most
government services and supports were mediated through the marriage relationships.
The labour market was likewise structured around the one income family. This habit
of government, building upon existing social practice, contributed to the problems
experienced by deserted wives; nonetheless, the solution was seen only in terms of
legal enforcement of the obligations of marriage. Two legislative reforms of marriage
law were enacted in 1976, each relying upon and re-enscribing existing understandings
of marriage.
The reforms of the 1970s thus demonstrate the productivity of power and its
connection to the forms of knowledge available to government at the time. They also
illustrate the connection between the objectives of the State and the aspirations of
individual citizens. State administration depended on the social practice of marriage
and married women, believing that their husbands had a moral obligation to maintain
them, claimed the right to be dependent in marriage. During the 1970s, therefore,
marriage law governed the Irish population by re-enforcing the necessity of genderbased roles, by subjectifying women as vulnerable dependents and men as morally
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bound financial providers. Government chose to deploy legal measures to address the
problem of desertion without considering other ways to facilitate married women’s
existence apart from a providing husband. The legal solution also focused only on the
problems of a particular social class of women whose husbands were in a position to
provide post-relationship maintenance and housing.

5.7.2 The power effects of marriage law
The Irish government had accepted that lifetime dependency marriage was a necessary
social institution in need of protection. It also needed its citizens to perform marriage,
because it was central to how social management, an essential element of
Keynesianism, was achieved. In Foucault’s scheme, the Irish government had begun
to deploy bio-political mechanisms that aimed to take control of life processes and
modify them. Choices were made regarding what constituted natural or normal
relationship behaviour, largely based on social practices and the tenets of dominant
morality. In seeking to maximise normality, the Irish government deployed marriage
law as a political technique for the explicit purpose of saving marriage. Marriage was
already a point of transfer between the State and individual interests, and the process
of law reform both engaged with and re-enforced social understanding of the nature
of the marriage relationships. During this decade, the objective of government in
regulating marriage was quite specific – it was intended to ensure the performance of
lifetime dependency marriage. Of course, this was an objective doomed to failure.
That all marriages did not last for life, nor adopt the dependency paradigm, was
already apparent, but government accepted the basic moral premise that marriage was
a social good, essential to the functioning of society.
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Six – Marriage Breakdown
1976 - 1990

In 1982, the Supreme Court declared marriage to be ‘a permanent, indissoluble union
of man and woman,’1 which the law must protect from attack, thus supporting and reinscribing the political objective of marriage saving articulated by government in the
1970s. A newly established Law Reform Commission,2 supported law reform as the
appropriate way to achieve this objective by demonstrating law’s efficacy in
identifying and managing non-conforming relationship behaviour. As a result, at the
end of the decade, a comprehensive legal machinery intended to save marriage and
regulate marriage breakdown was established. This chapter discusses how legal
expertise both shaped and reflected government objectives during the 1980s, resulting
in the further normalisation of lifetime dependency marriage and the installation of a
network of mechanisms of surveillance and intervention around those unable to
conform to the normative relationship form.

1

[1982] 1 IR 241, 286.
Law Reform Commission, Report on Divorce a Mensa et Thoro and Related Matters
(LRC 8 1983), 32.
2
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6.1 Governing the Social through Economic Decline
6.1.1 Economic decline in the 1980s
The oil crisis of 1973 put an end to the economic expansion of the 1960s, but the Irish
government ‘continued to behave as if nothing had happened.’3 Assuming the crisis
was a temporary difficulty, the government borrowed heavily to fund a major
expansion in public expenditure. 4 Government involvement in the economy had
increased hugely in the period since independence, but more particularly between
1973 and 1985 when the ratio of public expenditure to Gross National Product rose
from 42 percent to 67 percent.5 In 1981, almost 10 percent of the labour force was
unemployed.6 The situation did not improve:
In early 1987, a sense of crisis prevailed. The most obvious indications of this
crisis were the massive unemployment, the resumption of heavy emigration,
falling living standards and the intransigent public finance imbalances.7
By the end of the decade one fifth of the labour force were unemployed, despite levels
of emigration not experienced since the 1950s.8

6.1.2 Marriage practices in the 1980s
Marriage rates began to fall during the 1980s, 9 but labour market participation by
married women rose, increasing from 7.5 percent in 1970 to 16.7 percent in 1980,

Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912 – 1985 (Cambridge University Press 1989), 471.
ibid, 471 – 472.
5
Kieran Kennedy, Thomas Giblin and Deirdre McHugh, The Economic Development of
Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Routledge 1988), 87. Gross National Product is the sum of
gross domestic product (value of final goods and services produced within the domestic
territory) and net factor income from abroad.
6
From a labour force of 1,272,000 in 1981, 126,000 were unemployed. The corresponding
figures for 1971 were 1,110,000 and 61,000 respectively. ibid, 143.
7
ibid, 92.
8
ibid, 93.
9
Falling to 5.2 per thousand in 1986 and remaining at that level for the rest of the decade.
Central Statistics Office, Statistical Abstract 1993 (Pl 9990, Stationery Office 1993), 27.
3
4
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reaching 23.7 percent in 1989.10 This was still low in comparison with other European
countries; the workforce participation rate for married women in Britain was 57.2
percent and in Sweden 75.6 percent.11 Fertility rates were also above the European
average, despite a decrease from 3.76 children per woman in 1960 to 2.33 children per
woman in 1987.12 The presence of children was the single biggest factor determining
whether married women worked, suggesting that social practices continued to reflect
an understanding of women’s role in marriage as a caring one.13 This perceived role
extended to unmarried mothers. A 1992 National Economic and Social Council
sponsored report on the participation of women in the labour market categorised
women by marital status,14 but did not present any statistics in relation to unmarried
mother’s labour market participation, despite 32 percent of first births in 1991
occurring outside of marriage (16 per cent in 1981).15

Tim Callan and Brian Farrell, Women’s Participation in the Irish Labour Market (Pl
8449, National Economic and Social Council 1992), 18
11
ibid, 31.
12
ibid 19.
13
Callan and Farrell identify a significant correlation between number and age of children
and women’s labour market status. They also note that labour market participation rates do
not differentiate between full and part-time employment and that many married women with
children engaged in part-time work, ibid 29 – 36. No statistics were collected on the correlation
between men’s labour market participation and the number of children in their household.
14
ibid.
15
Eithne McLaughlin and Paula Rogers in their study of unmarried motherhood in Ireland
suggest that the unrestricted nature of the unmarried mother’s allowance at this time also
reflects a conceptualisation of women with children as non-workers. Eithne McLoughlin and
Paula Rogers ‘Single Mothers in the Republic of Ireland: Mothers not Workers’ in Simon
Duncan and Rosalind Edwards, Single Mothers in an International Context: Mothers not
Workers (UCL Press 1997), 9, 12. By 1991, one in ten families with children under 15 were
headed by single parents, and 83 percent of these by women; employment rates for both
married and unmarried mothers remained low and as a result there was a high level of poverty
and reliance on welfare among single women with children.
10
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6.1.3 Governing through marriage – social provision
The Report of a Commission on Social Welfare, published in 1986, illustrates the
extent to which marriage remained central to the distributive functions of the State.
The Commission commented that:
the underlying concept was that the husband was the breadwinner and head of the
household and the person to whom increases of benefit for his wife and children
was paid. Any married woman living with her husband was regarded as his
dependent and any children were also regarded as his dependents whether or not
the wife was working and contributing to their support.16
Married women could receive increases of benefit only for husbands who were
incapable of self-support through mental or physical infirmity. Similarly child
dependent increases were not payable to a married woman except where her
husband was an invalid or where she was living apart from and not being supported
by her husband. A married man on the other hand could receive increases for his
wife and children regardless of her employment or financial status.17
When the 1986 report was published, the position regarding payments for dependents
was in the process of amendment, but the general scheme of the social welfare system
remained as described.18 Of the twenty-one social welfare payment types available in
1985, nine were awarded only to women, and for eight of those, marital status was a
qualifying condition.19 Widows contributory pension, deserted wives benefit, widows
non-contributory pension, deserted wives allowance and prisoner’s wives allowance

16

Commission on Social Welfare, Report (Stationery Office 1986), 17. The Commission
was established in August 1983 by the Minister for Social Welfare, Barry Desmond. It was
tasked with reviewing the social welfare system and related social services and making
recommendations for development with the aims of producing social equity and relieving
poverty through the social welfare system. It was also required to examine the interaction of
policy in social welfare, tax, health, education and housing. The commission recommended
the establishment of the Combat Poverty Agency, which was set up with an interim board in
1984. In its introductory section, the report notes that 37.4 percent of the population were in
receipt of social transfers in 1985, an increase from 20% in 1966.
17
ibid, 27.
18
Pursuant to an EEC directive on equal treatment of men and women in social welfare
(79/7/EEC), the Social Welfare (No 2) Act 1985 provided for the gradual implementation of
equality of treatment. However, the Act focused on entitlement to unemployment assistance
and the treatment of dependents. Widowhood, maternity and family benefits were specifically
excluded from the directive and payments for women using marital status as a qualifying
condition were not removed until 1990.
19
Commission on Social Welfare, Report, 17.
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compensated for the loss of a breadwinning husband, and single women’s and
unmarried mothers allowance for the failure to secure one. Only maternity benefit did
not require proof of marital status. An extraordinary feature of the contributory
payments in today’s terms was that they were paid to working age women until they
reached pension age, irrespective of the income or assets of the recipient, and often
whether or not they had dependent children. Social welfare payments were completely
exempt from tax, and maintenance received by spouses amounting to less than the
payment rate for unemployment benefit were disregarded for the purpose of deserted
wives payments.20
The number in receipt of these supports was not insignificant; at the end of 1985.
there were 78,815 women in receipt of a contributory widow’s pension, a numerical
value surpassed only by unemployment payment recipients.21 Other than payments
based on the disruption of a women’s marital position, most social welfare payments
were made on the basis of the marriage based household, and ‘the fact that a woman
is working would not affect her husband’s entitlement to claim for her as a
dependent.’22 Married women could not qualify in their own right for unemployment
assistance until 1986, and where they qualified for social insurance benefits received
lower rates and for shorter periods than men did. Women who remained out of the

ibid, 121. SI No 227 of 1970, as amended by SI No 74 of 1972, provided that ‘monetary
payments and other contributions to the support and maintenance which are inconsiderable
may be disregarded.’ This provision was generously interpreted by the Department deeming
the maximum amount of unemployment assistance, plus and child dependant allowances to
be ‘inconsiderable.’ See Paul Ward Financial Consequence of Marital Breakdown (Combat
Poverty Agency 1990), 15.
21
At the end of 1985 there were 89,219 recipients of unemployment benefit and 120,985
receiving unemployment assistance. 3,965 women received the deserted wives allowance,
5,165 the deserted wives benefit and 11,530 the unmarried mother’s allowance. Commission
on Social Welfare, Report, 121
22
ibid, 49.
20
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workforce following marriage were unlikely to have sufficient social insurance
contributions to qualify for benefits in their own right.23

6.1.4 Governing through marriage - taxation
Increased social provision required increasing taxation, and this too was achieved
through the medium of the dependency model family. A Commission on Taxation was
appointed in 1980 to:
enquire generally into the present system of taxation and to recommend such
changes as appear desirable and practicable so as to achieve an equitable incidence
of taxation, due attention being paid to the need to encourage development of the
national economy and to maintain an adequate revenue yield.24
It produced five reports during the 1980s reviewing existing tax arrangements and
making both specific and broad stroke suggestions for reform. In relation to direct
taxation, it concluded that:
the family should be adopted as the unit for all taxes. This means that transfers of
wealth within the family, that is between husbands and wives and dependent
children should be tax-free.25
The family envisaged as the tax unit was that based on marriage, the Commission
specifically recommended the exclusion of other family types:
We think that the family unit should only include spouses and children, except
where an additional allowance for dependents residing with the taxpayer … is
claimed.26
The Commission considered a conceptualisation of family to be essential to the
administration of the taxation system, and marriage as the most appropriate proxy for
family sharing. The extent to which the administration of both tax and social welfare
depended on the tying of spouses together is illustrated by the practice of allocating

23

In 1986, the workforce participation rate for married woman was 20.9 percent. Central
Statistics office Labour Force Survey 1986 (Pl 5259, Stationery Office 1987), 18.
24
Commission on Taxation, First Report: Direct Taxation (Pl 617, Stationery Office
1982), 25
25
ibid, 426.
26
ibid, 230.
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new Revenue and Social Insurance numbers to women upon marriage, which
consisted of their husbands’ numbers with the addition of the letter ‘W’ a practice that
persisted until 1991.27
In practical terms, tax policy continued to favour marriage over other relationship
practices. The Finance Act 1980 extended significant tax advantages to married
couples, substantially reducing liability to income tax, particularly for higher
earners.28 The 1980 Act also allowed married couples to claim double allowances in
respect of capital gains, mortgage interest, life assurance premiums and residence
related expenditure. 29 A complete exemption from Capital Acquisitions Tax on
inheritances between spouses was introduced in 1985,30 and this was extended to gifts
between spouses in 1990.31
6.1.5 Governing through marriage – sex
The expression of sexuality was also regulated through the medium of the marital
family: contraception was available only to married couples on prescription until
1985.32 When seeking to extend availability in 1985, the Minster for Health, Barry

27

Revenue and Social Insurance Numbers or RSI numbers were the precursor to the
current Personal Public Service or PPS number. They were introduced in 1979 with pay related
social insurance, pursuant to the Social Welfare (Amendment) Act 1979 and were based on
existing PAYE numbers issued by the Revenue Commissioners. The practice of adding a W
for married women was discontinued in 1991. See Minister for Social Protection Joan
Burton’s response to a parliamentary question on the number of PPS numbers issued. Dáil
Deb 14 December 2011, vol 735, col 646. The change of practice in relation to ‘W’ numbers
took place when the responsibility for issue of numbers was transferred from the Revenue
Commissioners to the Department of Social Welfare in 1991. Dáil Deb 11 July 1991, vol 410,
col 1490.
28
A system of income splitting was introduced, which continued a process begun in 1978,
whereby a married couple received double the tax-free allowances and tax bands of single
people, regardless of whether one or both spouses were employed. This change created a
significant cost and disproportionately favoured the better off.
29
Finance Act 1980, s 61, 6, 7, 15.
30
Finance Act 1985, s 59.
31
Finance Act 1990, s 127.
32
Prior to 1979, the importation of contraceptives was banned. The Health (Family
Planning) Act 1979, s 4(2) made contraception legally available ‘bona fide, for family
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Desmond, argued that wider availability of contraception was necessary to prevent the
‘great tragedy’ of unmarried motherhood. 33 His position was a marked contrast to
Charles Haughey’s approach in 1979 when he argued that the Health (Family
Planning) Bill 1979 was a measure which:
places family planning firmly in the context in which, I believe, it should be placed,
that is, in the context of family medical care provided by the general practitioner.
This seems to me to be a wise and sensible way to ensure that the making available
of contraceptives will be for family purposes and will be accompanied by advice
regarding the merits and the hazards of different forms of contraception. The
provision in this, and the preceding sections, should, in my view, ensure the
availability in this country of an adequate family planning service under the
general direction and control of those who are in the best position to advise about
the manner and extent of the provision of such services in individual cases.34
Not all doctors were ‘willing or in a position to provide a full family planning service
to their patients.’35 Contraception was in practice, therefore, available only to a limited
segment of the married population whose doctors did not oppose its use. The Health
(Family Planning)(Amendment) Act 1985 36 facilitated the sale of non-medical
contraceptives by pharmacies and family planning clinics to people over the age of 18.
Despite legalisation, many pharmacies refused to sell contraceptives and their
availability remained limited, particularly outside Dublin.37

planning purposes’ to married couples. The meaning of bona fide was not defined in the
legislation.
33
Minster Desmond noted ‘a significant increase in extra-marital sexual activity resulting
in an increase in illegitimate births, from the point in 1971 where they constituted 2.7% of all
births to the point where they accounted for more than 6.8% in 1983. Furthermore, there has
been a two-fold increase between 1962 and 1981 in the proportion of marriages in a calendar
year to which a birth is registered in the same year, suggesting a corresponding increase in
premarital conceptions.’ Dáil Deb 14 February 1985, vol 355, col 2485.
34
Dáil Deb 330 28 February 1979, vol 312, col 330.
35
Minster for Health Barry Desmond on the Second Stage of the Health (Family Planning)
(Amendment) Bill, 1985. Dáil Deb 14 February 1985, vol 355, col 2485. He continued ‘[t]his
extends in some cases to a refusal to provide authorisations for non-medical contraceptives
under the Act.’
36
The Act came into force on 1 October 1985 (SI 1985/316), and their sale remained
subject to the proviso in s 11 of the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, that noting in the Act
could oblige any person to import, manufacture, advertise, display or sell contraceptives.
37
The availability of contraceptives, in practice, was so limited following the 1985 Act
that it was necessary to produce a list of pharmacists stocking condoms in a 1986 book on
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6.2 The Problem with Marriage
6.2.1 Counting marriage failure
The extension of social provision to the female victims of marital failure inevitably
led to the production of statistics regarding detailing its prevalence. Despite the
enactment of the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act in 1976, the
number of wives and children in receipt of welfare assistance continued to increase.
The Commission on Social Welfare reported 3,965 women in receipt of deserted wives
allowance and 5,165 receiving deserted wives benefit at the end of 1985. 38 A labour
force survey, carried out in 1983, estimated that there were 21,100 separated and
deserted persons in the country.39 The 1986 census, which for the first time included
a question designed to measure marriage breakdown, identified 40,000 people who
were separated, deserted, or remarried following divorce.40 The scheme of civil legal
aid established in 1980 (following Josephine Airey’s successful challenge to the
absence of government funded legal assistance in family law cases),41 provided further
evidence of the extent of marital disharmony. Although the scheme’s remit extended
to landlord and tenant law and consumer law, 80 percent of legal aid cases related to
family law during the first 3 months of operation.42

women’s health. Anne Roper, Woman to Woman: A Health Care Handbook for Women (Attic
Press 1986).
38
Commission on Social Welfare, Report, 121.
39
Referred to by Michael Woods in the Dáil, Dáil Deb 14 May 1986, vol 366, col 804.
40
The question allowed respondents to identify themselves as separated, divorced or
remarried following a previous divorce. The figure of 40,000 represents an approximation of
the total of these three categories. Peter Lunn, Tony Fahey and Carmel Hannan, Family
Figures: Family Dynamics and Family Types in Ireland, 1986 – 2006 (ESRI 2009), 45.
41
The Legal Aid Board was initially set up on an administrative basis in 1980, following
a finding by the European Court of Human Rights in Airey v Ireland [1979] 2 EHRR on 9
October 1979 that the absence of a scheme of legal aid in family law matters was a breach of
Ireland’s obligations under Article 6.1 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
42
John Horgan tabled an oral question in the Dáil on 29 October 1980 regarding the
percentage of applicants attending Legal Aid centres with matrimonial cases. The Board had
commenced operation in mid-August of that year and the reply, delivered by Sean Doherty
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6.2.2 The problem with marriage – marriage breakdown
Desertion continued to incite political discussion in the 1980s, and the deserted wife
remained an object of sympathy. Discussion of the cause of her difficulties, however,
began to shift, from the moral failure of men, to the more general phenomenon of
‘marriage breakdown.’ It is difficult to pinpoint the specific moment when marriage
breakdown began to displace the deserted wife as an object of political attention,43 but
the first references in the Oireachtas appear in discussion of long-term unemployment.
In 1977, Deputy David Andrews refers to marriage breakdown brought about ‘by the
spectre and the reality of continuous unemployment’ because:
The father is at home almost 24 hours of the day and the male of the species,
whatever about the feminists amongst us, was never intended to be at home for
that length of time; he was meant to be out working. … Frustration begins to grip
and uncertainty is there all the time; the husband begins to fret and tensions begin
to build up in the home.44
By October 1980, the matter had gained enough political attention that Deputy Eileen
Desmond of the Labour Party felt justified in presenting a motion to the Oireachtas
proposing recognition of ‘the necessity of reviewing the constitutional prohibition on
the introduction of legislation to provide for the dissolution of marriages which have
irretrievably broken down.’45 Government did not support her proposal.

was that 75 – 80 percent of applications in the Dublin area were in relation to family law. Dáil
Deb 29 October 1980, vol 323 col 993.
43
Deputy Nora Owen, speaking in the Dáil, suggested a source for the change of political
subject:
This debate started in a uniquely Irish style in the early seventies with the introduction of
the deserted wife’s allowance. That was our first formal recognition that marriages break
down in Ireland. The debate on this issue did not progress publically for a number of years
after that. Although we were acutely aware that more and more people were suffering
from marriage breakdown, the debate did not have a public fact. In 1978, a motion calling
for a referendum to remove the constitutional ban on divorce was put down at a Fine Gael
Ard-Fheis. That opened up the public debate not only at a political level, but also in the
wider public arena.
Dáil Deb 26 February 1986, vol 364, col 450.
44
Dáil Deb 10 March 1977, vol 297, col 1218, during debate on the Social Welfare Bill
1977.
45
Dáil Deb 29 October 1980, vol 323, col 1086.
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The government sponsored Family Law Bill 1981, which sought to abolish actions
for criminal conversation,46 enticement and harbouring of spouses, and enforcement
of marriage contracts, further enabled discussion of marriage breakdown.47 The Bill
was criticised by opposition deputies for its minimalist approach, ‘a few mealymouthed measures designed to clear up anachronisms on the Statute Books which
other countries have got rid of hundreds of years ago.’48 The real problem, according
to Deputy Michael Keating, was the increasing incidence of marriage breakdown; the
necessary questions for government were therefore:
Why is it that we do not analyse why this fundamental marital breakdown is
becoming increasingly common? Is it just that we are now talking more about it?
I believe that it is becoming increasingly common. Why is that happening? How
can we help marriages in difficulty? How can we discourage marriages which are
likely to founder from taking place – for example, in the case of very young people
who may not be fully aware of the rigours and the demands, emotional and
financial, and all the circumstances which point towards difficulty in marriage?
Why do we not try to prevent the horrific situation arising where a wife, who on
one day years before held her husband’s hand on the altar and said ‘I do’ is now
being forced to seek the protection of the Garda and the courts against that same
man, the father of her children? To deal with the problem only at that level is
wrong. It is to deal with it in a simplistic, reactionary manner.49
Politics must concern itself, he implied, with the causes of marital difficulties. The
institution of marriage must be protected from all those social, personal, and economic
forces that might destabilise it. Government must aim, not to solve the problems of
women left indigent following the failure of male support, or suffering at the hands of
violent husbands, but to prevent these problems arising through the prevention of
marriage breakdown.

46

The Bill implemented recommendations of the newly established Law Reform
Commission.
47
The Bill became the Family Law Act 1981, which also contained rules relating to the
property of, and gifts to and between engaged couples.
48
Michael Keating, Dáil Deb 7 May 1981, vol 328, col 2456.
49
Michael Keating, Dáil Deb 7 May 1981, vol 328, col 2395.
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6.2.3 Marriage breakdown and marriage-saving
Marriage-saving as the appropriate response to marriage breakdown was confirmed
with the appointment, in 1983, of a Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown ‘to
consider the protection of marriage and of family life, and to examine the problems
which follow the breakdown of marriage, and to report to the houses of the
Oireachtas.’50 The Committee’s 1985 report began; ‘[t]he committee recognised the
pre-eminent desire of all concerned to ensure insofar as possible the preservation and
protection of marriage.’ 51 It is notable that individual marriage did not require
protection; rather the objective was to defend the institution of marriage. A decrease
in the rate of marriage was a ‘cause for concern’ making it ‘necessary to tackle the
problems which give rise to this’ and to ‘make marriage as secure and viable as
humanly possible.’ Thus, ‘much of the committee’s deliberations focused on the
protection of marriage and family life.’52

6.2.4 The political objective of marriage-saving
The expansion of social provision had led to the production of statistics about the rate
of marriage failure, which in turn posed the question of how it could be controlled,
minimised, and regulated. The Irish government had already accepted that the
relationship behaviour of the population was an issue for which it had responsibility.
Furthermore, in seeking to reduce the rate of marriage breakdown, government
attention was directed toward the protection of intact marriage. It was assumed that
marriage was a social good, and marriage breakdown (or alternative relationship

50

The Committee was composed of 11 Dáil deputies and 5 members of the Seanad of
which eight were men and eight women. Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown, Report (Pl
3074, Stationery Office 1985) vii.
51
ibid, 1.
52
ibid, 1.
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practices) a social problem. Crucially, the phenomenon of marriage breakdown was
the problem, not its practical effects.53
Two questions arise in relation to how government assumed the social necessity of
marriage, and formulated the marriage protection doctrine. First the meaning of
‘marriage’ in this context, and secondly, the forms of knowledge deployed in
constructing it as a social good. The Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown deferred
to the terms of the Constitution in defining the form of marriage requiring protection:
The pledge [in article 41.3.1] to guard with special care the institution of marriage
is a guarantee that this institution in all its constitutional connotations including
the pledge given in Article 41.2.2 as to the position of the mother in the home, will
be given special protection, so that it will continue to fulfil its functions as the basis
of the family and as a permanent, indissoluble union of man and woman.54
With regard to the truth that marriage was a socially privileged relationship, the Joint
Committee relied on natural law:
The rights of the family recognised by the Constitution are ‘antecedent and
superior to all positive law’ and are firmly based on natural law which is ‘of
universal application and applies to all human persons’ Northants County Council
v ABF [1982] ILRM 164. These rights are also ‘inalienable and imprescriptible.’55
Legal articulations of the meaning of marriage and its social importance shaped the
views of the Committee, they were also instrumental in determining how government
went about the marriage saving project. Article 41 of the Constitution assumed a new
political status in the 1980s, but not because government decided to enforce its terms.
Rights-based arguments, suggesting the usefulness of the Constitution as a limiter of
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The Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown, despite producing a report of over 400
pages in length, considered the practical effects of marriage breakdown in three short
paragraphs. One noted that marriage breakdown may often result in a decrease in the standard
of living of all concerned, the second that the State may incur additional costs in social housing
and legal aid, and the third that ‘financial considerations’ might compel couples ‘to subsist in
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State action, produced a series of politically motivated judicial reviews of legislation
that in turn re-enforced the importance of marriage to the maintenance of social order.

6.3 Protecting Marriage – A New Reform Imperative.
6.3.1 The morality of constitutional marriage
When judicial review of State action by reference to the fundamental rights provisions
of the Constitution began in 1965 with the Supreme Court decision in Ryan v Attorney
General,56 a papal encyclical provided the source of the unremunerated right to bodily
integrity relied upon by the plaintiff.57 In the 1951 case, In Re Tilson’s Infants Gavin
Duffy J had referred to the moral nature of the marital family:
The cardinal position ascribed to the family by our fundamental law is profoundly
significant; the home is the pivot of our plan of life. The confused philosophy of
law bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century is superseded by articles which
exalt the family by proclaiming and adopting in the text of the Constitution itself
the Christian conception of the place of the family in society and in the State.58
The Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in 1964, in rejecting, as not part of
natural law, the proposition that the father of an illegitimate child had a ‘natural right’
to a say in its upbringing.59 Walsh J invoked natural law in McGee v Attorney General,
holding that the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution:
indicate that justice is placed above the law and acknowledge that natural rights or
human rights are not created by law but that the Constitution confirms their
existence and gives them protection. The individual has natural and human rights
over which the state has no authority and the family as the natural primary and
fundamental unit group of society has rights as such which the State cannot
control.60
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bodily integrity. He referred to the Encyclical letter ‘Peace on Earth’ as supporting his
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The Irish Courts had begun to adopt the idea that individual claims to justice could
limit State action, and that these rights-based claims derived their authority from an
antecedent order beyond positive law. Consequently, the political value of rightsclaims and the rhetoric of natural law was used in the 1980s, not to challenge the social
primacy of marriage, but to re-enforce it.

6.3.2 Producing legal knowledge about marriage
In 1964, the Supreme Court had confirmed Article 41’s textual implication that the
‘family’ attracting constitutional protection was that based on marriage. 61 In 1982,
relying on this interpretation, Francis and Mary Murphy sought judicial review of a
number of sections of the Income Tax Act 1967.62 The Act deemed a married woman’s
income to be that of her husband for tax purposes,63 gave a married man a tax-free
allowance that was more than, but not double, that allocated to a single person. Further,
the incomes of husband and wife were aggregated in determining the rate of tax
payable. Tax bands were the same for married couples and single persons. Thus,
married couples paid more tax than cohabiting couples whose incomes were not added
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State (Nicolau) v An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567.
Section 192(1) of the Income Tax Act 1967 stated:
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, a woman's income chargeable to tax shall, so far
as it is income for a year of assessment or part of a year of assessment during which she
is a married woman living with her husband, be deemed for income tax (including surtax) purposes to be his income and not to be her income, but the question whether there is
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Despite the provisions of the Married Women’s Status Act 1957 many government
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purposes. The legal imperative to separate property had not yet permeated political discourse.
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together. The differential in tax-free allowances disadvantaged all working married
couples, the effects of aggregation increased with income.64
There were two principle grounds of challenge. First, that the relevant provisions,
in disadvantaging married couples vis a vis cohabitees, was a breach of the equality
guarantee in Article 40.1 of the Constitution. Secondly, that the financial preferencing
of cohabitation over marriage represented a failure to protect with special care the
family based on marriage in accordance with Article 41.2.1. In the High Court,
Hamilton J rejected that part of the claim that related to tax-free allowances because:
there is a difference of social function between a husband and wife living together
and single people living together to which the legislature was entitled to have
regard. The husband and wife living together do so as a family recognised by the
Constitution. The law or the Constitution does not recognise or have regard to any
other union or liaison between single persons.65
In other words, government could not equate marriage with cohabitation for any
purpose. The judge did accept that the aggregation rules were a breach of the equality
guarantee in Article 40.1, ‘as they discriminate invidiously against married couples,
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salaries). The comparative effects are set out at [1982] 1 IR 241, 261. Unemployment
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and the husband in particular, and cannot be justified on any ground’ 66 (my
emphasis). He also ruled that aggregation infringed the marriage protection guarantee
in Article 41.
On appeal, the Supreme Court again rejected the claim in respect of tax-free
allowances, and narrowed the grounds on which the aggregation rules were
unconstitutional, declaring them an infringement of Article 41 only. Kenny J accepted
that:
[t]here is, admittedly, an inequality for income-tax purposes between, on the one
hand, married couples living together and, on the other hand, married couples who
are separated or unmarried couples living together. That inequality, however, is
justified by the particular social function under the Constitution of married couples
living together.67
The aggregation rules were declared unconstitutional because;
the nature and potentially progressive extent of the burden created ... is such that,
in the opinion of the Court, it is a breach of the pledge by the State to guard with
special care the institution of marriage and to protect it against attack.68
In other words, the disproportionate increase in tax liability at higher incomes was an
attack on marriage.
Kenny J, in the Supreme Court, adopted a natural law perspective on marriage and
the family it supported, affording marriage a privileged position in the natural order
outside the domain of State regulation:
It is to be noted that Article 41 has three sections. Section 1 recognises the family
as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and
superior to all positive law. It is because of those fundamental features that the
State gives the guarantee in s. 1, sub-section 2.
Section 2 stresses the importance of woman in the home and pledges that mothers
shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of
their duties in the home.
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Section 3, sub-s. 1, must be read not only in the context of the whole of s. 3 but in
that of the whole Article. This means that the pledge given in s. 3, sub-s. 1, to
guard with special care the institution of marriage is a guarantee that this institution
in all its constitutional connotations, including the pledge given in Article 41, s. 2,
sub-s. 2, as to the position of the mother in the home, will be given special
protection so that it will continue to fulfil its function as the basis of the family and
as a permanent, indissoluble union of man and woman.69
This view of the unique social function and moral nature of marriage was endorsed
by the Supreme Court in O’B v S.70 In that case, the court refused to interpret the word
‘issue’ in the Succession Act 1965 to include children born outside marriage. Walsh J
accepted that ‘in general speech, the word “issue” might well refer to children born
within marriage or children born out of marriage,’71 but this was not the case in the
context of succession law. The plaintiff could not inherit her father’s estate under to
the rules on intestacy, because she was ‘not the child of a family based upon
marriage.’72
In Dennehy v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General,73 Barron J, in the
High Court, held that making a social welfare payment available to a deserted wife,
but not a deserted husband, was not, having regard to Article 41.2 of the Constitution,
‘unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary.’74 In Hyland v Minister for Social Welfare and the
Attorney General, 75 Barrington J, in the High Court, expressed sympathy with a
legislator:
attempting to enact social welfare legislation. … He must be careful that the
legislation contains no element of sexual discrimination … [b]ut he must also
guard the institution of marriage and must not … make the financial position of
the working wife, when compared with the financial position of the wife who stays
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at home, so attractive as to encourage mothers to take up outside work to the
neglect of their work in the home.76
At issue in Hyland, was the validity of social welfare legislation, the net effect of
which was to limit the total social welfare entitlement of a married couple to the
maximum amount payable to one spouse plus an adult dependent. The section operated
to reduce Mr Hyland’s rate of unemployment assistance because his wife was entitled
to unemployment benefit in her own right. Barrington J suggested that the central issue
in the case was ‘whether the State has … guarded with “special care” the institution
of marriage.’ A cohabiting, but not married, couple in similar circumstances could
potentially receive the total of their separate entitlements without limitation. This case
was slightly less clear-cut than Murphy, because the department of social welfare
could use ‘benefit and privilege’ rules to limit the entitlements of cohabiting couples,
although evidence was adduced that they did not, in practice, do so. Barrington J held,
and the Supreme Court confirmed, that the impugned sections of the social welfare
code ‘penalised the married state’ and were therefore unconstitutional.77
Article 41, as interpreted by the Superior Courts in the 1980s, therefore endorsed
the marriage-saving objective of government. These decisions provided apparently
objective authority for the proposition that marriage was self-evidently a social good
deserving protection, and that the form of marriage attracting protection was the
lifetime, dependency model adopted by the vast majority of the Irish married
population. Legal knowledge provided a method for identifying optimal relationship
behaviour, but this simply reflected and consolidated all of the notions about marriage
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that had circulated between politics, religion, and individual practice since the
foundation of the State. Although claiming objectivity, these legal constructions of
marriage, and its place in society, reflected the dominant morality of 1980s Ireland.

6.3.3 Marriage protection and legal expertise
Legal knowledge, in the form of constitutional interpretation, supported the political
objective of marriage saving. Legal expertise also demonstrated its utility as a
technique for achieving this aim with the establishment of a Law Reform Commission
in 1975.78 Following publication of five working papers relating to marriage law, 79
the Commission published its First Report on Family Law in 1981.80 The theme of the
working papers and report was the ‘protection of the family against damage to the
continuity and stability of relationships among its members.’81 Seven further reports
on family law were published between 1982 and 1985 dealing with: divorce a mensa
et thoro and related matters; restitution of conjugal rights, jactitation of marriage82 and
related matters; nullity of marriage, and three separate reports relating to public
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international law aspects of marriage, divorce and judicial separation.83 More than a
third of the Commission’s output between 1981 and 1985 related to aspects of the
legal regulation of marriage.
The Commission’s recommendations for new legal techniques, in hindsight, seem
hopelessly naïve. For example, in the First Report on Family Law the Commission
suggested a ‘family action for adultery … available to either spouse for the benefit of
the members of the family, comprising each spouse and the children.’ 84 Damages
would be available to both the ‘innocent’ and ‘adulterous’ spouse in an action taken
against the third party ‘responsible’ for spousal adultery.
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Nonetheless, the

Commission’s reports on marriage law during this period had two important practical
implications. First, they demonstrated the historic importance of law and legal
mechanisms in the regulation of marriage, 86 and secondly, they illustrated law’s
efficacy in identifying and managing abnormal (amoral) marital behaviour.
Law, in the form of constitutional protection, and the imperatives of an antecedent
‘natural order’ defined the ‘normal’ marital relationship: lifetime, heterosexual,
gendered. Centuries of marital litigation based on the canon law of the established
Christian church supported this construction of normality, but it also identified the
83

Law Reform Commission, Report on Restitution of Conjugal Rights, Jactitation of
Marriage and Related Matters; Law Reform Commission, Report Divorce a Mensa et Thoro
and Related Matters (LRC 8 1983); Law Reform Commission, Report on Nullity of Marriage
(LRC 9 1984); Law Reform Commission, Report on Recognition of Foreign Divorces and
Legal Separations (LRC 10 1985); Law Reform Commission, Report on Private International
Law Aspects of Capacity to Marry and Choice of Law in Proceedings for Nullity of Marriage
(LRC 19 1985); Law Reform Commission, Report on Jurisdiction in Proceedings for Nullity
of Marriage, Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees, and the Hague Convention on the
Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriage (LRC 20 1985).
84
Law Reform Commission, First Report on Family Law, 4.
85
ibid, 4.
86
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that the legal rules recorded by the Law Reform Commission were direct descendants of the
Christian canonical tradition.
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abnormal. The Law Reform Commission’s methodology was to state the existing legal
position and then make proposals for reform. Its reports, therefore, contained detailed
accounts of historical (often centuries old), case law detailing marital irregularity,
individual deviance, and aberration. A 1983 report on Divorce a mensa et thoro, for
example, began with an examination of the grounds upon which the order should
relieve the duty to cohabit.87 There followed a detailed discussion of the necessity of
penetration in the commission of adultery,88 the level of violence or mental torture that
constituted cruelty,89 the naturalness or otherwise of sodomy, and whether it applied
to both men and women.90 Each of these grounds had its own reference library of
cases. Wilful communication by one spouse of venereal disease constituted physical
cruelty in the 1854 case of Chesnutt v Chesnutt.91 In McA v McA, the husband’s refusal
to communicate with his wife other than through notes relayed by their three-year-old
daughter constituted mental cruelty.92 A report on nullity also catalogued marriages
doomed to failure by such abnormal behaviours as homosexuality, schizophrenia,
impotence, paedophilia and emotional incapacity.93 Transsexuality, ‘a psychological
disposition that makes [individuals] believe that they are really members of the other
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sex trapped in the body of the wrong sex’94 was also a threat, and any marriage by ‘“a
Lunatic by any Inquisition …” or by a “Lunatic or Person under a Phrenzy, whose
Person or Estate by virtue of any Act of Parliament … shall be committed to the Care
and Custody of Particular Trustees”’95 was absolutely void.96
As well as demonstrating the horrors of sub-normal relationship practice, the
Commission’s reports laid claim to the continuance of legal machinery into the future.
Law’s approach to marriage failure in the past - providing a ritualised forum within
which warring spouses could apportion blame - had successfully identified and
managed many dysfunctional relationships in the past.97 Speaking from a position of
authority, the Commission recorded the long history of law’s intricate apparatus that
individualised marital abnormality. Marriage failure, when seen from a legal
perspective, was an individual failure. Specific spouses, with particular disadvantages
were unable to maintain lifetime marriages – their problems were personal, not social
or structural.

6.3.4 Law and the normalising objectives of government.
The Irish government, in attempting to address the social problem of marriage
breakdown had, formulated the political objective of marriage saving. This objective,
and the form of marriage in need of protection, was supported by superior Court
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interpretations of Article 41. Lifetime, dependency model marriage was accepted by
government as ‘normal’ social behaviour, a position supported, to an extent, by
statistical information regarding its preponderance, but principally by cultural, and
later, legal understandings of the meaning of marriage. Law also offered itself as a
means to identify and control marital abnormality. The legal complex, therefore
adopted a number of roles that acted (even when purporting to challenge political
action) to support the marriage saving objectives of government.
Foucault describes the process of normalisation necessary to secure bio-political
objectives. It requires a social understanding of what is normal, a method for
measuring normality and a set of rules of judgment.98 Francois Ewald, in using the
insurance industry as an example of this process, argues that law, in an insurance
society, imposes a rule that refers back to social understanding of risk rather than
transcendent notions of right. He further argues that this is a departure from law’s
traditional role of law in apportioning blame.
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In 1980s Ireland, lifetime,

heterosexual, dependency-model marriage represented social understanding of normal
relationship behaviour. This ideal of normality emerged from social practice and
religious doctrine; however, legal knowledge supported it with the transcendent power
of natural law, not ideas about social risk. Furthermore, the traditional role of law in
apportioning blame was not apposite to the construction of normal relationships – it
supported it. Historically, legal techniques had identified and catalogued abnormal
individuals, supporting the idea that identifying, educating and re-forming spouses
could save marriage by preventing marriage breakdown. Thus, law does not
necessarily have the benign role suggested by Ewald. Bio-political, normalising
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objectives like marriage-saving focus on the division between normal and abnormal
behaviours and individuals. Although remaining open to the possibility of alternative
ways of living (the Irish government did not deny that marriage breakdown and
desertion occurred), the formulation of a normalising objective necessarily implies the
existence of alternative behaviours inhabiting a curve of abnormalities. 100 More
problematically, these abnormalities become the object of political techniques
designed to identify, control, and modify them. The abnormal is not excluded and
repressed, but becomes the focus of ‘power that fashions, observes, knows, and
multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects.’101

6.4 Implementing the Marriage-Saving Objective
6.4.1 Constitutional reform
Article 41, as promulgated in 1937, specifically prohibited the enactment of any
legislation facilitating the dissolution of marriage, reflecting political and social
understanding of marriage as a lifetime commitment. By the mid 1980s, this ban,
easily removed should political will and a majority of the electorate support the
introduction of some form of dissolution,102 by the mid-1980s, had become central to
political discussion of marriage breakdown. The 1986 census had identified 40,000
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separated, divorced (abroad) or deserted individuals,103 and it had become necessary
for government to confront the statistical reality that, at least for some marriages, the
commitment did not last for life.
The 1983 report of the Committee on Marriage Breakdown had recommended a
referendum on the removal of the ban on divorce in Article 41.3.3 and, if successful,
the introduction of legislation to facilitate dissolution. The Committee noted that the
simple removal of the ban would not be enough, because legislation enabling divorce
would conflict with marriage protection doctrine of Article 41. 104 It would be
necessary to included specific authorisation for divorce legislation in the Constitution.
The Commission was prepared to accept that marriage breakdown happened, but that
this should not detract from the marriage protection objective.
A similar approach was adopted in a 1986 attempt to amend Article 41. The
Minister for Justice Alan Dukes in introducing the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution Bill, 1986 to Dáil Éireann commented that:
It is wrong to contend that divorce legislation “defines” all marriages as dissoluble.
It does no such thing, rather it defines the circumstances and conditions in which
a marriage that has ceased to be a source of happiness and strength to those
involved may be brought to an end. The constitutional amendment proposed in this
Bill and the further legislation which the Government will propose will, together,
provide that a marriage can be dissolved in law only in very restrictive
circumstances. There is no compulsive power in this amendment nor will the
supporting legislation contain any obligation on those who do not wish to do so to
use the mechanism it will set up.105
Facilitating divorce, in the minister’s view, did not change the essential nature of
marriage as a lifetime commitment.
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6.4.2 The meaning of ‘Divorce’ in 1986?
The Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, announced the holding of the 1986 referendum at a
press conference in Government buildings on April 23 1986. His statement was
broadcast live on RTE television and outlined details of the proposed amendment and
the provisions of legislation that would be enacted should the referendum succeed. His
statement is notable for how he conceptualised divorce, not as a way to end marriage
but as a route to the stabilisation of ‘irregular unions:’
In thus providing the people with an opportunity to express themselves on this
subject, the parties in government are conscious that diverse views may be held on
whether the introduction of divorce on the restrictive basis proposed is for the
social good, or is necessary for the relief of cases of marriage breakdown where
spouses have entered into or propose to enter into other liaisons. The parties
believe that the balance of the social good will be served by making this provision,
and while it is accepted that the divorce provision may have a negative effect on
some existing marriages, on the other hand, the number people now involved in
irregular unions and the number of children adversely affected by the situation is,
in the considered view of the parties, more destabilising.106
The need to provide a ‘second chance’ for the victims of marital breakdown was also
emphasised in the Dáil by Deputy Alan Shatter, a family lawyer who would later be
instrumental in shaping judicial separation legislation.
Divorce does only one thing. It extends the right of remarriage to those whose
marriage have collapsed totally. To those who argue we should not have divorce,
I ask what social advantage arises in preventing a 28 year old battered wife or a 30
year old deserted husband from remarrying when there is no prospect of them ever
again living with the person they first married.107
Divorce, therefore, had the capacity to save the institution of marriage by replacing
failed relationships with new, and better ones. The social problems associated with
marriage breakdown (violence, poverty, social instability) could be solved by saving
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existing marriages. For the unsalvageable, a divorce jurisdiction would address the
problems of marriage breakdown through the provision of a substitute spouse.

6.4.3 Divorce, remarriage and the protection of marriage.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 1986 proposed the removal of Article
41.3.2, and its replacement with a restrictive framework within which marriage could
be dissolved.108 Throughout debate on the Bill in the Oireachtas, deputies and senators
emphasised the potential for remarriage. Mary Flaherty gave a number of examples of
marital breakdown, and the advantages of remarriage for affected women: ‘I should
like that woman to have a chance in the future to meet somebody else so that her son
will have a different model as a father – and a different model as a family.’109 Alan
Shatter similarly presents divorce as a route to re-marriage:
Currently, 9,353 wives are in receipt of deserted wife's allowance or benefit and
for those 9,353 wives, all of whom are deserted and none residing with their
husbands, presumably there are 9,353 husbands living somewhere ... [T]hey know
that, as our Constitution stands at the moment, the possibility of their ever
experiencing a real, happy marriage within the laws of the State is non-existent.
How can it be suggested that we are enhancing family life in Ireland, giving dignity
to the family, behaving compassionately and humanely, when we say to all of those
wives, “We are sorry, we are sacrificing you in the interests of some concept of
public good”? How many of those wives wish to remarry-and would have a
possibility of remarrying if our Constitution did not prohibit it?110
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Viewing the principle effect of divorce as a licence to remarry was not only the
purview of divorce advocates. Fianna Fail’s Padraig Faulker, who opposed divorce,
argued that:
If divorce is added to our Constitution, the second marriage will have all the rights
prescribed under the Constitution and all the supports that were there for the first
family will then pass to the second family.
If, for example, the court allocates a part of the husband's income to his first wife,
because the Constitution declares that the family rights are antecedent and superior
to all positive law and as this now applies to the second family, the second wife
can have a constitutional right to contest the right of the first wife to the allowance
and with the full force of the Constitution behind her claim.111
The over-riding theme of both the pro and anti-divorce campaigns on the 1986
referendum was the protection of marriage, each side arguing that their position was
the best way to achieve this objective.

6.4.4 Social government and lifetime marriage.
Although the referendum Bill was passed by the Oireachtas, it was rejected by
voters.112 Anti-divorce campaigners focused on the shift of legal protection from first
to second families implicit in the government’s proposal, and how such shift would
impact, in particular on ‘discarded’ first wives.113 As the first family would no longer
be based on marriage, it would have no entitlement to constitutional protection, and
women who entered such marriages in good faith expecting them to last for life would
111
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be left without the incidents of the marriage protection doctrine. William Binchy, a
leading anti-divorce campaigner and lawyer, pointed out early in the referendum
campaign that many of the financial benefits accruing to women in marriage do so
because it is a life-long constitutionally protected union. If it is not for life then
entitlements, such as pensions, tax splitting,114 the Family Home Protection Act and
Succession laws make no sense.115 Binchy made a powerful, and in the end convincing
argument: lifetime marriage was central to how government of the social domain was
conceived and achieved in 1980s Ireland. The ending of marriage through divorce
would cause financial hardship, particularly for women. Whilst Binchy was able to
articulate how women would suffer financially upon the introduction of divorce, Fine
Gael Deputy, Alice Glen’s election slogan was perhaps more memorable: ‘Women
voting for divorce is like turkeys voting for Christmas.’116
Despite the pro-divorce side also emphasising the need to protect marriage, its
focus on the relief of suffering caused by inability to remarry meant that it had no
effective counter-argument to the allegation that first families would suffer financial
hardship. Proinsias de Rossa, leader of the Workers Party, although pro-divorce, was
able to point out the inherent weakness in conflating protection of the constitutional
family with the introduction of divorce.
There is … an assumption that the only people who would either have the right to
work or be willing to work following the breakdown or marriage are men. There
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is also an assumption that the only people who will get custody of the children
following the breakdown of marriage are women. These assumptions underlie
many of the attitudes being promoted by those who oppose divorce … Article
41.2.1 … refers to women, not wives or mothers … the assumption there is that a
woman’s place is in the home and that society cannot survive without the unpaid
labour of women in the home. I put it to Deputy Flynn and other deputies who
argue similarly about the financial straits in which divorced women may find
themselves that that attitude and the assumptions underlying it have more to do
with the financial straits of women whether divorced, separated, deserted or indeed
married than any legislation which we or any other State would pass.117
Deputy De Rossa refers to attitudes and assumptions in relation to divorce, but these
same assumptions had formed the basis of social welfare and taxation policy since the
foundation of the State. Government relied on, and assumed, not only lifetime
marriage, but also a particular form of marriage in which men were breadwinners and
women dependent homemakers. Despite employment equality legislation enacted in
the 1970s, the vast majority of Irish married women remained financially dependent
on their husbands, a position facilitated and assumed by the tax and social welfare
systems. Government had created a network of government services that made life
outside of marriage increasingly difficult for dependent women. These women were
significantly better off if deserted by their husbands through death or departure than
they could expect to be following divorce.
Although the 1986 divorce referendum is often characterised as a duel between
tradition and modernity, or a victory for conservatism, when seen through the lens of
dispersed relationships of power a more nuanced picture emerges. Dominant
worldviews, such as that offered by the Catholic Church and supported by the
Constitution and rulings of the superior courts, saw lifetime, dependency marriage as
representing the natural order. A failure of marriage was a personal tragedy, but it also
represented a threat to the stability of society itself. As observed by Foucault, in order
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for power to function, there must be, at some level, a common understanding of the
issues at stake. These common understandings form the boundaries to power that both
depend upon and re-inscribe common beliefs and assumptions. 118 Marriage, as
described in the Irish Constitution, was one such common understanding. It facilitated
management of the social domain by the State and encapsulated the wishes of
individual citizens for their own lives. Divorce was constructed as the right to remarry
because there was no available, alternative way of thinking about ending marriage. So
intense was the relationship between marriage and the State, that imagining family life
outside marriage was politically impossible. Providing the right to remarry was not
enough because, as pointed out by anti-divorce campaigners, in 1980s Ireland it would
amount to little more than a sanction for polygamy.119 The limits to power that blocked
the way for divorce were not conservatism or tradition, but common understandings
of acceptable ways of living. Even for those not ideologically opposed to divorce, the
extent of dependency marriage, and the lack of opportunities for women’s selfsufficiency in 1980s Ireland, would surely have encouraged them to resist its
introduction.

6.5 Political Strategies for Protecting Marriage
6.5.1 The privileged role of law.
The defeat of the divorce referendum meant that the political problem of marriage
breakdown remained unresolved. A new Fianna Fail government, elected in February
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1987, promised a program of family law reform, and almost immediately following
the election introduced the Family Law Bill 1987 to the Oireachtas. The Bill provided
for the abolition of the common law action for restitution of conjugal rights, an action
rarely commenced in the Irish courts. As Dáil deputy Maurice Manning pointed out,
when sought, it was ‘a crude device, not to restore conjugal rights but as a motive for
financial gain before the law at a future time.’ 120 Fine Gael Senator Phil Hogan
commented in favour of the 1987 Bill that, ‘it seems ludicrous to have a law on the
Statute Book that compels two people to live together even though they may not be
getting on with each other.’121 However, facilitating their living apart was, in practical
terms, more problematic.
The Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown had focused on the role of law in
addressing the problem of marriage breakdown:
The committee acknowledges that the present law does not provide adequate
protection for those persons whose marriages do not remain viable and that this,
in itself is a threat to marriage.122
Similarly, the Law Reform Commission offered reformed marriage law as solution to
marital difficulties, and the 1986 Divorce referendum emphasised the essential legal
quality of the marriage relationship. Seanad debates on the Family Law (Protection of
Spouses and Children) (Amendment) Bill 1987 illustrate the extent to which issues
within couple relationships were perceived as properly dealt with through a specialised
system of private law rules. Attempting to extend the regime of civil protection orders
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‘to protect women against domestic violence,’123 the Bill assumed that application to
court for a restraining order could solve the problem of inter-spousal violence. Senator
Nuala Fennell supported the legislation by reporting a recent incidence of ‘domestic’
violence:
In June 1986 a husband brought home three men from the pub and he invited his
three friends to have intercourse with his wife. As the husband watched, the men
took up the invitation. Neighbours heard the screaming and shouting of this
woman and eventually rescued her and called the Garda. The husband and
companions were arrested and charges were pressed by the Garda. Within two
days that wife was pleading to have the case quashed. However, because of the
grievous nature of what they had witnessed the gardaí went ahead with the case in
the District Court. The outcome was that the case against the husband was struck
out. The three defendants, who were charged with aiding and abetting, breach of
the peace, common assault and indecent assault, were fined £500 each. The judge
in this case claimed that he would have jailed the three men for a year but for the
fact that the husband had been involved in inviting them into the house.124
Intending to highlight the extent of victimisation of wives by both their husbands and
by (male) judges with no special training in dealing with family relationships, Senator
Fennell managed to confirm that the solution to such victimhood lay with specialised
family laws, civil protection orders and sympathetic judges. Her portrayal of wives as
victims of domestic violence was uncontested, these women throughout the debate
were referred to as ‘unfortunate people who live a life of hell,’125 who are ‘battered’126
and ‘beleaguered by matrimonial strife and difficulties.’127
6.5.2 Solving the problem of marriage breakdown – marriage law reform.
Marriage, as described by the legal truth of the Constitution, was lifetime,
heterosexual, and gendered. The courts supported political moves to protect marriage,
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and the Law Reform Commission demonstrated the historical link between marital
problems and legal processes. The failure of the divorce referendum meant that the
problems caused by marriage breakdown could not be solved by divorce, but the only
authoritative information available to government in relation to marriage was legal. It
was therefore inevitable that the legal complex would have a central role in solving
the problem with marriage.
Opposition deputy, Alan Shatter, introduced the Judicial Separation and Family
Law Reform Bill 1987 to the Oireachtas in private member’s time. 128 The Bill
provided for an action for judicial separation, replacing the ecclesiastical remedy of
divorce a mensa et thoro. The main legal effect of the legislation was to suspend the
duty to cohabit, although the obligation had become unenforceable with the passage
of the Family Law Act 1987. The Court could also make ancillary orders providing
for maintenance, lump sum payments, and property adjustment. Deputy Shatter
described the Bill as, ‘a social reforming’ measure ‘which is designed to encourage
spouses whose marriages have broken down to reach a civilised agreement about their
future arrangements without the necessity of court proceedings.’129 The ancillary order
provisions would benefit women fulfilling their constitutional role:
these provisions will, for the first time in our law, afford a substantive recognition
of the work done by the wife in the home and for the first time in legislation give
statutory expression to the constitutional duty imposed on the State to recognise
the worth of the work done by a wife in the home. Despite all the constitutional
rhetoric on this issue we have not, up to now, conferred such recognition on such
work or required the courts to take such work into account when determining a
wife's interests in family property acquired during the course of a marriage.130
With the support of the Government, the Bill passed all stages in the Oireachtas in
April 1989, becoming law on 18 October.
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6.6 Marriage-Saving Law
6.6.1 The Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 (the 1989 Act)
Protecting marriage as an institution meant the defence of its essential characteristics
as understood in 1989. Enacted to protect dependency marriage, the terms of the 1989
Act aimed to maintain women in a dependent role by enforcing their husband’s
commitment to lifetime financial support. The Bill provided for variation of
maintenance orders at any time following the grant of the decree of judicial separation.
Deputy Monica Barnes of Fine Gael described this provision as ‘one of the most
welcome sections’ which would allow a wife to ‘go back and make a case for an
increase in maintenance.’131 The deputy also refers to a woman’s inability to find work
after spending many years in the home, anticipating that financial support would be
for her life. Due to this on-going dependency, it was necessary to retain a wife’s right
to a share in her husband’s estate following judicial separation, because the
termination of such rights would ‘leave wives destitute.’132 Her role as carer gave her
an entitlement to stay ‘in the family home with the children, she would be given overall
ownership under an adjustment order. That would be the reality in 90 per cent of the
situations … that is the situation the general public would require.’133
The constitutional family’s hold on the conceptual idiom of the legislation is clear.
When making financial orders following the grant of judicial separation, the court
must take cognisance of a spouse’s contribution ‘to the welfare of the family,’ any
‘contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family’ and:
the effect on the earning capacity of each spouse of the marital responsibilities
assumed by each … in particular, the degree to which the future earing capacity of
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a spouse is impaired by reason of having relinquished or foregone the opportunity
of remunerative activity in order to look after the home or care for the family.134
Section 22 allows for the variation of maintenance without time restriction if the court
‘considers it proper to do so having regard to any change in the circumstances of the
case and to any new evidence.’ 135 Alan Shatter had opened Dáil debate with a
reference to the protection of women in the home, and closed committee debate by
commending the property adjustment provisions of the legislation on the basis that
they:
will be a full recognition given to the work done by the wife in the home and also
a full recognition given to the contribution that the dependent spouse … makes to
the overall family welfare, property ownership and financial resources. This
should be a provision that will be of some considerable importance, I think it will
be recognised as an historic contribution to our law in the future. It is the first
statutory recognition of the role played by the wife who works in the home and
who does not have an independent income.136
6.6.2 Mechanisms of control.
This first major piece of Irish legislation addressing the problems associated with
marriage breakdown, thus sought to solve them by continuing the financial aspects of
marriage after the interpersonal relationship between the parties had ended. The Act,
nonetheless, also sought to save marriages. The Act’s sponsor, Alan Shatter, favoured
‘irretrievable breakdown’ as the sole ground for the grant of an order for judicial
separation. Government deputies pointed out that irretrievable breakdown connoted
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the end, not the suspension of marriage. The legislation was intended, they argued, to
suspend the obligations of marriage, not to terminate them, and provision must be
made for the possibility that spouses might reconcile. Brian Cowen commented ‘[i]t
(judicial separation) is a right for people to live separate from each other but there is
still, within that jurisdiction, the right for those people to come back and live together
again.’137 Mervyn Taylor confirmed, ‘[t]he whole ideal of judicial separation is that
there is still a marriage, still a hope that at some future date there may very well be
reconciliation.’138 The 1989 Act was thus seen as a measure that would facilitate the
suspension of the cohabitation obligation of marriage until spouses could work
through their differences and resume marriage.

6.6.3 A role for morality
The 1989 Act set out specific grounds upon which an order for judicial separation
could be granted: adultery; unreasonable behaviour; one year’s desertion; living apart
for one year with consent to order; living apart for three years with no consent to order;
and the absence of a normal marital relationship for one year.139 This mix of fault and
non-fault grounds reflects the traditional blame-apportioning role of the legal process
and the emergence of new ways of thinking about the nature of marriage.
In the Oireachtas, the grounds upon which judicial separation was available were
understood as having the potential to ensure conflict-free separation in most situations.
Brian Cowen describes the legislation as, ‘designed to keep, in so far as it is humanly
possible, these matters out of a court of law,’ however ‘there are certain individual
cases where agreement is simply not possible … difficult complex situations … very
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tragic.’140 In the ordinary course, ‘if it is reasonable for people to want to live apart …
they would live apart for a year.’141 Likewise, according to Henry Abbott:
a claim for separation based on the three year separation rule would be a very
painless, non-controversial application … there is no doubt that it would be clean,
efficient and would not give rise to any great emotional trauma throughout the
proceedings.142
Non-confrontation is the preferred approach to marriage breakdown:
the essence of marriage is the making of a formal commitment between two people
to create and maintain a lasing and stable relationship … where such relationship
collapsed the purpose of separation proceedings was to provide the means whereby
the parties to a broken marriage could rearrange their lives for the future with a
minimum of bitterness and recrimination.143
Marriage was being re-made as an interpersonal relationship in political discourse.
The 1989 Act required consideration of reconciliation, mediation and separation by
agreement prior to application to the courts,144 and the Court was obliged to consider
the possibility of reconciliation, and to adjourn proceedings, if necessary, in order to
afford spouses the opportunity to consider it. 145 The status of marriage as an
expression of transcendent authority was diminishing, but this did not mean that its
social importance had lessened or that the marriage saving objective of government
could be abandoned. Rather, the social significance of marriage was being reformulated.
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6.7 The Power Effects of Marriage Law
6.7.1 Marriage as a legal domain
By the end of the 1980s, marriage had become an indisputably legal domain,
penetrated by notions about the legal right of women to take on a dependent role, the
lifetime nature of marriage, and the constitutional imperative to protect it. The impact
of tax, social welfare, education, labour market and other government policies on the
choices available to individuals in building their familial lives were marginalised by
the dominance of legal expertise. The creation of private law rules that transferred
property and income between spouses presupposed the existence of such property and
income, a seriously flawed assumption in a country experiencing severe economic
difficulties. Furthermore, they re-enforced marriage as a privileged relationship and
the role of men in providing for the lifetime, financial well-being of women.
References to marital fault, mediation, counselling and reconciliation in the 1989 Act
began to suggest a role for individual spouses in the marriage saving project, a role
that would continue to be emphasised in the 1990s. Recourse to the courts (although
the primary remedy under the Act), was considered by government to be a last resort
for only the most intractable of disputes, a perception supported by widespread
reporting of a high profile marital disputes at the end of the decade.

6.7.2 Marital litigation and the abnormal relationship.
As the 1989 Act was making its way through the Oireachtas a marital dispute before
the High Court attracted considerable media and political attention. 146 Mr Justice
Barr’s judgement on the division of assets amassed during a volatile twenty-year
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marriage, although overturned on appeal, provided a powerful argument for Stateregulation of marriage. It also served to illustrate the horror of dysfunctional marriage
and law’s role in protecting the victims of marriage breakdown. The wife in L v L
sought a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro and an order under s 12 of the Married
Women’s Status Act, 1957 declaring the respective interests of the spouses in the
family home and farm. She ‘had been a devoted full-time homemaker and mother from
the beginning.’147 Although having made no financial contribution to the family, she
oversaw the renovation and maintenance of an eighteenth century manor house that
became the family home. In the course of his judgment, Barr J recounted the events of
14 February 1988.
[L]ate at night after she had retired to bed the husband returned to the house,
having been drinking heavily during the day. He came to her bedroom, turned on
the light and started a row. He told her that everything was his, even her clothes.
The conflict escalated:
the husband started to beat his wife severely. The struggle continued through the
house and out onto the avenue. … She then was subjected to great pain when he
forced her arm behind her back. She screamed but there was no one to hear as other
houses are a long way off. … Her legs were bleeding from kicking by the husband
and her arms were very sore.
The neighbour, a family friend and the local doctor gave evidence of the wife’s
injuries:
On examination the doctor found that there was extensive bruising and
haematomas on her limbs and a few grazings. Among other injuries, he noticed
that there were large bruises on the back of the wife's left hand and left forearm
and in addition the whole of the distal part of that limb was particularly red and
inflamed. She also had large areas of bruising on both lower limbs. She had pain
and tenderness on the right side of her jaw and there was some redness on the front
and on both sides of the neck which was consistent with an attempt having been
made to choke her.148
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Mr Justice Barr catalogued the horrors of marriage breakdown, the deviance and moral
failure of the husband and the devotion and fortitude of the wife. Only when her
position became truly untenable did the wife seek a remedy against her aberrant
husband. Her reward for fulfilling the role of devoted wife and mother in the face of
her husband’s adultery, indifference and violence was a share of his property.
Referring to Article 41 of the Constitution Mr Justice Barr said:
[I]f the Article is to be given flesh and meaning in practical terms, a mother who
adopts that concept and devotes herself entirely to the family after marriage, has a
special place in society which should be buttressed and preserved by the State in
its laws. … It is … in harmony with that philosophy to regard marriage as an equal
partnership in which a woman who elects to adopt the full-time role of wife and
mother in the home may be obliged to make a sacrifice, both economic and
emotional, in doing so. In return for that voluntary sacrifice, which the
Constitution recognises as being in the interest of the common good, she should
receive some reasonable economic security within the marriage.149
The Judge awarded to the wife a 50 percent share in the family home and contents,
and the right to live there for life to the exclusion of the husband. The husband
appealed to the Supreme Court, and although the appeal was allowed, the Supreme
Court expressed sympathy with Barr J’s position.
After careful consideration and with a reluctance arising from the desirable
objective with the principle outlined in the judgement of Barr J would achieve, I
conclude that to identify this right in the circumstances set out in this case is not
to develop any known principle of the common law, but is rather to identify a
brand new right and to secure it to the plaintiff.150
The Court held that it was a matter for the legislature, and not the courts, to
introduce such a right. The 1989 Act provided legislative support for Barr J’s position,
allowing the court to take non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family into
account when making financial and property adjustment orders on judicial
separation.151 Despite the legal difficulty identified in L v L having been dealt with by
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the 1989 Act, the potential for law to support the position of dependent women within
marriage continued to have a significant influence on government in the 1990s.

6.8 Conclusion
6.8.1 Governed by marriage law
In the 1980s, dependency model marriage continued to act as an instrument of
government, facilitating the distribution of welfare and the collection of tax. The
extension of social provision to the female victims of marital failure in the 1970s
inevitably led to the collection of statistics regarding its prevalence and a focus on the
more general difficulty of ‘marriage breakdown.’ Marriage was accepted as a selfevident social good, and marriage breakdown as a threat to social well-being. Political
interest in marriage breakdown corresponded with the expansion of the judicial review
jurisdiction of the Superior Courts who, from a position of presumed neutrality,
formulated a marriage protection doctrine based on the provisions of Article 41 of the
Constitution. The form of marriage deserving protection, according to the courts, was
that described by the Constitution and largely corresponded to dominant social
practice and the form of relationship assumed by government in managing the social
domain.
Political discussion of marriage focused on constitutional definition and other legal
formulations of marriage. When government decided to take action to save marriage,
it therefore inevitably turned to legal expertise. An Oireachtas Committee on Marital
Breakdown recommended legal reform, and a newly established Law Reform
Commission produced detailed accounts of law’s historical role in identifying marital
abnormality. An attempt to introduce provision for legal dissolution of marriage by
referendum failed, because in focusing on the capacity for remarriage, government
was (in a social context where wives depended on their husbands for their means of
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existence) recommending a form of polygamy. The referendum, nonetheless,
emphasised the essential legal quality of the marriage relationship and the political
objective of marriage saving was, at the end of the decade, pursued through reformed
marriage law. The problem with marriage thus identified in the 1980s was marriage
breakdown, the solution to this difficulty was to save marriage, and the means was
legal.

6.8.2 The role of marriage law in managing life
The Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 adopted the traditional role
of marriage law in apportioning blame between spouses, however it also indicated a
new way of thinking about managing marriage that relied on the self-governing
capacities of individual spouses. Reconciliation, mediation and separation by
agreement were an integral part of the legislative framework, although their scientific
basis not fully articulated or understood at the level of politics. For those unable to
manage the breakdown of their own marriage, a detailed, court-based machinery was
available to re-make their post-relationship lives in the image of lifetime marriage.
The political objective of the 1989 Act was to save marriage, but there was no attempt
to achieve this aim through command, or legal barriers to marriage breakdown. Rather,
the self-evident benefit of marriage to the social order provided a justification for
intervention in those marriages unable to conform to the lifetime dependency ideal.
Around these relationships was installed an extensive system of legal techniques –
counselling, mediation, adjudication – intended to identify and modify them. The legal
regulation of marriage represented the deployment of ‘a fundamentally positive power
that fashions, observes, knows, and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects.’152
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By the beginning of the 1990s, marriage had become a fully legal matter and the social
primacy of lifetime dependency marriage had been accepted and re-enforced by the
actions of government. Marriage, in its constitutional form remained central to the
administrative function of the State, and legal knowledge, in the form of Superior
Court decisions and Law Reform Commission reports, acted to consolidate the ideas
about marriage that had circulated between politics, religion and social practice since
the foundation of the State.153

6.8.3 Looking forward
Despite a movement away from dependency model marriage as a social practice in the
early 1990s, the concerns of the middle-class housewife continued to dominate
political consideration of marriage law. There were, however some changes in how
couple relationships were conceptualised as government came to accept long-term
stable (heterosexual) cohabitation as equivalent to marriage for some purposes. A
divorce jurisdiction was introduced in 1997, but its conceptual paradigm was largely
similar to that proposed in 1986. Foucault equates the development of bio-power and
the normalising objectives of government with the availability of scientific
knowledge. As we have seen in the context of Irish marriage law up to 1990,
government relied on moral/legal knowledge to formulate its political objectives, with
sociological or psychological expertise playing a subsidiary role through deployment
of mediation and relationship counselling. This begins to change in the 1990s,
although a marked departure from moral formulations does not occur until after the
introduction of divorce in 1997.
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Seven – Marriage-Saving Divorce
1991 - 1997

The Irish general election of 1992 is often seen as marking a decisive movement away
from a political culture informed by the morality of the Catholic Church.1 The election
of Mary Robinson as president in November 1990, and the passing of two referenda
facilitating the provision of information on abortion and the right to travel abroad for
an abortion, further suggest that the 1990s were a decade of political change.
Nonetheless, moral politics had not disappeared, and despite successfully
campaigning for the introduction of divorce, government continued to accept the
moral proposition that stable, lifetime, heterosexual marriage was the basis of social
order. The problems with marriage continued to be seen in terms of its potential for
failure and the effects of marriage breakdown on dependent women. The solution to
these difficulties was again sought in marriage-saving law.
One significant change in the 1990s was improved economic conditions, leading
to the ending of emigration and the retention of large numbers of married women in
the workforce. Social practice began to move away from dependency marriage and
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Affairs 599, 603. The Labour Party, the most socially liberal of the three main parties, made
significant gains in the election and entered into coalition government with Fine Fail.
1
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government acknowledged that legal marriage and de facto co-habitation were
functionally equivalent in some circumstances. A shift towards an understanding of
marriage as a relationship between individuals, rather than a moral institution occurred
in the courts, but not yet at the level of government.
Constitutional reform in 1996 facilitated the introduction of divorce. Enabling
legislation adopted a marriage saving objective and acted to support the continuance
of marriage after the interpersonal relationship at its core had broken down. Revised
tax and welfare rules, intended to facilitate divorce, also operated to continue marriage
for the lives (or until remarriage) of former spouses. At the level of practice, the
marriage law process supported the objective of marriage-saving, encouraging
individuals to save their own marriages through counselling, but also by illustrating
the dangers of marriage breakdown and its effect on vulnerable women and children.
This chapter details these processes, concluding that reform of marriage law during
this period further entrenched lifetime dependency marriage as the normative, most
desirable relationship practice, and established mechanisms of self-control and selfsurveillance that penetrated deep into the relationships and lives of those individual
citizens.

7.1 Economic Improvement
7.1.1 Economic conditions in the 1990s
At the end of the 1980s, economic decline had begun to slow and Ireland took tentative
steps toward economic recovery. In 1991, government forecast continued falls in
unemployment,2 and published a Programme for Progress outlining policies intended

Cliff Taylor, ‘Public sector pay rises rule out major tax cuts’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 8
December 1991).
2
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to stimulate economic growth. 3 Ireland’s economic growth during the 1990s was
without precedent historically, or in other European Countries. By 2000, the general
unemployment rate was just 3.6 percent.4 Ireland, belatedly, but rapidly, had caught
up with the living standards enjoyed in other Western European nations.5 Tim Callan
et al calculated that increased prosperity led to an increase in disposable income of 56
percent between 1987 and 1994.6

7.1.2 The social practice of marriage
As the economic outlook improved, so too did the rate of married women’s
participation in the labour force. The Irish Times reported in 1991 that 23.5 percent of
married women worked outside the home, up from 16.7 percent in 1981.7 By 1998,
labour market participation rates for working-age married women had reached 48.3
percent. 8 The constitutional picture of marriage and family life began to hold less
practical significance as family size fell, and more women took up paid employment
outside the home. Brendan Walsh noted that the overall rise in labour-market
participation rates in Ireland during this period was due mainly to the retention of

‘Sustained growth key objective of government: strategy for the nineties’ The Irish
Times (Dublin, 23 January 1991).
4
Central Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2002 (Pn 12209) Stationery
Office 2002), 29.
5
Brendan Walsh ‘When Unemployment Disappears: Ireland in the 1990s,’ (Centre for
Economic Research, U C D, Working Paper 02/29, 2004), 4. There is a large volume of
economic and social literature describing change in Irish economic governance and
performance after 1973. Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An Economic History of
Ireland since Independence (Routledge 2013) contains a good, retrospective overview.
6
Tim Callan, Brian Nolan, Brendan Whelan, Christopher Whelan, James Williams,
Poverty in the 1990s: Evidence from the 1994 Living in Ireland Study (Oak Tree Press 1995),
58.
7
However, in the same year, Tony Fahey of the ESRI challenged calculations of
participation rates from earlier in the century, claiming that methodologies excluded those
engaged in farm labour, those unemployed but not on the live register and those who worked
part-time. He contended that rates were close to 25 percent in the 1950s and not the 5 percent
reported in official Statistics. Tony Fahey, ‘Measuring the Female Labour Supply: Conceptual
and Procedural Problems in Irish official statistics’ (1990) 21(2) Economic and Social Review
163.
8
Brendan Walsh ‘When Unemployment Disappears: Ireland in the 1990s’, 2
3
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married women in the labour force. This expansion was mostly in full-time
employment, and women working part-time accounted for only 26 percent of the total
growth in employment between 1988 and 2002.9 Marriage rates, which had dropped
significantly during the 1980s, continued to fall, reaching a low of 4.3 per thousand in
1995 and 1997.10 The birth rate remained well below that pertaining before 1980.11
One in six births took place outside of marriage in 1991, a proportion that increased
as the decade progressed.12
7.1.3 Marriage and State administration – social welfare.
In 1985, the High Court had struck down a section of the Social Welfare (No 2) Act
1985 that limited the value of social welfare payments made to married couples to 1.6
times the adult rate. 13 The section did not apply to cohabiting couples, and
consequently cohabiting couples could receive a higher payment than married couples
in similar circumstances. The government addressed the issue, not by removing the
cap, but by extending it to cohabitees.14 Similar caps applied in other parts of the social
welfare code, and government appointed a review group in 1989 to identify them and
make recommendations for reform.15

Brendan Walsh ‘When Unemployment Disappears: Ireland in the 1990s,’ 6.
Central Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2002, 55
11
The Birth rate was 21.8 per thousand in 1981, 15.1 in 1990, falling to 14.0 in 1996, ibid,
9

10

55.
12

Second Commission on the Status of Women, Report to Government (Pl 9557,
Stationery Office 1993), 67.
13
Hyland v Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General [1989] IR 624. See page
201.
14
Social Welfare (No 2) Act 1989.
15
The Review Group reported to the Oireachtas in May 1991. In establishing the group,
the Minister for Social Welfare state that it would ‘have the task of examining the social
welfare code as it affects households (in the context of the Supreme Court decision in the
Hyland case) with particular regard to the equal treatment provisions.’ Review Group on the
Treatment of Households in the Social Welfare Code, Report (PL8107, Stationery Office
1992), 6.
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The review group’s mandate was to examine the treatment of household types
under social welfare rules having regard to the requirements of the Constitution,
European Economic Community equal treatment directives, the financial means of
households, the economies achievable through resource sharing and the containment
of exchequer costs.16 The Review Group had a problematic task. Cohabitation had
become more common, 17 and the group were required to contain costs whilst
implementing the marriage saving objective mandated by the courts and the
government. At the time of review, the social welfare system discriminated against
married couples vis a vis cohabitees in a number of areas. One of a cohabiting couple
could receive a full child dependent allowance, whereas a married couple in similar
circumstances received the allowance at half rate. Supplementary welfare allowance
did not take account of cohabitation, and therefore a cohabiting couple could receive
two payments, whereas a married couple could receive only the lower married rate.
The means of an unmarried partner were not taken into account for family income
supplement, resulting in a higher payment for a cohabitee than for a married person.
The assets of an unmarried partner were excluded from the non-contributory old age
pension means test; therefore, a cohabitee could receive a pension when a married
person would not.18
The review group ultimately followed the government’s initial response to Hyland
in recommending that payments to married and cohabiting couples be equalised
downwards. For reasons of economy and fairness, it was felt that cohabitation should

16

Review Group on the Treatment of Households in the Social Welfare Code, Report, 1-

2.
17

The Review group lists the number of cohabitees as 417 in 1979, 819 in 1981 and 4916
in 1986. Although not specifically stated it must be assumed, because the first two numbers
are odd, that these are the numbers of cohabiting couples rather than individual cohabitees.
ibid, 7.
18
ibid, 56. The Social Welfare Act 1991 removed all of these discriminations, save that
affecting the old age pension.
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be equivalent to marriage for social welfare purposes. The group argued that resource
sharing was more likely to occur in households comprised of married or cohabiting
couples and their children than in other households comprised of more than two adults.
In non-couple based households, the ‘work and welfare status of individual members
… can change over time giving rise to fluctuations in the payment levels for
individuals in that household’ and ‘a greater number of permutations than currently
arise in the case of households comprised of married and cohabiting couples.’ 19
Despite ‘the obvious difficulties’20 in identifying cohabiting couples it was considered
appropriate to treat them in an equivalent manner to married couples:
the material support which married couples give to each other by virtue of the
marriage contract makes their situation fundamentally different from that of other
people sharing a household. The situation of cohabiting couples is similar in many
ways and mutual financial support can be assumed to exist in their case as well,
although not embodied in a formal contract.21
The review group decided that marriage and cohabitation were functionally
equivalent, and should therefore be treated the same. Government could assume
resource sharing in both relationship types, resulting in a reduction in the cost of
welfare provision. The marriage-protection doctrine promulgated in Hyland had
created the new, marriage-equivalent, relationship category of ‘cohabitation.’ Section
48 of the Social Welfare Act 1991 amended the definition of ‘spouse’ in the social
welfare code to include ‘each person of a married couple who are living together’ and
‘a man and a woman who are not married to each other but are cohabiting as man and
wife.’

19

ibid, 38.
ibid, 37.
21
ibid, 47.
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7.1.4 Marriage and state administration – tax
An expert working group examining the tax code also acknowledged the equivalence
of cohabitation and marriage. Reporting in 1996, it noted that the welfare system
treated cohabitees as spouses, whereas the taxation system treated them as single
people, leading to anomalies in the treatment of households:
The effect of this can be that a non-working partner is debarred from claiming a
social assistance payment on the basis of the other partner’s income, while the
working partner is taxed as a single person.22
The working group recommended that cohabitees with children be treated the same as
married couples for tax purposes.23 A shift in attitude to women working outside the
home is apparent in the report, with no reference made to the Constitution or the need
for one partner to care for a home or family.24 The group stated only that care must be
taken to ‘give a balance between women in paid employment, and women working
full-time in the home.’25 The general tenor of the report reflects an understanding that
married women do have paid employment, and that the taxation system should support
this:
the tax treatment of married couples … can result in high marginal tax rates on the
second earning in a married couple (usually the wife). Married women’s labour
market participation is particularly sensitive to incentives. A more individual
system of taxation [is] … one way of increasing incentives to this group … an
alternative approach … would be to increase the standard rate band.26
In the areas of taxation and social welfare, therefore, measurement of the
characteristics of the population had led to the conclusion that cohabitation had
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Expert Working Group on the Integration of the Tax and Social Welfare Systems,
Report (Pn 2755, Stationery Office 1996), 104.
23
This recommendation has not, to date, been implemented however the individualisation
of the tax code has largely eliminated the income tax advantage of marriage where both
cohabitees are employed.
24
Expert Working Group on the Integration of the Tax and Social Welfare Systems,
Report, 105.
25
ibid, 102.
26
ibid, 102.
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become a significant social practice. Despite the constitutional or moral primacy of
marriage, it would be necessary for government to account for these relationships if it
was to effectively manage the social domain.

7.2 The Persistence of Dependency-Model Marriage
7.2.1 The properties of dependent wives
In the early 1990s, dependency model marriage, whilst still common, no longer
represented dominant social practice. Increasing numbers of women remained in the
workforce following marriage, and co-habitation had become more common.
Government had begun, for social welfare purposes, to equate marriage with cohabitation re-defining it to include ‘marriage-like relationships’ and to de-emphasise
gender-based roles. Nonetheless, the problems of the dependent, middle-class wife
continued to form the focus of marriage law reform.
The wife in L v L had begun her legal action in 1987 seeking an order of divorce a
mensa et thoro and a declaration of ownership in relation to the family home.27 Her
action reached the Supreme Court in 1992, almost three years after the commencement
of the 1989 Act. The remedies available to her were, therefore, limited to alimony and
a declaration confirming pre-existing property rights and, as she had made no financial
contribution to the acquisition of the property in question, the court could not declare
that she had an interest in it.28
Specific provision had been made in the 1989 Act for consideration of the
contributions of a non-earning spouse in ‘looking after the home or caring for the
family’ when making ancillary orders on judicial separation.29 Had L v L been initiated

L v L [1992] 2 IR 77, Pursuant to s12 of the Married Women’s Status Act 1957.
See chapter one for an account of the legal remedy of divorce a mensa et thoro.
29
Section 20(2)(f).
27
28
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after the commencement of the 1989 Act, the Court could have ordered a property
adjustment in favour of the wife without reference to the Constitution. The perceived
injustice of the case was dealt with by the 1989 Act, but government responded to the
decision by attempting to further reform marriage law. The Matrimonial Home Bill,
introduced to the Dáil on 7 July 1993, purported to create an equitable joint tenancy
in any dwelling occupied by a married couple where the dwelling was legally owned
by one spouse.30
A Second Commission on the Status of Women31 and a White Paper on Marital
Breakdown had recommended legislation of this nature.32 It was a popular measure
among both politicians and the public, 33 welcomed as a necessary and important
reform measure contributing to ‘the equal status of women in marriage.’34 The Bill set
a date for vesting of existing homes, and any homes acquired after the commencement
of the Act by one of a married couple would automatically vest, in equity, in both.
Both Dáil and Seanad passed the Bill, but the Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional, holding that the automatic operation of the Act was an unwarranted
and disproportionate interference with the privacy and authority of the constitutional

30

Section 4, homes held by spouses as tenants in common would also vest in them as joint
tenants on the operative date. An application could be made to the court by the owning spouse
for a declaration that section 4 should not apply (s 6) and the non-owning spouse could opt
out in writing after obtaining legal advice (s7). If the home was held by one spouse as joint
tenant with a third party, the joint tenancy would be severed and the share as tenant in common
would be held by the spouses as joint tenants (s 4(7)). If the dwelling to which a spouse
becomes entitled was part of another property necessary easements would be created for the
benefit of the home and the court could grant compensation to any third party affected by the
creation of those easements (s 4(5) and s 17).
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Second Commission on the Status of Women, Report to Government.
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Department of Justice, Marital Breakdown a Review and Proposed Changes (Stationery
Office 1992).
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The Irish Times carried a number of positive opinion pieces about the legislation during
1993. See for example Pat Igo, ‘Legal recognition of housework’s value is a long-overdue
step.’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 18 June 1993) and Mary Cummins ‘Women’s groups hail
home equality Bill.’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 26 June 1993).
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Minister for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor, Dáil Deb 7 July 1994, vol 433,
col 1552.
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family.35 The decision was unexpected,36 and although a further attempt to implement
the policy of the Bill was made by the Progressive Democrats in a 1994 Private
Members Bill, no similar legislation has, to date, been enacted.37
The Matrimonial Home Bill was about married women, their role, and their
property. Although passed in gender neutral terms, when introduced to the Oireachtas
it referred throughout to ‘husbands’ and ‘wives,’ despite being drafted at the behest of
the Minister for Equality and Law Reform.38 In strict practical or economic terms, the
Bill would have made little difference to the majority of married couples. Joint
ownership in equity would apply only to intact marriages. Marriages that had broken
down would remain subject to property adjustment by agreement, or to the
discretionary jurisdiction of the 1989 Act. Within intact marriages, wives or husbands
occupied one and other’s property and could veto the sale and mortgage of ‘family
homes.’39 Domestic violence legislation facilitated the exclusion of an abusive spouse
from a home irrespective of ownership rights,40 and applications under section 12 of
the 1957 Act had ceased to have any practical utility following the introduction of the
1989 Act.41 One potential practical benefit was the Bill’s interaction with Succession
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Law. A spouse’s legal right share or share on intestacy would be in addition to their
entitlement to the matrimonial home by way of survivorship, but a similar result could
have been achieved by amendment of the Succession Act 1965.42 Michael McDowell
of the Progressive Democrats, despite supporting the legislation, pointed to a number
of significant difficulties with it, particularly with regard to debt (‘many women stood
to lose half their property to their husband’s creditors’), and the disadvantaging of
children following the remarriage of widowed parent.43
Despite the lack of practical utility, the legislation had universal support in the
Oireachtas. Although referred to throughout debate as an ‘equality’ measure,
legislative aims were expressed in terms of the protection of wives in a dependent role.
Indeed, deputies occasionally appeared to advocate a return to the ‘separate property’
doctrine of the nineteenth century.44 Wives, they argued, were entitled to share in the
property of marriage, but should not be liable for the debt. Averil Doyle of Fine Gael
commented:
The position regarding the liability for any pre-marital debts or any charges on the
house that subsequently would become the matrimonial home requires
clarification … It must be made clear that this is a benefit we are conferring on the
spouse that will be staying at home, usually the women, rather than a financial
noose being put around their necks.45
42

On an intestacy the surviving spouse takes the whole estate if there were no issue and
two thirds if there were issue, see 67 Succession Act 1965. Where there was a will the
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See chapter one.
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Married women were portrayed as weak and vulnerable, suffering ‘a high incidence
of depression,’46 and liable to be bullied into waiving their property rights. 47 They
‘defer to their husbands in matters regarding the purchase and sale of property,’48 can
be ‘bamboozle[d]’49and ‘will sign … documents’ because their husband’s tell them to
do so.50
Although detrimental to their mental health and a source of vulnerability, the
protection of married women’s constitutionally mandated role was considered
essential. Labour deputy, Willie Penrose, commented on second stage that ‘[W]omen
play a crucial and pivotal role in sustaining the fabric of family life and it is important
that this is reflected in the laws of the land.’51 By supporting, through property, the
role of women as homemakers, this Bill would ‘contribute to the stability of marriage,
the institution of family and the common good.’52 Joe Costello, also a labour deputy,
contended that ‘this Bill underpins not only the legal entity of marriage but marriage
as a desirable relationship and the importance of the security of marriage.’53
7.2.2 Irish family sociology – a source of knowledge about marriage
Sociological investigation of marriage and family life was limited prior to the 1990s.
Irish academic sociology had originated in St Patrick’s College, Maynooth at the

The husband’s estate was insolvent and the principle debtor was the revenue commissioners.
The court, by awarding the wife such a large share was effectively providing for her at the
expense of her husband’s creditors. EN v RN & MC [1992] 2 IR 116. Similarly in AS v GS &
AIB [1994] 1IR 407 the High Court held that the issue of judicial separation proceedings acted
as a lis pendens against all property held by either spouse. This had the effect of allowing the
court to make property adjustment orders without reference to a judgment creditor who had
not registered their interest prior to the issue of the judicial separation proceedings.
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beginning of the twentieth century. 54 Profoundly influenced by the doctrine of the
Roman Catholic Church, early Irish sociologists did not consider themselves to have
a role in shaping the direction of government policy and focused on discussions of
Catholic social principles. 55 The first Irish sociological journal, Christus Rex,
established in 1946, published Bishop’s statements and papal encyclicals as well as
articles on aspects of Catholic sociology.56 The renaming of the journal in 1972 (it
became Social Studies), marked its re-orientation towards an audience outside the
Church. The editor wrote in 1972 that the journal would ‘seek to gather and present
reliable information to assist the public in forming intelligent and accurate
judgments.’57 A lack of funding and instability in university departments hampered
this objective, and in 1993, a contributor to the Bulletin of the Sociological Association
of Ireland claimed that ‘there is, I think, a certain sense of demoralization among
sociologists in Ireland at the moment. And if there isn’t perhaps there should be.’58
There was some social research being carried out, principally by the Economic and
Social Research Institute (ESRI), which received government funding, and between
1970 and 1979, departments of sociology were established in University College Cork,
University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin. Despite the general malaise, a
number of books analysing Irish society were published during the 1980s,59 and the
ESRI, produced a number of empirically driven studies on economic aspects of family
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life. 60 Nonetheless, during the 1980s, Irish sociology lacked both credibility and
funding. 61 Sociological expertise was, thus, an unlikely source of alternative
understandings of the nature of marriage before the 1990s.
One major sociological study of the Irish family was carried out in 1989, but
unsurprisingly, given the intellectual heritage of the Irish sociological community, it
adopted the definitions of marriage and family provided by the 1937 Constitution.62
The report noted that economic expansion had tempted more married women into the
workforce, and that this had occurred in a way that was ‘incompatible with child
raising.’63 Mothers, the report noted, were being forced due to economic pressures to
work outside the home to pay rent and buy food – pressures which the Constitution
deplored.64 The dependency model of marriage was unquestioned:
the basic difference between the sexes remains relevant. No amount of equality
legislation or paternity leave will alter the fact that the bearing and breast-feeding
of children devolves on the mother.65
Further:
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the right of spouse and children to he maintained out of the husband’s income and
property has been more effectively secured both by changes in the law and by
providing free legal aid66 (my emphasis).
A significant theme of the report was the need for government to develop a family
policy ‘that consists of the establishment of goals for the family itself and devising a
framework of policies for the achievement of these goals.’ 67 The family requiring
attention was that based on marriage. The report acknowledged the existence of
cohabiting couples, deserted wives and single mothers, but did not consider them part
of the social category ‘family.’

7.2.3 Women and marriage
The Government established a Second Commission on the Status of Women in
November 1990, which, like the 1970s Commission, divided women into marriagebased categories and recommended that government ‘recognise different categories of
women and their roles.’68 Women’s role in relation to family was a caring, dependent
one, which required protection: ‘[w]omen who have made the choice to devote
themselves fulltime to their families should be supported and sustained in that
choice’69 (but only if married, single, never married, mothers ‘should be encouraged
to take up employment.’) 70 In the workforce or in education, European antidiscrimination standards applied:
The principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever on the grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in
particular to marital or family status.71
A key objective of the Commission was to ensure that:
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women [are] facilitated to develop economic independence. Without economic
independence there is no real choice [whether to work outside or inside the
home].72
For wives, this choice could be realised through a right to a share in household income,
a right to information on a spouse’s income and a proprietary interest in the family
home. 73 A review of the tax code to remove the disincentive to married women
working outside the home would further support choice.74 Thus, the form of economic
independence advocated for married women by the Commission was predicated on
male financial support. The State did not need to subsidise dependency in marriage
because:
in essence the maintenance of a full-time homeworker, although a benefit to
society, is primarily a benefit to the earning partner, and as such could hardly be
deemed to warrant a State payment.75
Nonetheless, the State could provide ‘moral support,’ implement measures to raise
‘self-esteem,’76 and improve married women’s ‘status in society.’77 Financial support
was to come from the men who primarily benefited from women’s work through the
allocation of tax allowances, 78 and improved private-law rights against husbands
backed by better legal enforcement.79
In a chapter titled ‘Women and Work,’ gender distinctions became less important.
Flexibility in the workforce was important for ‘both men and women,’ so that they
may ‘reconcile their working and domestic responsibilities and have real choice in
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their lives.’80 Similarly, ‘the Commission fully supports the choice by mothers – and
indeed fathers – to care fulltime for their children at home.’ 81 Nonetheless,
ambivalence regarding workforce equality remained. It was noted that 35 percent of
women with children under seven worked outside the home (no corresponding figure
is given for men), and that ‘realistically in our society at present the responsibility for
childcare devolves on women, whether married or lone parents.’ No suggestions were
offered as to how, or whether, this gendered division of labour, adversely affecting
women’s ability to attain economic independence within and outside marriage, could
be addressed.82

7.2.4 Law and marriage
In 1992, the Department of Justice published a white paper on marital breakdown that
opened with a reference to social expectations for marriage:
The vast majority of people in Ireland who get married go on to live together in
life-long unions. There is, however, the unfortunate reality that a minority of those
who marry have their hopes and expectations of a permanent union dashed though
the breakdown of marriage.83
The role of government was also set out:
A primary concern of the Government must be to do what it can to assist the
preservation of stable marriage and the avoidance of marriage breakdown. The
Government must also ensure that there is in our law and social policies a proper
response when marriages break down.84
The objective of government was both to promote marriage and to address the problem
of marriage breakdown. The report recommended, therefore, that government should
reject a suggestion by the Law Reform Commission that the age of marriage be
increased, or that parental consent be required before young couples could marry,
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because ‘it could lead to an increase in the number of co-habiting couples in cases
where parental consent was not forthcoming.’ 85 Divorce could likewise promote
stability by removing the need for ‘people whose marriages have broken down to …
form “second unions.”’86 Relationship counselling was proposed to prevent marriage
breakdown, and mediation and marriage law to deal with its effects.87
The white paper identified the principle practical effect of marriage breakdown as
poverty among women referring to a number of information sources. Citing a report
of the Combat Poverty Agency, the paper noted that 80 percent of District Court
maintenance awards to dependent spouses (assumed in the white paper to be wives),
were for amounts below social welfare rates.88 Moreover, these awards were proving
difficult to collect and ‘[t]he highest success rate for maintenance orders applies in the
category of better paid maintenance creditors.’89 The white paper reported detailed
statistics regarding the extent of marriage breakdown. In 1989/90, 2,273 applications
for maintenance were made in the District Court,90 132 in the Circuit Court and 115
in the High Court. In the first year of the 1989 Act’s operation, 916 applications for
judicial separation were made and 354 decrees granted. A labour force study, carried
out in 1991, counted 46,700 separated or divorced individuals, 17,100 men and 29,600
women. Of these 12,900 men and 11,500 women were in the workforce.91 In the same
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year, there were 12,255 recipients of deserted wife’s allowance,92 and 80 percent of
the workload of the Legal Aid Board related to family law.93
These statistics, although recording marital distress among a very small percentage
of the married population,94 presented marriage breakdown as a major social danger.
They also demonstrated the marginal impact of marriage law in addressing its
principle effect – female poverty. The white paper acknowledged that the most likely
reason for difficulty in collecting maintenance ‘is the inability of the husband to pay.’95
In addition, it noted that 25 percent of applicants for deserted wives allowance and
benefit were married to unemployed men. 96 Women’s poverty following marriage
breakdown was, in fact, closely related to their dependency and poverty in marriage.
Nonetheless, the white paper recommended legal reform as the appropriate
political response to the problem of marriage breakdown and subsequent female
poverty. In particular, it suggested that a divorce jurisdiction with comprehensive
financial reliefs and the capacity for remarriage was the solution. As the overall
political objective was to save marriage, relationship counselling and mediation were
also important. Government commitment to counselling and mediation was evidenced
with a list of service providers funded by government.97 The aim of counselling was
reconciliation, and successful mediation produced ‘couples who reached agreement or
who returned to marriage.’98

92

ibid, 28.
ibid, 68.
94
Just under 3 percent. There were 1,329,620 married persons in Ireland in 1991 (first
marriages). Central Statistics Office, Census 1991: Volume 2 (Pn 0815, Stationery Office
1994), 30.
95
Department of Justice, Marital Breakdown a Review and Proposed Changes, 200.
96
ibid, 201. Where a husband was unemployed, the family as a whole would receive a
higher rate of payment if the wife qualified for a deserted wives payment.
97
ibid 202 – 203. Funding was provided to health boards and to the Catholic Marriage
Advisory Service.
98
ibid, 204.
93

261

7.2.5 Political imaginings of marriage
Information available to government in the early 1990s did not challenge the
constitutional picture of marriage, and political objectives continued to focus on
saving dependency model marriage. Functionalist sociology did little to displace
existing political understandings, and although social welfare policy equated marriage
with cohabitation, this was not considered in other domains of government. The idea
that government and law had a role in managing the relationship behaviour of
individuals was similarly uncontested, as was the need for government to fund services
that might save marriages, one at a time. The principle practical effect of dependency
marriage breakdown was female poverty, but this was seen only in terms of marriage
with no attempt made to look at broader social contexts that created both poverty and
dependency.

7.3 Alternative Ways of Knowing about Marriage
7.3.1 Moving toward modernity?
As discussed in chapter two, in the late 1980s and early 1990s family sociologists
developed the individualisation theory of interpersonal relationships, arguing that the
family had been re-defined in modernity. It was no longer the lifelong legitimated
community of father, mother and child but a complex system that had to be
individually negotiated rather than follow an existing pattern of roles, rights and
responsibilities. Relationship conflicts, these sociologists argued, reflected conflict in
wider society brought about by structural instability. 99 According to this theory,
shifting relationships practices away from marriage in 1990s Ireland represented a
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modernisation of society, and the construction of individually negotiated interpersonal
relationships. It should therefore be expected that law would follow these social
practices in facilitating divorce and recognising alternative relationship forms. As
demonstrated in the next section however, in Ireland an individualised perspective on
relationships did not spring up at some time in the 1990s, and that legal
acknowledgement of the interpersonal nature of relationships, in fact, preceded
widespread ‘modern’ relationship practice. The law of nullity, and later the judicial
review jurisdiction of the superior courts, acknowledged the interpersonal aspect of
relationships long before divorce was introduced, or cohabitation became a
widespread social practice.

7.3.2 Law and scientific expertise
The Irish Courts had begun, in the 1980s and 1990s, to accept non-institutional ways
of rationalising the marriage relationship, initially through the law of nullity, and later
within the judicial review jurisdiction. The High Court had jurisdiction, derived from
the ecclesiastical law of the established Church of Ireland, to grant a decree of
nullity.100 Although required to act in accordance with ‘the principles and rules’ of
Ecclesiastical Courts, the High Court did not accept that the Matrimonial Causes and
Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870 had ‘fossilise[d] the law in its state
when the Act was passed.’ Rather, according to Henchy J, by 1986, ‘modern
psychological, psychiatric and other advances in knowledge and understanding of
human affairs’ could act to modify the basic principles referred to in the 1870 Act.101
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Paula Scully and William Duncan wrote in 1990 that ‘[t]he last ten years have seen
the judiciary particularly active in this regard,’102 and Alan Shatter traced the origin of
an expanded nullity jurisdiction to the 1982 High Court decision, RSJ v JSJ.103 In that
case, Barrington J accepted that a decree of nullity could be granted because a
psychiatric illness rendered a spouse ‘unable to maintain and sustain a normal
relationship.’104
Findlay CJ, in a later Supreme Court decision, voided a procedurally valid
marriage based on the respondent’s ‘homosexual nature’ that made himwas incapable
of forming or entering into a ‘normal marital relationship’ with the applicant.105 A
normal marital relationship was, in the Court’s view, a ‘caring and considerate
relationship’ not, 106 as under ecclesiastical law, simply a matter of physical
consummation. Findlay CJ held that:
Recognition by psychiatrists of the existence of a homosexual nature and
inclination, which is not susceptible to being changed [required that] in certain
circumstances the existence in one party to a marriage of an inherent and
unalterable homosexual nature may form a proper legal ground for annulling the
marriage.107
A schizophrenic illness rendered the petitioner in DC v DW,108 incapable of ‘entering
into a permanent and meaningful relationship with the respondent.’ 109 Emotional
immaturity could render a marriage voidable, 110 as could non-disclosure of a pre-
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existing mental health difficulty. 111 The courts relied on professional psychiatric
evidence where offered, but this was not always necessary particularly with regard to
grounds such as ‘immaturity’ or ‘homosexuality.’112
The application of psychiatry and psychology in nullity cases was one element of
the gradual separation of religious morality and marriage law that began in the 1980s.
In cases like Murphy, O’B v S and Hyland, the courts had emphasised the moral quality
of the marriage relationship and the family based on it.113 By the mid-1990s, however,
the application of social, economic and psychological knowledge in the resolution of
specific difficulties took precedence over the textual implications of Article 41. A
1995 challenge to the constitutionality of the 1989 Act marked a significant departure
from interpretations of Article 41 founded on ‘natural law.’ 114 The case originated
with an application for judicial separation in the Circuit Court, in response to which
the husband challenged the constitutionality of the 1989 Act. When the matter came
before Murphy J in the High Court on 28 July 1994, the applicant, relying on the
Constitution’s evocation of natural law and Christianity,115 attempted to call witnesses
to testify as to the characteristics of Christian marriage. Murphy J refused to hear the
evidence on the basis that:
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the obligations of the State and the rights of the parties in relation to marriage are
now contained in the Constitution and our law ... and it is not possible for me to
abdicate that function to any expert.116
The judge went on to describe the legal character and obligations of marriage.
Marriage, he stated, is ‘a partnership based on an irrevocable personal consent which
establishes a unique and very special lifelong relationship.’117 It depends on more than
physical consummation requiring ‘for its maintenance the creation of an emotional
and psychological relationship between the spouses.’118 The ongoing consent of the
parties was essential because ‘the implacable opposition of one or other of the spouses
to the continuation of the marriage ... must destroy the fundamental relationship’119
The husband had specifically challenged section 2(1)(f) of the 1989 Act, which
provides for the grant of a judicial separation where:
the marriage has broken down to the extent that the court is satisfied in all the
circumstances that a normal marital relationship has not existed between the
spouses for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the
application.
He argued that this was too low a threshold for granting a decree, and as such infringed
his constitutional rights with respect to marriage. Although the Court would not hear
evidence from a moral theologian on the nature of marriage, it was prepared to accept
the evidence of counselling professionals regarding the success rates of relationship
therapy, and the time required by spouses to resolve their difficulties. On the basis of
this information Murphy J held that ‘twelve months was a reasonable time to allow
the parties to resolve their problems’ and therefore section 2(1)(f) did not unreasonably
interfere with the plaintiff’s rights. The contrast between Murphy J’s approach and
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that of Kenny J in Murphy v Ireland120 is striking. Marriage was no longer seen a
socio-moral institution, but as a companionate relationship between individuals that
required the active participation of both. Politics, nonetheless, remained focused on
institutional marriage and its centrality to the maintenance of social order.

7.4 Saving Marriage with Divorce
7.4.1 Laying the groundwork
A ‘Programme for a Partnership Government,’ negotiated by a coalition government
following the 1992 general election, promised ‘a major programme of family law
reform culminating in a referendum on divorce.’ 121 An ultimately unsuccessful
challenge to the constitutionality of the 1989 Act halted the referendum element of the
plan.122 When the Supreme Court handed down their decision on 14th July 1995, the
coalition had collapsed and a rainbow government of Labour, Democratic Left and
Fine Gael under the stewardship of John Bruton was in power.
Despite not introducing a referendum Bill, the 1992 coalition was successful in
implementing a significant reform of the legal rules governing financial provision on
judicial separation. The Family Law Bill 1994, as drafted, extended the courts’ powers
to deal with the financial implications of marriage breakdown to cases of foreign
divorce and nullity. As enacted, it applied only to judicial separation and foreign
divorce; the nullity provision were removed at committee stage on the advice of the
Attorney General. The legislation had an ambitious set of aims. The Minister for
Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor, in his second stage introduction refers to
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the legislation mitigating the hardships that result from a decree of nullity, protecting
the institution of marriage, providing a model of future divorce legislation and
extending the range of financial orders available on marriage breakdown.123
Debate on the 1994 Bill, despite its length and complexity, was limited, perhaps
because by committee stage the most controversial aspects of the legislation relating
to nullity had been removed. The woman in the home and the symbolic importance of
property ownership to her well-being and self-worth featured, with an amendment
tabled that would create a presumption of equal sharing of the family home on judicial
separation. The Minister rejected the amendment but acknowledged that ‘what is
wanted most by spouses who work in the home and do not want to engage in litigation
with their partners is some practical recognition of their contributions.’124 Quietude,
in his view, should be rewarded by a simple procedure for placing homes in joint
names by agreement. ‘Such provision would enable couples who live in harmony to
give full and effective recognition to the contribution made by the spouse who works
in the home.’125 Austin Currie commented:
it must be very galling for any woman to think that the work she had done in the
home, sometimes over half a century or more, will not count. … The contribution
of women in the home is often more difficult, complex and valuable than that of
those who work outside the home. It requires talents that those who work outside
the home do not need.126
The 1994 Bill became the Family Law Act 1995, and was intended to form the
template for forthcoming divorce legislation. It repealed Part II of 1989 Act replacing
it with more comprehensive rules governing ancillary orders on judicial separation.
Provision was also made, in Part III, for financial relief following divorce or judicial
separation outside the State, and for application to the court for declarations of marital
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status.127 The minimum age of marriage was raised to 18 for both men and women,
and s 12 of the Married Women’s Status Act was repealed and replaced with a similar,
but more comprehensive provision, governing property questions arising between
spouses.128 A new pension adjustment order was introduced, and variation provisions
were updated. 129 The general scheme of the courts’ judicial separation jurisdiction
remained. The fault and no fault basis of the decree and the factors taken into account
in deciding appropriate financial provision were unchanged. 130 More significantly,
section 15 of the 1989 Act, which allowed the grant of property adjustment orders ‘on
one occasion only,’ was replaced by section 9 of the 1995 Act, which provided that
there would be no limit to the number of occasions on which a property adjustment
order could be granted. The lifetime nature of spousal support obligations was
enhanced rather than diminished in anticipation of divorce.131 The division of pension
assets under the Act could be achieved only by court order, thus ensuring that marriage
breakdowns, where one or both parties had made pension provision, could not be
resolved by agreement, unless the non-pensioned spouse was happy to waive all rights
to the pension.

7.4.2 Marriage-saving divorce
A new ‘Government of Renewal’ took office on 15th December 1995 planning to
continue the previous government’s efforts on divorce. 132 Fine Gael, the largest
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government party, favoured the simple removal of the constitutional prohibition but
the Labour Minster for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor, publically
announced his intention to include the conditions for divorce in the Constitution
without consulting his government partners. Bertie Ahern, the new Fianna Fail leader
immediately endorsed this approach, leaving Fine Gael with no option but to support
Taylor’s proposal.133 The proposed amendment was drafted and the referendum set for
30 November 1995. Article 41.2.3 would be replaced with a statement of the terms
upon which a marriage could be dissolved by the Court:
A Court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, but only
where, it is satisfied that –
i.
at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived apart
from one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four
years during the previous five years,
ii.
there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the spouses,
iii.
such provision as the Court considers proper having regard to the
circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses, any children of either
or both of them and any other person prescribed by law, and
iv.
any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.
The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill was introduced to Dáil Éireann in
September 1995, and a government information paper on the divorce referendum, with
draft legislation, issued to the public the same month.134
Levels of marriage breakdown had continued to increase since the previous
referendum on divorce in 1986. The government estimated that some 75,400
individuals were affected by marriage breakdown in 1993, and ‘the number of people
entering marriage [had] been decreasing steadily.’135 The government declared in its
information paper that it was ‘strongly committed to protecting the family and the
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institution of marriage,’136 and this commitment was ‘central to government’s position
on divorce.’ 137 The potential impact of divorce would be minimal; ‘we have legal
remedies equivalent to divorce in every respect except one, the right to remarry.’138 In
any event, government had introduced a wide range of measures to ‘support and enrich
existing marriages.’139 Government, in aiming to provide a divorce jurisdiction, had
accepted responsibility, not only for promoting and protecting the institution of
marriage, but for ensuring the quality of existing marriages.
Debate on the referendum Bill in the Oireachtas was prolonged, attracting
comment from a large number of deputies and senators. A variety of arguments were
made from a wide range of political positions, yet there was consensus on the notion
that lifetime marriage formed the basis of the socially optimal family. Government
was required to support and encourage this family type through its laws and social
policy, because any significant degradation of the primacy of the marital family would
lead to social and moral chaos. Niamh Breathnach, Minister for Education connects
the wording of the amendment to government’s marriage protection role: ‘at the centre
of the proposed wording is the Government's support for the family and the institution
of marriage.’140
There was no easy divorce; spouses would be required live apart for 4 years before
being allowed to remarry. The delay would, according to Deputy Michael Woods,
facilitate ‘counselling, reconciliation and a period of adjustment.’141 They would be
required to demonstrate, in addition to living apart for four years, that there was no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation. Spouses could not be trusted to correctly report
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that their marriage was at an end; government had a responsibility to ensure that their
interpersonal relationship was irreversibly over before sanctioning the ending of the
marriage and remarriage of the parties. During this period of adjustment and attempted
reconciliation, they must continue to provide for one and other, an obligation that
would continue beyond dissolution.142
In Oireachtas debate, pro-divorce arguments focused on the right to remarry. The
Minister for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor in introducing the Bill to the
Dáil described divorce as a recognition ‘that unfortunately some marriages can and do
irretrievably come to an end’ and that the option must be given to the parties ‘if they
so wish, to remarry.’143 Deputies continually emphasised the difficulties experienced
by those who enter second relationships. Liz McManus, then Minister for State at the
Department of the Environment, laments the recent:
increase in the number of family units that are not recognised in the tax and social
welfare codes and are simply outside the system. We have an expanding tier of
second class families.144
Although her purpose was to advocate for divorce, Deputy McManus clearly
communicated her view that families based on legally sanctioned marriage were
superior to other family forms. These non-standard families must be allowed to
conform so that they can avail of the advantages that the State endows on married
couples. Theresa Ahern argued that ‘because couples are incompatible with each other
does not mean they will be incompatible with everyone … separated, battered wives
or abandoned husbands’ must be afforded the ‘possibility of a future second happy
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marriage.’ 145 Alan Shatter described the absence of an ‘opportunity of a second
chance’ as an ‘extraordinary cruelty,’146 whilst Roisin Shorthall designated the right
to remarriage as a ‘civil right.’147
Fianna Fáil, the main opposition party, supported the government pro-divorce
position. Michael Woods claimed that ‘[w]e now have a significant number of people
who want to remarry.’ 148 Tom Kitt, also Fianna Fail, also focused on the ‘right to
remarry:’
Take for instance, the plight of a young woman, the victim of domestic violence
and, ultimately, desertion by her husband. If after some time, she meets someone
else and enters into a rewarding, stable and loving relationship, are we to deny her
the opportunity to remarry, and the right to have her long term and loving
relationship recognised by law as marriage.149
The implication of this argument is clear; marriage is a desirable status which should
be wanted and available to as many (heterosexual) individuals as possible, other family
structures are ‘second class.’ Divorce, in allowing separated persons to remarry would,
in David Andrew’s view support ‘the pre-eminent role of the family in the social fabric
of our nation.’150
All of the major parties officially backed the referendum campaign, and dissent in
the Oireachtas was relatively muted. Those who did voice opposition concurred with
the picture of marriage as the optimal relationship form, but conceptualised divorce as
a threat rather than a support to marriage. Michael Noonan was forthright in his
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opposition: ‘Divorce is basically wrong and will destroy the fabric of family life and
values.’151 Noel Ahern emphasised the affect of divorce on the nature of marriage:
Bringing in divorce abolishes marriage as we know it. Marriage up until now was
lifelong, based on a permanent commitment. If divorce is introduced, every
marriage in the State is made temporary in the eyes of the law.152
Anti-divorce positions also tended to focus on the moral aspects of marriage
occasionally referring to the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Senator Joseph Doyle
was particularly forthright regarding his membership of the church and his
commitment to ‘the permanency of marriage.’153
The Minister for Justice drew attention to ‘the authenticity of government support
for marriage’ demonstrated by ‘the package of action, involving both laws and
services, to prevent marriage breakdown in so far as possible.’ This included
‘Department of Equality and Law Reform funding for marriage counselling
organisations which provide pre-marriage counselling and assist marriages under
stress.’ 154 Michael Woods and Tom Kitt endorsed ‘educational programmes[s] on
marriage and what it entails … as part of the school curriculum.’ 155 Successful
mediation would help couples to maintain a harmonious relationship post-divorce.
Eithne Fitzgerald, the Minister for State at the Department of the Tánaiste, described
mediation as ‘much more civilised’ it created more ‘harmony’ than ‘trading
accusations and faults.’156 Phil Hogan argued that the form of divorce proposed by
government:
is well balanced ... It enshrines the need for reconciliation. This Government and
previous Governments have increased the funding in recent years to many
organisations involved in mediation and counselling … one will not qualify for a
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divorce unless one can show that a process of reconciliation was undertaken and
the needs of children and the other spouse have been dealt with.157
The message was clear; marriages must be saved, using professionals paid by the
State if necessary. If it was not possible to effect reconciliation through the deployment
of expertise over a four year period, then a civilised negotiated arrangement between
spouses would be tolerated. Marital disputes so intractable that they required the
intervention of the courts did not fall within the zone of behaviour that government
wanted to acknowledge or encourage.

7.4.3 Legislating for divorce
The Fifteenth Amendment Bill passed through the Oireachtas without difficulty and
was put to the electorate in November 1995, passing by a slim majority.158 A draft
Family Law (Divorce) Bill had been circulated to the general public in advance of the
referendum leaving little room for Oireachtas amendment when debate began in June
1996. As enacted, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1997 provided for divorce without
proof of marital fault following the separation of the spouses for a period of four out
of the previous five years. Fault was not wholly irrelevant. The conduct of each of the
spouses was a factor to be taken into consideration in the making of ancillary financial
orders ‘if that conduct is such that in the opinion of the court it would in all the
circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard it.’159The Act envisaged financial
orders being available following divorce, save in cases where the recipient had
remarried, thus ensuring the continuation of the financial obligations of marriage
beyond its legal dissolution.
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‘Proper provision’ for spouses and children was a constitutional prerequisite to the
grant of a decree of divorce, but its content was left to judicial discretion. Neither was
any legislative guidance given to the court regarding how it should determine that
there is ‘no prospect of reconciliation,’ or whether the parties have indeed lived apart
for four out of the previous five years.160 As with judicial separation, a list of factors
to be taken into account by the court in making financial awards was provided but the
termination of financial obligation was not one of them.161 Marriage, as defined by the
Act, was a semi-terminable relationship producing unpredictable post-relationship
obligations, subject to continual review during the lifetime of former spouses.

7.5 The Effects of Marriage Law
7.5.1 Self-governing marriages
Marriage, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, had become an intense relay of
interests; economic, legal, religious, political and psychological, creating more and
more centres of self-perpetuating power installed around the relationship behaviour of
individual citizens. The most powerful of these, or the one with the capacity to act as
a transfer point for all the others, was legal. Constitutional support for lifetime
dependency marriage endorsed religious values. Legally sanctioned marriage
facilitated political administration of the social domain. Legal processes assimilated
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scientific knowledge and demonstrated significant institutional experience in the
management of problematic relationships. The social and legal danger of marriage
breakdown generated a need for counselling and mediation
The centrality of law meant that legal expertise was the principle form of
knowledge relied upon by government in resolving the problems of marriage.
Government acknowledged that the difficulty with marriage was the financial hardship
dependency marriage created for wives. It was also aware of the limitations of
marriage law in addressing these difficulties. Nevertheless, alternatives to marriage
law were not considered. The over-riding aim of government was to save marriage, an
objective that seemed doomed to failure from the beginning. Yet, it was never
expected that marriage breakdown or cohabitation could be eliminated. Rather, in
developing mechanisms to save marriage, government established an ideal
relationship and installed mechanisms of control around those who did not conform.
Marriage law was presented as a measure to save marriage, but in effect, it established
lines of penetration into couple-relationships requiring individuals to pay close
attention to their own behaviour. Legal marriage, the optimal relationship form, once
entered into, had to be maintained. The desperately abnormal, those with clinical
diagnoses, could be released from marriage and all of its obligations. 162 The merely
transgressive were required to save their marriages through relationship counselling,
or to remake their post relationship lives in the image of lifetime marriage.
The deployment of legal mechanism in addressing the problems of marriage thus
inevitably implicated individual lives in the marriage-saving objectives of
government. The intense political focus on marriage between 1986 and 1996, and in
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particular two plebiscites on the issue of divorce, could leave no one in any doubt that
marriage was essential to the well-being of individuals and the stability of the State.
The marriage saving rhetoric of politics, the individualised nature of legal remedies,
and the proliferation of State funded of counselling services, intimated that failure at
marriage was both a social and an individual failure.
The individualisation thesis of family change posits that relationships became
more complex as a result of wider social and structural change. Carol Smart, found a
close congruence between Giddens’ description of the ‘rise of intimacy’ and British
legal change, suggesting that legal change had reflected social change. ‘Clean break’
divorce in particular, facilitated the movement of individuals from one relationship to
another. Smart also, however, noted a recent regression toward marriage protection as
a means to promote social stability. 163 The path of Irish marriage law, leading to the
introduction of divorce, does not follow this linear trajectory. It appears, rather, that a
series of elements were linked together in a more circular fashion. Government offered
dependency marriage as the optimal relationship form. This was supported by
religious ideals and the needs of State administrative systems such as tax and social
welfare. Value was attached to marriage, it was given an economic and affective
worth, and fear was installed around it as a source of danger, to women, to children,
to society as a whole.164 Failure at marriage carried a whole host of difficulties. It
created reasons for blame and responsibilisation, justification for intervention and
grounds for individuals to police their own relationships. Perhaps individualisation
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theories of relationships do not describe individual practice, but are a manifestation of
the power effects of the political problematisation of legal marriage.
7.5.2 Post-divorce marriage – social provision.
Increased participation by women in the workforce during the 1990s meant that they
had more financial independence from their husbands and, in contributing to the social
insurance scheme in their own right, had less need to rely on their husband’s
contributions, particularly in relation to pensions. Nonetheless, women dependent on
their husbands risked losing the substantial tax and welfare advantages of marriage
upon divorce. The government information paper circulated prior to the referendum
therefore carefully set out how divorce would affect tax and social welfare and many
of the measures were already in place prior to the referendum.165
The approach taken within the social welfare system was to allow a divorced
person, who had not remarried, to claim benefits based on their former spouses
contributions. For example, a widow’s pension would be available to a woman whose
former husband had made the requisite number of contributions prior to his death. If
he remarried, then both ‘widows’ would receive the pension. A woman in receipt of a
deserted wives payment would continue to be considered ‘deserted’ following divorce,
and a prisoner’s wife could also receive an allowance post-divorce. Social welfare
dependent allowances would continue to be paid to a person supporting a former
spouse, even if the paying spouse remarried and received a dependent allowance for a
second spouse.166 The objective of social welfare provision was therefore to assume
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that marriage and its obligations continued post-divorce. The information paper
specifically acknowledged that:
Where a spouse is unwilling or unable to meet maintenance obligations, State
intervention may be necessary to provide support for vulnerable dependents.167
The Social Welfare (No 2) Act 1995 redefined ‘spouse’ to include:
(a) a party to a marriage that has been dissolved, being a dissolution that is
recognised as valid in the State, or
(b) a man and woman who are not married to each other but are cohabiting as
husband and wife.168
Taxation policy similarly facilitated the continuation of marriage privileges
following divorce, but it also allowed single treatment, which would prove more
beneficial to two income couples with children.169 One significant fiscal implication
of divorce was the removal of the exemptions from capital taxes that applied between
spouses. These exemptions would be available for property transactions made
pursuant to an order for divorce, but not following divorce when the former spouses
would be treated as strangers. Nevertheless, if the need for property transfer arose
post-divorce, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 facilitated an application for
variation of a divorce order for the lifetime of the spouses which would attract the
exemption.
The effect of divorce on ‘discarded’ first wives had been a significant factor in the
1986 divorce referendum, with anti-divorce campaigners able to point to their

167

Department of Equality and Law Reform, The Right to Remarry: A Government
Information Paper on the Divorce Referendum, 22.
168
Section 9, referring to qualification rules for Family Income Supplement.
169
Aggregation allowed to married couples could be continued post-divorce, although the
spouses would be separately assessed. A married couple with one income and no children
could thus retain the full advantages of double tax allowances and credits. For a two-income
family with children, separate assessment would be more beneficial because each spouse
would have their own tax allowances and bands and, if they shared custody of children, also
claim an additional single parent allowance equal to an adult dependent allowance. In this
circumstance the couple would be significantly better off post-divorce. These provisions had
been introduced for separated couples in the Finance Act 1983 and were extended to divorced
couples by the Finance Act 1995.
280

effective exclusion from State services and the difficulty in supporting two families
with one income. Government had pre-empted this objection in 1996 by agreeing to
extend marriage-based social provision to former wives (and husbands in some cases).
Politics had not yet found a way to imagine that marriage and its obligations could, in
fact, end on divorce.
7.5.3 Effects of marriage law – apparatus of control
The Irish government had aimed to construct a set of legal rules that would symbolise
its commitment to marriage, save marriages in difficulty and, following the
introduction of divorce, create new, better marriages to replace failed attempts. Their
efforts, however, attracted significant criticism. Sociologists, Tony Fahey and
Maureen Lyons reviewed the operation of pre-divorce rules in 1995, and concluded
that legislators and policy makers had made, and changed, the law whilst ‘driving in
the dark,’ that is, without regard to the social context or impact of what they were
doing. 170 They found that family law operated as a two-tier system, lower income
families achieved de facto separations by making applications for barring orders.
Many maintenance applications were made to fulfil the prerequisites for lone parent
welfare payments. Judicial separation or formal legal separation was the experience of
only a small, better off, minority.171
The Law Reform Commission also criticised the operation of family law system
in a Consultation paper, and subsequent report, on the family law courts, published in
advance of the divorce referendum. The Commission found that in aiming to protect
marriage through law, government had produced:
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a system struggling and barely managing to cope with the very great increase in
family litigation in recent years. The result is a sad parody of that which might be
expected in a State whose Constitution rightly places such emphasis on the
protection of family life.172
Anticipating further difficulties upon the introduction of divorce the Commission
reported that:
There has in the last twenty years been a vast increase in family litigation. While
this may be a reflection of an underlying problem of greater instability in family
relations, its more direct progenitor has been a series of reforming measures.173
Fahey and Lyons and the Law Reform Commission drew attention to the
continually increasing number of applications for family law remedies. They also
described the dense legal apparatus governing intimate relationships and their
incidents that had developed since the government’s program of reform began in 1976.
Additional courts and sittings were established and specific family law venues
operated in Dublin. 174 The Legal Aid Board 175 and Family Mediation Service 176
expanded their services to cope with demand from troubled relationships. Probation
and Welfare Board professionals were involved in domestic violence and child-related
cases. 177 Court Clerks, formerly concerned only with the smooth running of their
courts, initiated procedures to deal with the large number of litigants in person seeking
the assistance of the District Court.178 Courts collected statistics on family law cases,
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work not undertaken or required in other civil law categories. 179 An abundance of
Statutory Instruments set out the specialised rules applying to marriage law cases and
courts.180 Professional bodies governing lawyers, counsellors, and mediators created
training and accreditation programs specifically directed to the resolution of
relationship disputes.181 This apparatus was not confined to the regulation of marriage.
Fahey and Lyons reported that in the District Court:
just over half of the maintenance cases arose in the context of what we might call
‘pure’ marital separation (i.e. involving wives and husbands where barring
proceedings were not being invoked). The balance was made up of maintenance
cases which were tied in with barring applications and maintenance cases between
non-married partners.182
The legal apparatus governing familial relationships had spread far beyond the
constitutional family and, according to the Law Reform Commission, was ‘in crisis,’
struggling to respond to demand. At District Court level, where the majority of family
litigation occurred, being married attracted no preferential treatment. The
Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 facilitated maintenance applications for non-marital
children and the barring order jurisdiction was extended to included cohabitees in
1996.183 Dysfunctional families of all types were dealt with by an ‘ill equipped and

179

Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Family Courts, 107. The Law
Reform Commission also noted that the Court staff were reluctant to collect this information
because it was not part of their traditional workload, the courts were already understaffed and
the extraction of the information was time-consuming, requiring the clerk to go through each
case file individually.
180
The following statutory instruments dealt only with court rules relating to Marriage
Law cases: Rules of Superior Courts (No. 1), SI 1990/97; Rules of the Superior Courts (No.
3), SI 1997/343; District Court (Family Law) Rules, SI 1998/42; District Court (Domestic
Violence) Rules SI 1998/201; District Court Rules SI 1997/93; Circuit Court Rules (No 1) SI
1997/84; Circuit Court Rules (No 1) SI 1991/159; Circuit Court Rules (No 1) SI 1994/225.
181
The Mediators’ Institute of Ireland was established in1992 as a professional association
for mediators in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland <www.themii.ie> accessed 14
June 2103. The Family Law and Legal Aid Committee of the Law Society of Ireland issued a
Family Law in Ireland-Code of Practice, in 1995.
182
Fahey and Lyons Marital Breakdown and Family Law in Ireland – A Sociological
Study, 45.
183
The Domestic Violence Act 1996 s 3(1)(b) extended the range of applicants to include
an application by a non-spouse who had ‘lived with the respondent as husband or wife for a
283

intimidating’ process. 184 Marriage law had, in effect, created an administrative
monster.

7.5.4 Marital litigation
Fahey and Lyons’ description of the ‘two tier’ system pointed to the circumstances in
which parties who could not agree would resort to the courts. If there were no assets
and little money, or if the parties lived in local authority housing, on welfare payments,
a judicial separation was unnecessary. A barring order was a convenient mechanism
for removing one spouse from the home, thus effecting a de facto separation.185 A
maintenance order might secure support for children or entitle the beneficiary to a
social welfare payment in their own right. Difficult marriages in which there was
property, the type of marriage pictured by government in making law, needed more
comprehensive remedies.
For the middle classes, suspending marriage was a complex procedure. A solicitor
consulted by a spouse was required to discuss the possibility of reconciliation, the
availability of mediation and the potential to negotiate an agreement.186 The possibility
of a nullity application also had to be explored, involving a detailed examination of
the circumstances in which the marriage was entered into. The formal requirements
for a valid marriage had to be confirmed, and the validity of prior marriages and
divorces verified. Once litigation was decided upon, the legislative framework for
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judicial separation obliged the court to consider the behaviour of the parties if it would
be unjust to ignore, thus creating an incentive to list marital failures in court
documents, 187 as conduct not pleaded could not be considered by the court. 188 A
judicial separation could be granted on the grounds of ‘adultery,’ ‘unreasonable
behaviour’ or ‘lack of a normal marital relationship,’189 necessitating consideration of
all of these issues. In order to claim the absence of a ‘normal marital relationship,’ an
investigation of the intimate lives of the spouses was required, and to commence a
judicial separation a grounding affidavit was prepared referring ‘to every possible
legal and factual permutation’190 In making an application in the Circuit or High Court
details of all remedies sought had to be stated. As the applicant spouse might not, at
that stage, have full details of their spouse’s financial position, all possible relief had
to be claimed, thus encouraging denial and correspondingly detailed counterclaim.
Although divorce legislation did not require proof of fault, the applicant was required
to prove that there was ‘no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.’ 191 In addition,
reconciliation and negotiated separation had to be considered (despite the minimum
four year period of separation), and again the lack of financial information at the outset
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of proceedings could lead a spouse to claim all possible reliefs in attempting to ensure
the legislatively mandated ‘proper provision.’192
The court, in both judicial separation and divorce, had a wide discretion in making
ancillary orders. Reporting restrictions and the in camera rule meant that the actual
outcomes of most family law cases were unknown. This uncertainty further
encouraged litigants to plead and contest every aspect of their failed relationship. Once
spouses with difficult issues had reached the stage of litigation, their negotiations were
inevitably difficult. The stakes were high and adjudicative outcomes unpredictable.
According to the Law Reform Commission, the in camera rule created ‘an unhealthy
atmosphere in which anecdote, rumour and myth inform the public’s understanding of
what goes on in the family court.’193
A further consequence of the existence of this dense, and high profile, network of
marriage law was to construct marriage as a legal relationship carrying enforceable
rights and obligations. Nevertheless, the in camera rule and the multi-layered,
discretionary nature of the marriage law system meant that individual spouses were
never entirely sure what precise rights and obligations applied to their marriage. In a
difficult interpersonal situation, spouses were free to construct their own image of
marital rights and obligations and to seek their vindication through counselling,
mediation and the courts. ‘Bargaining in the shadow of the law’ has been offered as a
way of thinking about the effect of law in divorce situations. Order, it is argued, is not
imposed from above, but rather divorce law provides a framework within which
divorcing couples can determine their post-marriage rights and responsibilities
themselves. This empowers individuals by facilitating the private ordering of legally
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enforceable commitment. 194 The form of law adopted by the Irish government,
focused on marriage-saving, was conducted in private, and was highly discretionary.
It provided no shadow. Rather it created a framework within which individuals were
free to create their own, highly mobile rights, guaranteeing not empowerment, but
seemingly inevitable conflict.

7.5.5 Identifying abnormality in the courts
In written judgments, Judges often referred to the failure, and blameworthiness, of
individuals submitting to marital adjudication, even when not strictly relevant to their
decision. In EP v CP for example,195 Mc Guinness J identified the most important
aspect of the case to be the ‘maintenance of the children’ and assigned responsibility
for their vulnerability to the husband.
Mr P showed no sign of regret for the breakdown of his marriage. I felt very little
sign of a real sense of responsibility for the upbringing and financial backing of
his children … It also astounds me that Mr P does not seem willing to make and
effort … to get ordinary employment … and at least make some payment towards
the arrears of maintenance for his children.
In JD v DD196 McGuinness J found that ‘the husband’s adultery put the nail in the
coffin of the marriage,’197 and granted the judicial separation on this ground, despite
acknowledging that the marriage had difficulties for a significant period. The Supreme
Court in MW v DW referred to litigants as ‘a dysfunctional family of parents and
children living under one roof.’198 The wife in S v S199 was condemned by Findlay CJ
for ‘enjoying her life to the full,’ and having ‘no proper appreciation of the
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commitments which marriage involves.’200 A finding that one party was the innocent
victim of marriage breakdown could confer considerable advantages. The husband in
S v S gained full custody of the children of the marriage as a result of his wife’s
failures. In AS v GS & AIB Notice Party201 the court protected the family home in
which the (‘innocent’) wife and children were living from the husbands debt because
it was ‘highly desirable that the property in question, being the family home of the
applicant and the children of the marriage, be transferred to the applicant.’ 202 The
courts, adopting their traditional blame-apportioning role, served to re-enforce the
dangers of entering into the legal complex surrounding marriage. Asserting one’s legal
rights, or seeking simply to exit a failed relationship, risked judicial censure.

7.5.6 Self government - negotiation
Couples who reached the end of their relationship were presented with a choice. They
could attempt to resolve their own disputes through reconciliation, mediation or
agreement, or they could submit to the adjudicative function of the courts, by
approaching a solicitor to initiate court proceedings or attending at the District Court
as a litigant in person to obtain a barring or maintenance order.203 This would not be a
pleasant experience. The Law Reform Commission described courtroom facilities as
‘a disgrace.’ 204 There were often no ‘waiting room facilities sometimes leaves
opposing spouses to confront one and other seated on benches in cold and draughty
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corridors.’ 205 Not only were the physical conditions in which litigants found
themselves difficult. The atmosphere of the courts was adversarial and litigious.
Its ethos and general approach … is negative. Instead of concentrating on the
empowerment of individuals to resolve their own family disputes, by encouraging
negotiation and agreement, the emphasis of our system with its concentration on
adjudication, is on solutions, which take control away from the participant.206
In entering into the adjudicative realm of the courts, particularly when seeking the
substantive remedies of judicial separation or divorce, litigants were required to reveal
every detail of their marital failure. Although their identity was protected from the
outside world, they had to justify their behaviour to a series of professionals and
eventually to a judge. If unable to prove their vulnerability and need for protection,
they risked personal chastisement and material disadvantage. Their ordeal did not end
with the grant of a judicial separation or divorce, the on-going nature of support
obligations left them tied to a former spouse for life. Whichever route individuals
chose to exit their marriage, they could never escape its obligations. Mediated
agreements and separations left them tied to their spouse by marriage, post relationship
co-operation and financial support created moral and practical ties, even divorce left
no escape from the (financial) responsibilities of a failed marriage.

7.5.7 Moving away from marriage
Fahey and Lyons recorded that most family cases coming before the courts related to
the fulfilment of pre-requisites for social welfare payments, protection from violence
and disputes regarding guardianship, custody and access to children.207 None of these
are specifically related to marriage and the first two in particular address issues –
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financial need and protection from violence – that are not necessary limited to those
involved in intimate relationships. 208 The resolution of specific ‘marriage’ law
disputes, the ‘marriage saving’ jurisdiction envisaged by government, therefore,
represented only a small portion of the work of the courts. Couples with financial
resources, and in agreement, could simply choose to live apart; the revenue
commissioners, social welfare and other organs of the State would accept a defacto
separation for administrative purposes. Without a court order, married parents
remained joint guardians of their children and if arrangements in relation to custody
could be agreed there was no need for the sanction of the courts. A negotiated
separation and distribution of property could be effected without reference to the
courts. The only cases requiring a judicial separation where those in which they were
necessary. For example, where the parties had significant assets and could not agree
on their distribution, where one party refused to leave the family home, or, following
the 1995 Act, where one of the parties had a significant employment related pension
provision. All other issues, child custody, access or maintenance, spousal
maintenance, domestic violence, could be more effectively resolved without recourse
to judicial separation.
In this sense, therefore, government rhetoric that divorce was simply the right to
remarry was accurate. Divorce legislation mirrored judicial separation legislation in
continuing marital obligations. The State would treat divorce and separation similarly
for social welfare purposes allowing any individual to accumulate a succession of
spousal obligations. For those who had agreed the division of their lives, obtaining a
divorce simply involved an administrative procedure following a wait period. For
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those who could not agree, however divorce represented another opportunity to revisit
the animosity of their relationship failure, another process of examination and division
and a re-iteration of the lifetime obligations of Irish marriage.

7.6 Shifting knowledge
The decision in TF v Ireland illustrates the extent to which judicial opinion had
departed from adherence to the textual truth of Article 41. Not only had marriage
become a companionate relationship requiring the ongoing effort and consent of the
parties, defined gender roles were no longer appropriate to modern social conditions:
The reality is that with improved education and increasing equality of opportunity
in all forms of careers and indeed the entitlement to retain employment after
marriage, a married woman will have in many cases the possibility to provide for
herself independently of her spouse and even where her own earnings are
insufficient the vastly improved social welfare arrangements have rendered it
unnecessary for a married woman to live in an unacceptable state of bondage.209
In a further departure from the position in the 1980s, the courts began to express a
reluctance to interfere with policy decisions made by government on the basis of social
economy.210 For example, in Mhic Mhathuna v Ireland & AG,211 a challenge to tax
and welfare measures that potentially conferred financial advantages on single parent
families vis a vis married couples was rejected. The Supreme Court held that ‘these
are peculiarly matters within the field of national policy to be decided by a
combination of the executive and the legislature that cannot be adjudicated on by the
courts.’ 212 Similarly, in Lowth v Minister for Social Welfare 213 the plaintiff
unsuccessfully challenged the scheme of deserted wives benefits from which he was
excluded because he was a husband rather than a wife. The High court rejected his
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claim, finding that the legislature was entitled to differentiate between married men
and married women because statistical evidence showed that married women were
more likely to be outside the workforce and in need of assistance than married men.
This is a marked contrast with Barron J’s decision on the same issue in Dennehy v
Minister for Social Welfare and AG,214 in which he achieved the same result in reliance
on the moral truth of Article 41.2.215

7.7 Conclusion
7.7.1 Governed by marriage law
Economic conditions improved in the 1990s and more women remained in the
workforce after marriage. Marriage remained popular and a significant number of
couples continued to practice the dependency model. Problematisation of marriage
focused on relationship breakdown and its effect on dependent women, Divorce was
introduced in 1997 in a restrictive form, with the political objective of saving marriage
by facilitating the formation of new and better marriages to replace failed unions. A
comprehensive programme of counselling and mediation focused on saving marriage
accompanied divorce legislation. Vulnerable dependent women, suffering postrelationship poverty were the intended benefactors of a comprehensive machinery
designed to enforce the financial obligations of marriage post-divorce. The State too
would see to it that the obligations of husbands to ‘discarded’ wives were fulfilled, by
extending marriage-based social insurance, such as widow’s pension, to both former
and current wives. Marriage law, nonetheless remained the principle political strategy
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for addressing the vulnerability of women and the social danger of marriage
breakdown.
By the mid-1990s, marriage was well established as domain of political
intervention. Marriage law, intended to save lifetime, dependency marriage and
protect vulnerable dependent wives, had created a dense regulatory network around
intimate relationships. Marriage was, without doubt, the most valuable relationship
and its commitments had to be respected, even after the interpersonal relationship
between the spouses had ended. Political support for marriage was largely drawn from
the tenets of the dominant morality, supported by an emerging functionalist sociology
and decisions of the superior courts. In seeking to save marriage, government did not
directly require marriage nor forbid its termination. Rather the marriage saving
objective was achieved through a series of techniques that engaged with the
population’s understanding of, and support for, marriage. The institutional status of
marriage was not significantly challenged during this period, but in funding
counselling and mediation, government had begun to accept that marriage was an
interpersonal relationship between two individuals.

7.7.2 A role for law in conducting the relationship behaviour of individuals
Construction of the basic form of marriage law as it exists today was completed by the
mid-1990s. The form and operation of the statutory framework, when contextualised
within social economic and political contexts, reflects Foucault’s description of the
operation of government in the modern State. The Irish government in attempting to
manage the population of the State used marriage law as one technique, among many,
to encourage lifetime, monogamous dependency marriage. The will to promote
marriage was so pervasive that divorce, the dissolution of marriage, was constructed
as a measure to protect marriage in facilitating re-coupling whilst maintaining the
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obligations of previous relationships. Government focus on marriage-saving also
created a regulatory environment within which marriage conferred financial and social
benefits on individual families.
In choosing to address the difficulties created by marriage through legal measures,
the Irish government required those whose intimate relationships had broken down to
co-operatively continue the relationship in different households, or to acknowledge
their failure and pass into law’s adjudicative quagmire. They were required to assert
their rights and plead their vulnerability in order to extract the remedies of financial
support, property ownership and custody of children. Whilst it may not have been the
intention of government to create a ‘family law system’ or increase the volume of
inter-spousal litigation, this was the inevitable outcome of its choice to regulate
marriage and its breakdown through a discretionary system of marriage law. This was
not necessarily a negative from the perspective of politics; individuals unable to
perform lifetime relationships were no longer the concern of government. It had
provided a comprehensive system of family law remedies requiring consideration of
reconciliation and mediation before court adjudication. Government funded
counselling and mediation services were available throughout the country. Judges
were on hand to adjudicate disputes and free legal aid was provided to assist the
indigent and vulnerable. Everything necessary had been done to guide and support
spouses in maintaining their relationships, those who were unable to do so were
therefore responsible for their own failure.
The political centrality of marriage in tax and social welfare rules and the
importance attributed to marriage by two referenda requiring reflection on the nature
of marriage by the entire population, also served to direct individual behaviour toward
the normative relationship form. Marriage was desirable, a status symbol and indicator
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of relationship and familial success. It is not surprising within this environment that
the numbers marrying increased following the introduction of divorce. The possibility
that marriage could be ended made it seem more desirable that it should continue.
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Eight – Rationalising Relationships
1997 - 2010

Marriage, the lifetime, monogamous, foundation of family life, somewhat
paradoxically became more popular as a social practice following the introduction of
divorce.1 Tony Fahey has suggested that this was the result of improved economic
conditions, and perhaps this is so,2 but by the end of the 1990s, marriage was no longer
a social pre-requisite to family status, sexual expression, couple formation or
parenting. Nonetheless, it experienced a resurgence at the level of social practice,
despite the onerous obligations imposed by marriage law.
Campaigns for marriage law reform in the 1970s had focused on its potential to
relieve the suffering of dependent housewives abandoned and left indigent by their
wage-earning husbands. In the 1980s and 1990s, more marriage law was necessary to
protect institutional marriage. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new role
for marriage law emerged. Marriage law, despite its increasingly onerous obligations,

1

The marriage rate had been falling steadily since the early 1970s, but began to increase
in 1997. In 1996, the marriage rate was 4.5 per thousand persons per year and in 2002 it was
5.2, remaining at that level until it began to decline again in 2009 falling to 4.5 in 2010. Central
Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2013 (Stationery Office 2013), 73; Central
Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2004 (Prn 3509, Stationery Office 2004), 54.
2
Tony Fahey ‘Small Bang? The Impact of Divorce Legislation on Marital Breakdown in
Ireland’ (2012) 26(2) Intl Jnl Law Policy Family 242.
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its chaotic and often ineffective operation, its punitive effect on those who failed to
live up to its expectations, came to be seen as the solution to the problems of social
exclusion and discrimination. This final empirical chapter is concerned with the
continued problematisation of marriage law following the introduction of divorce. It
connects a renewed desire for marriage law reform to a shift in how government was
rationalised at the end of the 1980s. Membership of the European Union, and the
demands of a globalised market economy, required adoption of a rational, technocratic
form of government, and the pursuit of economic growth predicated on social stability.
Stable couple relationships were an essential part of the growth imperative because
they contributed to social, and consequently, economic stability. Furthermore, by
sharing the care of dependents within couple relationships, two workers became
available where in the past there had been one.
This chapter begins by identifying the shift in how government was rationalised
that occurred during the 1990s, and then discusses how this necessitated a rational, as
opposed to institutional, conceptualisation of marriage. The second part of the chapter
looks at how marriage law was problematised during this period focusing in particular
in the role of human rights and equality discourses in posing marriage law as both a
problem and a solution to problems. Finally, the chapter looks at how marriage law
operated in the courts, noting an increasingly administrative approach to the judicial
decision making process. The marriage law system, however, continued its traditional
role in identifying abnormality, and a discursive conflation of marriage and child law
acted to emphasise further the deviance of relationship failure.
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8.1 Ensuring Economic Progress.
8.1.1 Rationality, the European Union (EU) and economic progress.
Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973, and was almost
immediately designated a less-developed region. As a result, it received significant
ongoing financial transfers from the European regional development fund.3 Following
ratification of the Single European Act in 1988, regional development funds were
doubled, and Ireland, designated an ‘Objective One’ region, was once again a
significant beneficiary. The Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1992, emphasised both
social and economic cohesion, and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1998 made a direct
connection between social and economic development.4
The European project, although begun as political and economic initiative, by the
late 1990s, had adopted a strong social policy role. A specific link between economic
and social development was made in the governing treaties, and closer union was
predicated on both economic and social cohesion. The Amsterdam Treaty inserted a
new Article 2 in to the EEC treaties stating that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities
referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high
level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women,
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and
convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living
and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among
Member States.5

3

Between 1989 and 1999 aid flows to Ireland from EU cohesion funds amounted to 3.5
percent of gross domestic product per annum. Frank Barry, John Bradley, and Aoife Hannan,
‘The Single Market, The Structural Funds and Ireland’s Recent Economic Growth’ (2001)
39(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 537, 550.
4
The Amsterdam Treaty was ratified by Ireland following a Constitutional Referendum
held on 22 May 1998. It amended the European Economic Community treaties to advance the
process of social and economic integration.
5
Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340, Article 2.2.
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The European project required a highly rationalised economic approach to
management of both market and society. The necessary connection between social and
economic government was given further weight in Ireland between 1987 and 2003 by
six partnership agreements entered into between government, trade unions, employer
groups, and later, representatives of civil society. 6 The strategic purpose of this
process was succinctly summarised by the then Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, in his
introduction to the second partnership agreement published in 1991:
The strategy is simple. It is to maintain a low-inflation economy with a stable
exchange rate which can compete internationally and give us the higher standards
of living and improved social services to which we aspire.7
Social inclusion was a central element of this aim, particularly in the later agreements,
and this was to be achieved ‘through a strengthening of economic capacity and the
adoption of a coherent inclusion strategy.’ 8 Social inclusion was predicated on
workforce participation. Partnership 2000 stated that:
The single biggest contributor to social exclusion, and poverty, is unemployment.
Conversely, access to work, to adequately paid employment, is a major source of
participation. Thus, the most effective strategy for the achievement of greater
social inclusion is one which focuses, across several fronts, on increasing
employment and reducing unemployment.9
Direct control over monetary policy was removed from individual States following
the currency union adopted under the Maastricht Treaty, 10 but strict controls on
inflation and growth were imposed by Europe. The strategy adopted by the Irish

6

Department of the Taoiseach, Program for National Recovery (Pl 5213, Stationery
Office 1987), Department of the Taoiseach, Program for Social and Economic Progress (Pl
7829, Stationery Office 1991), Department of the Taoiseach, Programme for Competitiveness
and Work (Pn 0513, Stationery Office 1994) Department of the Taoiseach, Programme for
Prosperity and Fairness (2000) Department of the Taoiseach, Partnership 2000 (1996
Stationery Office) Department of the Taoiseach, Sustaining Progress: Social Partnership
Agreement 2003 – 2005 (2003).
7
Department of the Taoiseach, Program for Social and Economic Progress, 5.
8
Department of the Taoiseach, Partnership 2000, 4.
9
ibid, 14.
10
Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191.
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government maintained economic stability as required by the European Union, and
achieved the desired outcome of significant economic growth. By the late 1990s,
Ireland’s economy was considered one of the best performing in Europe.11

8.1.2 Economic rationality and social governance.
The marriage-based family, as the central institution around which social provision
orbited, was uniquely placed to mediate the implementation of the social plank of
social partnership and European integration. Whilst previously, government had
formulated its support for families in terms of direct financial transfers, reflecting the
view that families should take care of themselves, by the end of the 1990s a much
more interventionist approach emerged. It was no longer acceptable to simply
subsidise families seen as financially or morally deserving, families needed to be
supported in order to ‘combat disadvantage and social exclusion by improving the
functioning of the family unit.’ 12 Such an aim could not be achieved within a
technocratic and economically rational approach to government without significant
investigation and consideration of Irish family, and by 2001, Tony Fahey and Helen
Russell were able to note a ‘considerable policy interest in various aspects of family
behaviour.’13

A useful account of Ireland’s economic development between 1992 and 2008 can be
found in Seán O’Riain, The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger: Liberalism Boom and Bust
(Cambridge University Press 2013), 32-67.
12
Mary Daly and Sara Clavero referring to the stated objectives of the Family Resource
Centres, which received dramatically increased funding in the final years of the 1990s. Mary
Daly and Sara Clavero, Contemporary Family Policy in Ireland and Europe (Department of
Social Welfare 2002), 63.
13
Tony Fahey and Helen Russell, Family Formation in Ireland: Trends, Data Needs and
Implications. Report to the Family Affairs Unit, Department of Social, Community and Family
Affairs (Policy Research Series No 43, ESRI 2001), 65.
11
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8.1.3 Securing family stability.
A Commission on the Family, appointed in response to the United Nations Year of the
Family in 1994, and World Summit for Social Development in 1995, produced a
comprehensive report for the assistance of government in 1997.14 The Commission
carried out a review of family policy concluding that:
Marriage as a visible public institution, underpinned by contractual obligations,
presents clear advantages from a public policy perspective, in promoting security
and stability in family life and in providing continuity in society.15
Despite accepting that family existed outside marriage, the Commission maintained
that marriage was the best foundation for family from the perspective of government.
This conclusion was based, not on moral reasoning or by reference to the Constitution,
but on scientific evidence. Marriage, the Commission contended, had significant
advantages for the State as it offered a route out of welfare dependency for lone
parents, 16 conferred on children the stability and security of a loving two-parent
family, 17 was a public institution with a valued role in society, 18 and represented
continuity and stability in society.19 State support was necessary because:
continuity and stability in family relationships has a major, though not over-riding
value for individual well-being and social stability, especially, though not solely,
as far as children are concerned.20
The Commission further noted that:

14

Commission on the Family, Strengthening Families for Life: Interim Report to the
Minister for Social Welfare (Pn 3290, Stationery Office 1996), 8.
15
Commission on the Family, Final Report the Department of Social Community and
Family Affairs: Strengthening Families for Life (Pn 5818, Stationery Office 1998), 183.
16
The Commission commented that ‘it is worth remembering that research, although
limited, shows that the most usual reason for unmarried mothers to stop claiming the oneparent family payment from the department of Social Community and Family Affairs is
because they marry.’ ibid, 182.
17
ibid, 184.
18
ibid, 180.
19
ibid, 180.
20
ibid, 400.
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For many people marriage represents their commitment to long term continuity
and stability. In this context, the Commission considers that marriage should be
supported in public policy.21
Government policy could, and should, incentivise marriage, prevent marriage
breakdown, provide preparation and education for marriage and step-in ‘as soon as
difficulties in the family are identified’ with counselling and other social supports.22
A number of prominent sociologists contributed to the Commission’s report,
giving scientific authority to the link between marriage, society and good government.
Gabriel Kiely, in his contribution, noted the importance of stable couple relationships
to social stability. Drawing on scientific expertise, he argued that the modern condition
had created companionate relationships based on feelings, which were more fragile
than relationships with an institutional base, and therefore required effort and
professional counselling assistance to survive. 23 The Commission, and later the
government, accepted this position, and recommended increased State expenditure on
marriage counselling. The role of individual spouses in making their relationship work
was also noted by the Commission:
Marriage maintenance courses and personal enrichment programs for men and
women offer couples the opportunity to look at their relationship and take time to
reflect on what is valuable and what needs attending to, in order to keep the
relationship in good working order. 24
The Commission on the Family’s report had a significant influence on government
policy at the end of the 1990s leading to the establishment of a Family Affairs Unit in
the Department of Social Community and Family Affairs, a Family Support Agency

21

ibid, 160.
ibid, 185.
23
Although not referencing any theorists or academic papers in particular Dr Kiely is
clearly referring to the conceptualisations of traditional and modern families current among
social scientists. See chapter 2 above for a discussion of this branch of sociological thought.
24
Commission on the Family, Strengthening Families for Life, 205.
22

302

and a significant increase in funding for relationship counselling.25 The objectives of
the Family Support Agency were to:
bring together the main programmes and pro-family service introduced by the
Government in recent years to support families, promote continuity and stability
in family life and prevent marriage breakdown, and to foster a supportive
community environment for families at local level.26
The aim of family policy, in the Commission’s view, was to promote family
functioning in order to ensure social stability. This could be achieved through
techniques such as mediation and counselling that would help individual relationships
survive the difficulties intrinsic to the modern condition. The role of government was
thus to both set standards for relationship behaviour, and to facilitate the attainment of
optimal outcomes, not through the imposition of rules, but by engaging with the hopes
and desires of individuals for their own familial lives.
The report of the Commission also illustrates the extent to which marriage,
children and family had become conflated. Whilst previously marriage was assumed
to produce both family and children, the three concepts now had independent, yet
mutually supportive meanings. Family was something to which everyone belonged –
it was created by the presence of children, and embodied the social values of love and
stability. Marriage was the best foundation for a stable family, and the best marker of
love and commitment.

8.2 Rationalising Marriage
8.2.1 The continuing centrality of marriage.
Social stability had become the principle objective of family policy, and management
of the social domain continued to circulate around institutional marriage. A report

25

Established by the Family Support Agency Act 2001.
Minster John O’Donohue introducing the Family Support Agency Bill 2001 to the Dáil,
Dáil Deb 11 October 2001, vol 542, col 16.
26
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produced by John Mee and Kaye Ronayne in 2000, on behalf of the Equality
Authority, demonstrated the extent to which the government of family life was
mediated through marriage. 27 In particular, it illustrated the importance of marital
status with regard to the guardianship and custody of children. Mee and Ronayne noted
that joint adoption of a child was possible only by a couple married to each other.28
Similarly, automatic joint guardianship and custody of a child was available only to
married parents.29 People acting as ‘de facto’ parents of children could not acquire
custody,30 access, or guardianship rights to a child whilst its mother was alive, and
following her death such rights were available only if designated in the mother’s will.31
Only married couples could claim support from each other following relationship
breakdown,32 or succeed as of right to one and others estate on death.33 Civil Service
and private pension schemes generally did not provide survivor benefits to nonspouses, 34 and social welfare pension dependant payments were awarded only for
spouses.35 Married people could block the sale or mortgage of their family home,36
and apply for a share of their spouse’s assets following relationship breakdown.37 The
taxation system substantially benefited married couples,38 particularly where only one
of them was employed (although this was subsequently changed), and capital taxes
did not apply to transactions between married couples.39 Social welfare payments were

27

John Mee and Kaye Ronayne, Partnership Rights of Same-Sex Couples (Equality
Authority 2000).
28
ibid, 6.
29
ibid, 9.
30
ibid, 9.
31
ibid, 9.
32
ibid, 11.
33
ibid, 25.
34
ibid, 18.
35
ibid, 18.
36
ibid, 28.
37
ibid, 28.
38
ibid, 34-38.
39
ibid, 36.
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focused around the marriage based family, calculating the means of one spouse when
determining the entitlements of the other. 40 Domestic violence legislation applied
principally to married couples or those ‘living as husband and wife,’ 41 and
immigration law privileged marriage over all other forms of relationship.42
The privileged position of marriage was also re-enforced by other areas of State
regulation. A spouse was a ‘connected person’ for the purposes of a wide range of
statutory enactments governing ethics and conflicts of interest. 43 The Mental Health
Act 2001 allowed ‘a spouse or relative’ to make an application for involuntary
admission under the Act. 44 Marital, but not relationship status, was a prohibited
ground under the Employment Equality Act 1998, and the Equal Status Act 2000, and
a spouse was a dependent for the purposes of an action for damages under the Civil
Liability Act 1961.

8.2.2 Recognising marriage-like family practices
In 1996, for the first time, information on rates of cohabitation was collected in the
Irish census, marking the beginning of an understanding of ‘family’ beyond that based
on constitutional marriage. The census reported 31,229 households comprised of
cohabiting couples with or without children,45 and by 2006, this had risen to more than
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ibid, 40.
ibid, 41.
42
ibid, 45.
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For example, the Companies Act 1990 designates spouses as ‘connected persons’ for
the purpose of Company Law.
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Section 9(1).
45
Working Group Examining the Treatment of Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent
Families under the Tax and Social Welfare Codes, Report (Pn 7950, Stationery Office 1999),
21.
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105,000. 46 Marriage rates also rose, 47 and single parent families became more
common.48 Taking the three groups together, the Irish population was experiencing a
surge in family-formation.
The visibility of family beyond marriage combined with a rational economic
approach to the process of government, created an imperative to recognise the
potential for family stability outside marriage. As noted in chapter seven, social
welfare rules had equated cohabitees with married couples since the Supreme Court
decision in Hyland.49 In 1999, a working group on the treatment of married, cohabiting
and one-parent households in the tax and social welfare codes, following statistical
analysis and a review of sociological reports, concluded that ‘breadwinner marriage’
was no longer an appropriate basis for the tax and social welfare codes. Rather:
the focus should be on support for children rather than on the marital status of their
parents. In addition to the advantages for children of such an approach, it is also
felt that changing the focus away from the status of the parents should help in
surmounting any Constitutional difficulties which may rise in considering the
proposals for the treatment of married, cohabiting and one-parent families.50
A radical transformation was not, however, envisaged. The advantages of two
parent families could not be ignored, and the group was sympathetic to the extension
of marriage tax benefits to long term cohabiting couples with children.51 Marriage was
noted to be a significant route out of lone parenthood (45 percent of terminations of
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Central Statistics Office, Census 2006: Volume 3 (Prn A7\1020, Stationery Office
2007), 30.
47
Marriage rates rose from 1997 to 2003 when they levelled off at 5.2 per thousand per
year, declining to 2.8 in 2009 and 4.3 in 2010. Central Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook
of Ireland 2012 (Stationery Office 2012), 63.
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Central Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook 2002 (Pn 12209, Stationery Office 2002), 19;
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49
Hyland v Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General [1989] IR 624.
50
Working Group on the Treatment of Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Households
under the Tax and Social Welfare Codes, Report, 83.
51
ibid, 11.
306

one parent family payment in 1996 were the result of marriage),52 but due to the statusbased nature of welfare payments, marriage resulted in a drop in income for most lone
parents. The working group could not resolve this conundrum. It was clearly beneficial
that lone parents should marry or form long-term relationships, but the cost of
individualising welfare payments, perhaps focusing them on children’s needs rather
than adult relationships, was considered prohibitive from a cost perspective. 53 No
significant additional progress regarding the manner in which non-marital households
should be regulated was made until until well into 2000s, but the Working Group’s
report marked the beginning of governmental acceptance that ‘marriage-like’ might
be good enough.

8.2.3 Bringing marriage fully within the domain of the State.
Although ‘marriage,’ had been central to the administration of the social domain since
the foundation of the Irish State, it had remained undefined in legislation and entry
into marriage was largely governed by the rules of the various churches. 54 A
registration requirement was imposed in 1845, and provision made for marriage by a
Civil Registrar, yet the vast majority of Irish couples followed their parents in
marrying in church according to the rites of the Catholic Church. This began to change
in the 1990s, as more and more couples sought civil ceremonies, which allowed them
to enjoy the social benefits of marriage without submitting to religious oversight.55
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In the courts, the judiciary had retained Christian connotations in defining marriage
for the purposes of law. In Murray v Ireland [1985] IR 532 Costello J stated that:
the Constitution makes clear that the concept and nature of marriage, which it
enshrines, are derived from the Christian notion of a partnership based on an
irrevocable, personal consent, given by both spouses which establishes a unique
and very special life-long relationship.
A number of years later in TF v Ireland [1995] IR 321, the same judge approved a
definition of marriage as ‘the voluntary and permanent union of one man and one
woman to the exclusion of all others for life.’ The definition of legal marriage
remained firmly tied to its theological origins. Costello J’s definitions came under
some conceptual pressure with the introduction of divorce, but no attempt was made
to review the meaning of marriage until the government decided, in 2003, to overhaul
the service provided by the Central Registrar’s Office.
Whilst principally concerned with streamlining the work of the Registrar’s Office,
the government also decided to examine the rules governing entry into marriage and
appointed an inter-departmental Committee on Reform of Marriage Law to:
review current marriage procedures and to bring forward a universally applicable
framework of clear and simple procedures to underpin the solemnity of the
marriage contract.56
The Committee noted that:
Traditionally, marriage has been characterised as the giving of mutual consent to
the public recognition of the union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of
was provided directly to the author by the Central Statistics Office by email on 20 February
2014. In relation to 1996, see:
<www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/vitalstats/2002/marriages2
002.pdf> accessed 3 March 2014.
56
Inter-Departmental Committee on Reform of Marriage Law, Discussion Paper 5:
Definition of Marriage, Who Can Marry, Capacity to Marry (Stationery Office 2004), 3. The
committee’s discussion papers appear to have been published after the Civil Registration Act
2004 passed into law. There is no record of the Committee communicating or laying any
documents before the Oireachtas. It would appear therefore that the Committee’s findings
were communicated directly to the Taoiseach’s department prior to the drafting of the Bill.
The Committee’s findings were made available to the media less than two weeks prior to the
Order for Second Stage of the Bill. Paul Cullen, ‘Major Reform of Marriage Law Proposed’
The Irish Times (Dublin 17 January 2004).
308

all others. Marriage is therefore perceived to be both a social contract and a
partnership based on a relationship. Married persons are entitled to legal rights,
privileges and duties from which persons who are not married are generally
precluded.57
Marriage was thus conceptualised as a legal relationship, a contract creating mutual
legal obligations, which required specific definition in legislation. It was also a
personal relationship, not an institutional one. The Committee, drawing on Costello
J’s decisions, recommended that legal marriage be defined as:
the voluntary and permanent union of one man and one women to the exclusion of
all others for life.58
The Civil Registration Bill 2003, whist not adopting a definition of marriage, did set
out the parameters of the possible and, most significantly, removed marriage fully
from the social or spiritual sphere, placing it firmly within the realm of State
regulation.
The Civil Registration Act 200459 covered a range of civilly registerable events;
births, deaths, marriages, stillbirths, divorces, adoptions, divorces and nullities. It set
out the detailed requirements and procedures for registering these events and makes
their registration compulsory.60 With regard to marriage, the Act set out a series of
impediments to marriage which included a minimum age, consanguinity, pre-existing
marriage, mental incapacity and both parties being of the same sex.61 The ceremony
of marriage, the legislation provided, was to be ‘solemnised’62 following a three month
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notice period during which time both parties were required to attend in person at the
registrar’s office to sign a declaration that there was no impediment to their marriage.63
The registrar had to request detailed information from the parties, and might, if
required by the Minister, publish details of forthcoming marriages.64
Marriage, following the 2004 Act, was no longer a social practice which
government recognised and deployed in managing the social domain. It became a fully
legal status, available only to those who had complied with the detailed provisions of
the Civil Registration Act 2004. The State would replicate the pomp and circumstance
of church rituals in ‘solemnising’ marriages - Eamonn Ryan, in debate on the Bill
called upon the minster ‘to provide the very best civic space that is available’ in order
that there would be a sense that ‘the State was taking the occasion seriously.’ 65
Minister for Social and Family Affairs, Mary Coughlan, noted that the three month
notice period (originally introduced by the Family Law Act 1995) would ‘give couples
intending to marry an opportunity to reflect on the seriousness and importance of the
commitment that they are making.’66 It was clear that marriage, and the long-term
commitment it represented, was a matter of significant importance to government.
Despite what could be seen as a major conceptual marker for Irish social politics,
little was made of the 2004 Act. The Oireachtas debate on the Bill, unlike previous
debates on marriage law, mentioned neither the Constitution nor the moral quality of
the marital relationships. Although the 2004 Act was the first codification of the legal
rules for entry into marriage since the foundation of the State, there was no discussion
of the nature of the marriage, in contrast to earlier debates on divorce and judicial
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separation, which focused almost entirely its institutional and transcendent
characteristics. It now seemed universally accepted among politicians that marriage
was a committed long-term companionate relationship based on contract, a civil and
legal matter fully within the domain of State regulation.

8.2.4 New family roles in an expanding economy
As economic growth continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century, the
Irish population proved inadequate to support the demands of the ‘Celtic Tiger’
economy.67 Immigration became a feature of Irish population growth, and domestic
policy focused on labour market activation measures. Women, particularly those
performing a domestic role, became a particular target. A Programme for Prosperity
and Fairness negotiated between the government and the social partners in 2000,
mirroring the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty, specifically connected gender
equality imperatives to the needs of the expanding economy.
Positive action is permitted to promote equal opportunities geared to remove
existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities to access to employment,
vocational training and promotion and working conditions.
The emergence of a tightening labour market and the increased emphasis on
human resources as a key competitive element serve to underpin the importance
of developing innovative ways of maximising the available labour supply.
Similarly, the importance of facilitating equality of opportunity for men and
women in the workplace also underscored the desirability of developing policies
that can assist parents in reconciling work and family life. Family-friendly policies
can serve a dual purpose of contributing to the needs of business as well as meeting
the needs of employers with family responsibilities.68
The program emphasised that women must be facilitated in their aspirations for equal
treatment because it served economic needs. Men were to be encouraged to share with
women ‘the caring responsibilities carried out within the home for children and
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dependent family members,’69 because this too would facilitate the entry of their lifepartners into the labour market. A society must be created in which access to labour is
‘available to all.’ Supply must be mobilised by ‘tapping into potential pools of labour
to support sustainable low inflationary growth.’70 The terms of the Irish Constitution
had not changed, but women were no longer defined by marital status, and wives were
not mothers in the home needing protection. Women, wives and mothers, like other
‘disadvantaged groups’71 were a supply of labour to be called upon in support of the
growth objectives of political government.
Family stability was also closely connected to the objective of economic
development. Households with children headed by two adults caused considerably less
difficulty for labour-market activation measures than those with just one resident
parent. As the National Economic and Social Forum reported in 2001, lone parents
presented particular difficulties in relation to barriers to employment. The forum noted
that ‘lone parents, because they are parenting alone, have very acute needs when it
comes to reconciling work and family life.’ 72 The historical focus on supporting
women qua mothers through welfare payments until their children were adults had
created a welfare trap for those who wished to work. A lone parent entering the
workforce stood to lose her welfare payment, housing support and free medical care,
making work un-economic.73 Similar barriers existed to the formation of a two-parent
households and this issue was raised in a number of government sponsored research
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reports. 74 The National Economic and Social Research Forum looked at the
disincentives to work great detail, examining permutations of welfare payments, and
approaches that might reduce the disincentive to cohabitation, but were unable to reach
a conclusion beyond the desirability of cohabitation over lone parenthood.75

8.2.5 Getting wives out to work
The principal objective of the Irish Government during this period was to drive
economic growth. The Minister for Finance in making his ‘Budget 2000’ speech on 6
December 2000 remarked:
Today’s budget also re-enforces the basis for progress. It does so by improving the
attractiveness of work and enterprise through further reform of the tax system and
by ensuring, through a high priority for investment, that infrastructural pressures
do not inhibit growth.76
The 2001 budget progressed a policy of individualisation of the taxation system that
had begun in 1999. This reform rowed back on the doubling of tax bands introduced
following Murphy by restricting the transferability of tax bands between spouses.77 In
order to achieve this, tax bands were substantially increased for single people so that
there was no immediate loss to the net pay of single-earner married couples. The effect
was to incentivise non-earning spouses to enter the workforce. As Michael Noonan
pointed out from the opposition benches, the measure was ‘designed to increase female
participation in the labour force by forcing stay-at-home wives out to work rather than
allowing them a free choice of whether to work.’78 It also equalised the tax treatment
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of married and cohabitating couples where both partners worked, and on a national
level redistributed wealth ‘decisively in favour of the better off.’79

8.3 The Problem with Marriage Law.
8.3.1 Relationship rights
As public, governmental and sociological concern with the nature of the Irish family
continued to expand through the 1990s and 2000s, human rights and equality
discourses came to colonise discussion of the regulation of couple relationships.
Consideration of intimacy in terms of rights based arguments began quietly and slowly
but gradually amplified as the 2000s proceeded. Fine Gael was the first political party
to promise reform of marriage law as a solution to human rights and equality
difficulties.80 When a Bill extending marriage law to a greater range of relationships
was introduced to the Oireachtas in 2009, the notion that marriage law both
transgressed human rights and equality guarantees, and could vindicate them, was
politically uncontested and incontestable. As Senator Mary White noted in support of
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the 2009 Bill ‘securing the civil rights and human rights of gay people is a mainstream
goal,’ and one that could be achieved through the reform of marriage law.81
The principle of equality or non-discrimination, although reflected in the Irish
Constitution, gained discursive vigour in the 2000s via the activities and treaties of the
European Union and its institutions. The Amsterdam Treaty had particular influence
in the Irish context, leading to the enactment of the Employment Equality Act 1998
and Equal Status Act 2000. 82 The deployment of rights based arguments by
campaigners for marriage law reform emerged around the same time as these
legislative enactments, reflecting the increased influence of European equality
imperatives on Irish political discourse. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998,83 which
recorded a settlement agreement in relation to Northern Ireland, pushed the human
rights agenda to the fore in the Republic.

8.3.2 The necessity of human rights and equality.
Ireland ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, but the Irish
Courts consistently held that, pursuant to Article 29.6 of the Constitution, it did not
have the force of law within the jurisdiction absent a legislative instrument of
incorporation. 84 Following the Good Friday Agreement, which required Ireland to
81
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have similar protection for human rights as existed in the United Kingdom, a Human
Rights Commission was established, and the European Convention on Human Rights
incorporated into Irish Law.85 Establishing and funding a Human Rights Commission
represented an acknowledgement by the Irish government of the political potential of
international rights norms. It also provided a forum for discussion, and an expert body
ready to identify how government should act to vindicate rights.
The Equality Authority, established in 1999, 86 was tasked with overseeing the
implementation of the Employment Equality Act 1998, and later the Equal Status Act
2000. During second stage debate on the 2000 Act, in both Dáil and Seanad, the
Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law Reform specifically referred to the connection
between the legislation, the Good Friday Agreement, the Amsterdam Treaty and
Ireland’s United Nations Convention obligations. 87 He particularly emphasised the
European Union dimension:
Article 13 of that [Amsterdam] treaty gives the Union a basis to combat
discrimination, both in employment and non-workplace areas.88
At the beginning of the 2000s, therefore, human rights and equality had been accepted
by government as appropriate conceptual frameworks within which to formulate
policy. Specific bodies had been established to inform government, and indicating the
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continued social importance of marriage, directed their attention to the issue of
marriage law.
Four of the nine forms of discrimination set out in the Equal Status Act 2000 had
application to the area of marriage law: gender, marital status, family status and sexual
orientation. It is therefore not surprising that one of the first reports published by the
Equality Authority related to couple relationships.89 The report was a measured and
careful account of the specifically legal disadvantages suffered by same-sex couples
in negotiating their joint lives. Although making no recommendations, the title of the
report, Partnership Rights of Same-sex Couples, placed the issues clearly within the
domain of relationship regulation. It assumed that legal rights should attach to couple
relationships, and the comparisons made in the report between the position of married
couples and same-sex couples who could not marry clearly suggested that the
inequalities identified should be addressed through the extension of marriage law.
In 1999, the Equality Authority appointed an advisory committee on lesbian, gay
and bisexual issues to identify international best practice in relation to the promotion
of equality on the sexual orientation ground, to develop a perspective to inform policymaking, and using both, to suggest a program for action. The advisory committee
published its findings in 2002 as, Implementing Equality for Lesbians, Gays and
Bisexuals.
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disadvantages of same-sex couples vis a vis married couples were carefully identified,
but in this instance specific recommendations for reform were made. The
recommendations included a facility to identify a ‘nominated’ person in place of a
spouse in relation to taxation, welfare, employment, pensions, succession, and other
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areas. 91 The report recommended the acknowledgment of a wider range of family
forms, households and couple relationships. 92 Although focusing on ‘partnership
rights’ the recommendations in this report were much more holistic, suggesting a
comprehensive re-evaluation of how government regulated family life. Nonetheless,
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage law meant that, according to the
report, ‘lesbian and gay couples had no guarantee of fair treatment under the law
because legally their relationships did not exist.’93 It was noted that:
Equality should be the core principle underlying any process of reform of the
current laws and social provision with the aim of developing a legal and policy
framework based on rights and responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities
currently conferred on married heterosexual couples in relation to pensions,
residency, property, adoption, taxation and welfare entitlements, etc, should be
equally conferred on lesbian and gay couples as well as heterosexual unmarried
couples. This type of focus might involve an exploration of a legal framework
based on individual rights and responsibilities.94
This paragraph encapsulates the approach of the Advisory Committee, which although
acknowledging the exclusionary effect of marriage law, did not suggest removing the
privileges of marriage from heterosexual married couples. It accepted that the legally
legitimated conjugal couple should have significant economic and social advantages.
The issue for the Equality Authority concerned identifying those categories of person
who should be able to avail of marital status, not the social inequalities produced by
the preferencing of marriage (or marriage like) relationships over all other modes of
living. Furthermore, there was no questioning of the form of marriage law that applied
to heterosexual couples, it was simply assumed that legal regulation and access to the
discretionary jurisdiction of the family law courts was a desirable adjunct to the legal
legitimation of couple relationships.
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The growing consensus on the need to reform marriage law in order to remove
inequalities arising between married and unmarried couples was further evidenced by
a 2006 report commissioned by the Human Rights Commission on the Rights and
Duties of De Facto Couples. The report aimed to contribute to public debate on de
facto couples by:
providing clarity and legal certainly, where such is possible, and highlighting areas
of doubt, uncertainty or ambiguity with a view to having such issues addressed.95
This report focused on international human rights standards, assessing ‘the adequacy
of Irish law in the light of that International framework.’ 96 Within this conceptual
scaffold, it was possible only to see the inequalities between one form of couple
relationship and another, no account was taken of wider inequalities produced by the
privileging of couple relationships.97
Also in 2006, the Department of Justice appointed a working group to examine
‘the categories of partnerships and relationships outside of marriage to which legal
recognition might be accorded, consistent with Constitutional provisions.’ 98 The
Colley Report identified how the incidents of marriage had been gradually extended
to cohabitees in matters such as social welfare, domestic violence, parental leave,
residential tenancies and European free movement. 99 Differences, nonetheless,
remained in areas such as property, financial support, death and succession. In relation
to lesbian, gay and bi-sexual couples, the report focuses on ‘key objectives for
advancing equality,’ which included not only the eradication of specific material or
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legislative disadvantage, but also the need to accord ‘visibility and value to
diversity.’ 100 It was considered important that a visible form of legitimation be
available to couples willing and able to commit to long term stable relationships.
The addition of the legal concepts of human rights and equality to consideration of
marriage law reform did not challenge the supremacy and centrality of marriage in the
regulation of the social domain, rather it re-enforced the importance of the legitimate
couple to social functioning. In order to implement human rights and equality
imperatives government needed to identify and regulate more marriage-like
relationships. It needed to investigate, know, and categorise the intimate and familial
lives of a greater range of citizens. Legal knowledge had offered, once again, a solution
for government to the difficulty presented by changing relationship practices. As new
forms of stable partnership became visible, and demanded the advantages conferred
on married couples, human rights and equality arguments were deployed to re-enforce
the privileges of long-term conjugality. The government objectives of family stability,
social stability and economic growth could thus be furthered with more marriage law.

8.4 Promoting Equality and Human Rights
8.4.1 Reforming marriage law.
Political consideration of the possibility that marriage law could be extended to a
greater range of relationships began in 2004, when Fine Gael issued a policy document
supporting legislation that would allow ‘two people of the same or of opposite sex to
formally register their partnership with the State.’101 The argument in favour of such
extension was couched in terms of economic and social practicalities; ‘the State has a
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vested interest in the promotion of lifelong, stable relationships,’ and should therefore
extend practical advantages in the areas of pensions, tax, social welfare benefits and
succession to all registered couple relationships.102 Senator David Norris introduced a
Civil Partnership Bill to the Seanad in 2004, which provided for the legal registration
and recognition of same or opposite sex couple relationships, their dissolution or
annulment, and the conditions for entry.103 His Bill did not move beyond second stage.
Similar attempts were made by the Labour Party in 2006 and 2007, but were not
progressed because the government gave a commitment to introduce its own
legislation. During the 2007 general election, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party,
the Green Party, Sinn Fein and the Progressive Democrats all called for the legal
recognition of same-sex relationships.104
It was with some inevitability, therefore, that a government sponsored Civil
Partnership Bill was introduced to the Oireachtas in 2008. The Bill provided for the
civil registration and recognition of same (but not opposite) sex relationships and
extended many of the obligations of marriage law to these relationships.105 Adopting
recommendations of the Law Reform Commission, 106 the Bill also created a
presumptive recognition scheme for cohabitants, applying marriage law to same and
opposite sex cohabiting couples in some circumstances. Despite apparent political

102

Fine Gael, Civil Partnership (2004).
Seanad Deb 16 February 2005, vol 179, col 675 et seq
104
Irish Human Rights Commission, Discussion Document on the Scheme of the Civil
Partnership Bill (IHRC 2008), 63. This document contains a detailed account of the
background to the introduction of the Civil Partnership Bill 2008 to the Oireachtas.
105
There were a number of differences in the treatment of dissolution and succession, with
less onerous conditions imposed upon civil partnerships although the lifetime support
obligation was applied. Crucially, however, the statuses of marriage and civil partnership were
equated in taxation, social welfare and many other functions of government. The Schedule to
the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights of Cohabitants Act 2010 notes 120 consequential
amendments necessary to apply the consequences of marriage to civil partners.
106
Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and Duties of Cohabitants (LRC 82
2006). The report recommendations in relation to cohabitees only and did not deal with civil
partnerhship.
103

321

consensus on the objectives of the Bill, there was significant debate on its contents in
the Oireachtas, the media and in academic literature.107
Of particular interest in the Oireachtas debates is the resurgence of Article 41 of
the Constitution as a potential limiter on State action. The Minister for Justice, Dermot
Ahern described the scope of the Bill during second stage debate:
I believe this Bill is as comprehensive as possible consistent with the requirements
of the Constitution. The Bill recognises that there are persons who are in
committed same-sex relationships who wish to share duties and responsibilities. It
affords them an opportunity to register their partnership and to be part of a legal
regime that fully protects them in the course of that partnership and, if necessary,
on termination of the partnership. The redress scheme is a response in law to a
growing need for protection of vulnerable cohabitants.108
Throughout debate, the Minister pointed out the care taken to avoid offending the
primacy afforded to marriage in the Constitution, and the advice he had received from
the Attorney General on the issue.109 A number of deputies and senators pointed out
that, as Constitution does not specify that marriage is between and man and a woman
it could, by legislation, be extended to same-sex couples. The Minister rejected this
argument on legal grounds, but also indicated that it was politically impossible to
extend the definition of marriage:
My clear advice on this area has consistently been that it would not be
constitutionally sound to legislate for same sex marriage without holding a
107
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constitutional referendum on the definition of family. Marriage may not be
expressly defined in the Constitution, but it has always been understood in
common law as being between a man and a woman, ideally for life. I do not believe
the necessary political and social consensus exists to make such a constitutional
referendum desirable (my emphasis).110
The recognition and regulation of committed relationships beyond marriage was on
the other hand, not only desirable, but also essential. Senator Shane Ross reflected the
views of many contributors to the debate:
I do not know whether this legislation is based on pluralism, tolerance or human
rights, but it seems to me that it represents eminent good sense. All it does is
recognise something that should have happened a very long time ago, namely, the
granting of straightforward human rights for people who deserve to be treated
exactly as everyone else it treated.111
The legislation was enacted as the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and
Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, becoming law on 1 January 2011.112

8.5 More Marriage Law
8.5.1 Performing marriage – regulated relationships under the 2010 Act
The 2010 Act created two new forms of regulated couple relationships, civil
partnership and ‘qualified cohabitation.’113 Civil partnership under the Act mirrored
marriage, save in respect of some inelegant attempts to differentiate it for the purposes
of constitutional compliance. 114 The principle difference between the two was that
marriage applied to those of opposite sex, and civil partnership to those of the samesex. Judicial separation was not provided for civil partners, thus avoiding the need to
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define ‘adultery’ for same-sex couples,115 and the minimum period after breakdown,
before dissolution, was two years rather than four.116 Provisions in relation to financial
orders and succession were broadly similar to those for married couples, including the
need to ensure proper provision,117 and the potential for lifetime support.118 In relation
to qualified cohabitants, the position was more complex, and regulation applied to
both same and opposite sex couples. In order to avail of the redress scheme under the
Act a cohabitant was required to demonstrate that they were involved in a relationship
of cohabitation that was intimate and committed, and lasted for five years (or two if
the parties were of opposite-sex and had a child together).119 Additionally, a party
seeking to avail of redress under the Act needed to show financial dependence on their
partner. The forms of redress were much less comprehensive than those attaching to
civil partnership or marriage, extending to property transfer orders, lump sum and
periodic maintenance only.

120

Crucially, however, if a qualified cohabitant

demonstrated the seriousness of the relationship in accordance with the Act, and
proved financial dependence during or arising from the relationship, he or she could,
potentially, continue to seek redress for their lifetime.121
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The 2010 Act, particularly the provisions in relation to cohabitants, was the subject
of significant criticism prior to its enactment. 122 The civil partnership scheme was
broadly welcomed, although there was concern expressed that it did not amount to full
marriage and did not adequately provide for the position of children living with samesex couples.123 From the perspective of government, however, it was assumed that the
legal inequity between relationship types had been removed. Minister for Justice,
remarked at report stage:
The Bill is a fine balance, as is required by the Constitution, between the
constitutional provisions that people be equal in the eyes of the law and that
marriage be protected.124
The 2010 Act applied selected incidents of marriage law to relationships depending
on the degree to which they performed marriage, as then understood. Marriage, as
evidenced by sociological expertise, was an intimate, companionate, lifetime
relationship in which the partners provided one and other with care and support. This
type of relationship was useful to government because it was assumed to produce
social stability, which in turn was essential to economic stability and growth. In
relation to civil partners, a public declaration of lifetime commitment would attract
the obligations and advantages of marriage. By entering into a lifetime, monogamous,
couple relationship same-sex partners would become an authorised unit, ready to
support and maintain one and other in much the same way as a married couple. For
cohabitants, the position was more complex, their performance of marriage needed to
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be more closely monitored to ensure that they were indeed intimate and committed,
and that they had a record of accomplishment in mutual support and dependency.125
In order to avail of redress, a cohabitant needed to show, not only commitment to the
relationship, but also a financial investment in it, by demonstrating that were
economically dependent on their partner.126 Although the legislation did not have the
overriding ‘marriage saving’ objective of earlier marriage law reform, it did represent
an attempt to secure the performance of marriage among a greater range of relationship
types. Political ambivalence to cohabitation is clear in the legislation, with a return to
concern for the vulnerable dependent in need of protection. There are also echoes of
the moral overtones of early marriage law in the financial redress scheme. Those who
adopt constitutional roles without the sanction of marriage, will be made responsible
for their actions should they fail to commit to their quasi-spouses for life.127
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8.6 Normalising Lifetime Monogomy
8.6.1 The normalising effects of marriage law
In 1970s Ireland, cohabitation, marriage breakdown, single parenthood and same-sex
relationships were invisible, uncounted and unacknowledged. With the expanded
involvement of political government in managing the social domain, relationship
practices beyond marriage became facts, impossible to ignore, essential to account for
and govern. Maintenance and judicial separation legislation attempted to preserve
conjugality, divorce allowed the replacement of failed relationships. Counselling and
mediation services, buttressed by social research, aimed to encourage stability in all
couple relationships. As government became a process of rational management,
couple relationships became increasingly an issue for the State whose primary concern
was the creation and maintenance of social, and consequently economic, stability.
It was an undisputed fact that, in the main, adults formed themselves into couple
relationships, which facilitated their social and economic functioning. Formation of a
conjugal couple was normal social behaviour, which was also of significant benefit to
the State. As social practices shifted away from marriage toward other marriage-like
relationships, these relationships, like marriage, also became normal, and politics
aimed to support and maintain them in their normality. Whilst the extension of
marriage law to same-sex and cohabiting couples might be characterised as a victory
for human rights and equality, when viewed in the context of wider relationships of
power it becomes clear that it is simply one technique, among many, that aimed to
produce social stability and regularity. Relationships were admitted to legal regulation
depending on how closely they resembled lifetime conjugality, how well they
demonstrated commitment, presented themselves as couples, practiced intimacy and
remained monogamous.
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The 2010 Act set out the parameters for admission to the domain of social
acceptability, requiring exclusivity, permanency and intimacy. Partners must provide
each other with financial support, and commit to doing so for their lifetime, regardless
of the ending of their interpersonal relationship. They must not be related by blood,
must live together in a shared home, provide for one and other on death, share their
income, tax allowance, welfare and pension entitlements. They must provide care, and
support the dependency of their partner; they must perform lifetime, monogamous
marriage.
The extent to which the performance of ‘marriage’ was important to the
functioning of the State, to the achievement of good government, is manifest in the
schedule to the 2010 Act, which sets out the legislative provisions amended by the
creation of the new status of civil partnership. There are 120 statutory amendments
listed in the schedule, which are in addition to the changes made to a diverse range of
statues in the main body of the Act. Relationship status was relevant to property
transactions, powers of attorney, employment legislation, criminal damage, social
welfare, pensions, mental health, ethics and conflicts of interest, inheritance,
guardianship of children, company law, housing, banking, food safety, planning and
development, sustainable energy, industrial development, private security, consumer
protection, policing, harbours, electricity supply and many more. 128 Categorising
individuals by relationship status had become an increasingly essential technique of
government, but so too had ensuring the performance of the central characteristics of
marriage as then understood.
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First Schedule, Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants
Act 2010, consequent amendments. Many of the provisions relate to potential conflicts of
interest, remuneration and pensions but act to demonstrate the centrality of marital status to
the administration of the state.
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Identifying and recognising relationships requires the categorisation of individual
lives. People must identify themselves to the State as male or female, hetero or
homosexual, sexually active, psychiatrically healthy, and intellectually capable. 129
They must construct themselves as rights-bearing, and willing to shoulder
responsibility, willing to work at their relationships and commit for life to the care and
support of another. The power effects of regulating couple relationships and regulating
through couple relationships are both global and local. The centrality of marriage-like
relationships to the process of governing makes them desirable, constructs them as
normal but it also has negative effects. Those unable or unwilling to perform marriage
are excluded from its social and material advantages, but they are also designated as
different, abnormal, perhaps even deviant. Single, never married, parents fail to
provide the stability their children need, and in caring for their children alone, they
deny a worker to the labour market. Formerly married individuals are constructed by
marriage law as both personal and social failures, and the more fraught their
relationship, the more obvious their failure.
This pursuit of marriage performance by government is therefore problematic in
its exclusionary, normalising effect. It requires the supervision of relationships, by the
State, by counselling professionals, social scientists and the courts, with all of these
mechanisms acting to monitor collective relationship behaviour. These mechanisms
however also individualise relationships, particularly those in difficulty, focusing on
them, requiring them to confess their difficulty in order that the pathology of an
abnormal relationship might be identified, and the risk of its occurrence calculated.
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The Civil Registration Act 2004 requires that parties to a marriage be of opposite sex,
s2(2)(d), the Marriage of Lunatics Act 1811 prevents marriage by ‘any lunatic or person under
a phrenzy.’ The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.
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Law and legal processes play a particularly important role in this process, as it is within
the courts that the most deviant relationships reveal themselves.

8.6.2 Legal domains and the normalisation of marriage.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Irish government had created a set of legal rules
governing marriage that had as their objective the affirmation of government
commitment to marriage, saving marriages in difficulty and, following the
introduction of divorce, creating new, better marriages to replace failed attempts.
Following the commencement of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, the volume of
marital litigation began to increase, principally in the Circuit and District Courts, but
also in the Superior Courts where written judgments were regularly produced.
Marriage law cases were subject to the in camera rule, which restricted reporting of
cases in the media, and as a result little information emanated from the lower courts
beyond the statistical and general information produced by the Courts’ Service. In
2006, Carol Coulter carried out a study of family law cases in the Circuit Court, which,
as with reported decisions of the Superior Courts, indicated that the judiciary had
begun to adopt the rational, economic focus of government in managing the
relationship disputes that came before them, moving away from the moral
considerations of the early 1990s.

8.6.3 A rational approach to the end of relationships.
The legislature imposed lifetime support obligations on spouses following both
divorce and judicial separation, an obligation removed only upon the re-marriage of
the receiving spouse. Government focus on the protection of marriage within which
spouses performed designated gender-based roles for life had resulted in this
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obligation, and the courts initially accepted this objective when adjudicating on marital
disputes. McGuiness J in JD vDD130 stated that:
The Oireachtas made it clear that a “clean break” situation is not to be sought and
that, if anything, financial finality is to be prevented ... finality is not and can never
be achieved.131
Dunne J in the Supreme Court decision in DT v CT,132 took a similar approach holding
that
A ‘clean break’ principle may be found in the law as to financial orders relating to
divorce in other jurisdictions. However, such a provision is not part of the Irish
Constitution or legislation. There is no provision providing for a single payment
to a spouse to meet all financial obligations. Rather the fundamental principle is
one of ‘proper provision.’133
Fennelly J, also in DT v CT opined that the continuation of obligations following
dissolution:
reflects the fact that marriage is, in principle, intended to be a lifetime commitment
and that each spouse has fashioned his or her life on that premise. If the law
permitted a spouse to cut himself or herself adrift of a marriage on divorce without
any continuing obligation to a former spouse it would undermine the very nature
of the marriage contract itself and fail to protect the value which society has placed
on it as an institution.134
As the Superior Courts presided over an increasing number of marital disputes,
many of which related to couples with ‘ample resources,’ the advantages of providing
financial finality became apparent. Keane CJ, representing the majority in the fivemember Supreme Court that decided the divorce application in DT v CT elegantly
subverted legislative policy when he held that:
It seems to me, that, unless the courts are precluded from so holding by the express
terms of the Constitution and the relevant statutes, Irish law should be capable of
accommodating those aspects of the ‘clean break’ approach which are clearly
beneficial. As Denham J observed in F v F [1995] 2 IR 354, certainty and finality
can be as important in this as in any other areas of the law. Undoubtedly, in some
cases finality is not possible and thus the legislation expressly provides for the
130

[1997] 3 IR 64.
[1998] 3 IR 64, 89.
132
[2002] 3 IR 334.
133
[2002] 3 IR 334, 403.
134
[2002] 3 IR 334, 426.
131

331

variation of custody and access orders and the level of maintenance payments. I
do not believe that the Oireachtas, in declining to adopt the ‘clean break’ approach
to the extent favoured in England, intended that the courts should be obliged to
abandon any possibility of achieving certainty and finality and of encouraging the
avoidance of further litigation between the parties.135
As the decade progressed, superior court decisions in judicial separation and
divorce cases, adopting the rational attitude of Keane J, took on an increasingly
administrative character, seldom referencing legal precedent or providing detailed
reasons for the property divisions ordered. Although ‘proper provision’ was a
constitutional pre-requisite to the grant of a divorce decree, it is clear that the decision
on whether a divorce was to be granted largely centred on the statutory time period
having passed, with decisions on provision an ancillary issue. Judicial rumination
focused on the appropriate proportions to be allocated to each spouse, and the financial
needs created by their individual circumstances. In an acknowledgment of the policy
of the legislation, however, the courts did accept that the financial circumstances at
the time of divorce should be examined, irrespective of the existence of a prior judicial
or agreed separation, or the period of time since the relationship had broken down.
The estranged husband and wife in MK v JPK 136 required two hearings in the
Supreme Court, and two full trials in the High Court to settle the consequences of their
relatively short but fertile marriage that had ended more than twenty years
previously.137 The wife had raised six children (mainly alone), surviving on limited,
but regular, maintenance payments from an absent, wealthy, and re-coupled husband.
The High Court held that in a situation such as this where there were ‘ample resources
... the applicant should be put in a position akin to that which she would probably be
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enjoying if she had not forgone the opportunity of a remunerative career.’ 138 A
situation that included, ‘having an estate of modest proportions to bequeath to her
children.’139 The decision in this case confirmed the implication of the 1996 Act, that
an application for divorce following a long period of separation would require a
detailed investigation of both the current and historical financial and interpersonal
relationship between the spouses.140
Poor behaviour on behalf of the spouses was a matter open for consideration by
the courts under the 1989 Act and 1996 Act. A court was obliged to consider conduct
‘if that conduct is such that in the opinion of the court it would in all the circumstances
be repugnant to justice to disregard it,’ 141 and under the 1989 Act adultery,
unreasonable behaviour, and desertion were grounds for judicial separation.142 The
courts, however, proved unwilling to adjudicate on the issue, particularly following
the Supreme Court decision in DT v CT, in which it was held that conduct was relevant
only if ‘obvious and gross.’143 O’Higgins J followed this decision in C v C,144 holding
that the husband’s conduct in sending his wife on holiday so that he could install his
lover in the family home was irrelevant to the making of ancillary orders. Subsequent
to these decisions, there were few references to conduct in the superior courts. Carol
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Coulter heard conduct pleaded only three times during 62 days observing the work of
the Circuit Court in 2006, and in only one of those did the judge take account of it.145
Despite the judiciary’s reluctance to adjudicate conduct, the legislative framework
encouraged individual litigants to plead it.

8.6.4 Adjudicating marriage law.
Responsibility for administration of the courts transferred from the Department of
Justice to a new statutory body, the Courts Service, in 1999. 146 The functions of the
service were to manage the courts, provide information in relation to the courts to the
public, provide support for judges, provide, manage and maintain court buildings and
provide facilities for the users of the courts. 147 As part of its mandate, the service
produced annual reports, beginning in 2000, that provided an overview of how the
courts were organised and the type and volume of work processed. From the reports,
we learn the volume of marriage law cases adjudicated upon each year in the various
courts. Of particular note, is the very small volume of cases that came before the High
Court, less than 100 per year, indicating the atypical status of the reported cases
discussed in the previous section.148 In the District and Circuit Courts, marriage law
cases were more common, involved substantially smaller sums of money, and were
adjudicated upon in chaotic circumstances.149
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dependent family members in the wake of breakdown, and to secure the fair distribution
of family assets. Unfortunately, the means for the delivery of these new rights and
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Carol Coulter’s study of cases in the Circuit court, undertaken in 2006, precipitated
a family law reporting project, which involved the observation and redacted reporting
of in camera family law cases heard in the District and Circuit Court. Coulter spent a
number of months observing court cases previously closed to all but the participants,
their lawyers and the judge. She focused in particular on a number of contentious cases
in relation to children, maintenance and the family home. Although her study covered
the full range of ‘family law,’ at Circuit Court level, unless the matter was an appeal
from the District Court, the vast majority of cases related to couples who were, at some
point, married. Coulter noted:
Some of [the contested cases] were very repetitive in the issues raised and the way
in which they were dealt with, with extensive examination of bank accounts which
ultimately decided very little, or disputes about custody or access that revealed
more about the level of hostility between the parents than any developments in
judicial decision making.150
The Court Service bulletin Family Law Matters, published between 2006 and 2009,
similarly records the tedium of repeated, apparently irresolvable personal disputes
played out before Circuit Court judges.
The Court’s service in its Annual report, and in Family Law Matters, was at pains
to point out the ‘volume of work being processed in our family law courts’ 151 and the
importance of this work:

remedies have not received the same level of attention. The structures which this society
offers for the mediation and resolution of family conflict are inadequate in the extreme.
Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Courts (LRC 52 1996), 10.
Carol Coulter, found little improvement in 2006 when she reported that the District court
carried out an:
enormous volume of work … with little or no ancillary resources or support … Inevitably,
cases have to be disposed of quickly. The sheer pressure of numbers of litigants may have
an inhibiting effect on the amount of evidence that is heard, compounded by the fact that
most litigants are not legally represented. This can lead to some litigants or respondents
not being adequately heard.
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The impact of these cases not only affects the parties directly, but also has a
bearing on society in general. The combination of issue such as relationship,
emotional, economic, child rearing and health are unique to family law. The impact
they have on people influences their bearing and behaviour as they navigate
themselves through the family law system. The emotional impact explains, in
some cases, the level of conflict that exists between the parties and the adverse
effect this has, particularly on children.152
Judicial decision making in the lower courts, as reported in Family Law Matters, does
not demonstrate any appreciation of the wider social impact it may have, focusing
instead in finding workable routes through claims and counterclaims, allegations of
misbehaviour and lack of candour in relation to assets. A sample of cases reported by
the service illustrates the nature of the cases arising in the lower courts. A reported
judicial separation case involved an abusive, violent husband who had committed
adultery on a number of occasions. His wife had worked throughout the marriage, paid
for the family home, and had a substantial pension. The husband worked only casually,
and was in receipt of an invalidity pension from the State. Despite facilitating the
competing claims of the parties, and a detailed examination of the assets of the family,
the Judge advised counsel for both parties that ‘I would think it is probably a thirdtwo-thirds case in favour of the applicant [husband].’153 Similarly, a judge sitting in
Cork heard who had paid for a wedding that had taken place thirty years previously,
the extent of the husband’s drinking, the wife’s physical abuse, ‘cans of beer at a
confirmation,’ and aspirations for grown up children, but concluded the matter with
an even splitting of the only asset, the family home.154
These spouses, having prepared for their day in court by attending solicitors,
consulting with barristers, collecting financial information and allegations of marital
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misbehaviour, inevitably sought the honour of a legal victory. They pursued every
detail of their claim with vigour hoping for a judicial affirmation that their former
partner had proved inadequate to his or her promise of lifetime monogamy. The judge,
facilitated their disputes, but resolved them on the basis of mathematical portions,
without explanation how he or she came to their conclusion. The judicial process
almost seemed designed to produce maximum conflict for the prize of a slight
adjustment in a judge’s rule of thumb.

8.6.5 Child law and marriage law
Although marriage law, the law that regulates the relationship between adults, is quite
a distinct body of law from that dealing with children, the two are regularly
conceptually bundled. Whilst it may have been the case in the 1970s and 1980s that
marriage and children were largely synonymous in terms of social practice, this was
not the case at the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s, when more than one third of
births were to women not involved in regulated relationships. 155 At the level of
academic investigation, child law was separated from marriage law, but at the level of
practice, particularly in the courts, they were often conflated. The result was that
difficulties with adult relationships were, at the level of practice and in political debate,
discussed within the same conceptual space as issues relating to child custody,
maintenance, and Heath Service Executive applications for child-care orders.156 The
various court applications also took place within the same physical space, at special
‘family law days’ in the Circuit and District Courts.
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During the 2000s, this had two effects. First, it re-enforced the connection between
legal marriage, legal family, and legal rights to children, a connection well illustrated
by the plaintiffs’ arguments in Zappone & Anor v Revenue Commissioners & Ors in
which the plaintiffs sought recognition for their Canadian, same-sex, marriage. 157
Although the plaintiffs had no children, a large portion of the evidence in the case was
taken up with an attempt to demonstrate that children did not suffer from being raised
by a lesbian couple. Dunne J in the High Court considered expert evidence adduced
on both sides, but found that she could make no firm conclusion on the issue due to
the absence of sufficiently comprehensive research. 158 This case was about the
recognition of a Canadian marriage in Ireland, and although the courts had long before
held that the facility to procreate or parent children was not an essential characteristic
of marriage,159 the plaintiffs felt compelled to address the issue and the judge to rule
upon it.
Secondly, the conflation of marriage law and child law in the courts equated the
breakdown of adult relationships with a failure to protect children. Relationship
breakdown, child neglect and disputes about who should care for, or support children
cohered to designate the family courts and their trappings with those who transgress
against the most vulnerable members of our society. Ireland had ratified the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992, but it was not until the 2000s
that action in respect of the Convention was politically visible. A National Children’s
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Strategy was published in 2000,160 the National Children’s Advisory Council was also
established in 2001,161 and the office of the Ombudsman for Children in 2004.162 The
increased visibility of child related issues in the media and politics, leading to a
campaign for the insertion by referendum of a provision protecting children’s rights
in the Constitution, placed further emphasis on the vulnerability of children.163 This
new political focus on children corresponded with increased interest in the operation
of the family law courts. The vast majority of the cases coming before the family law
courts related to custody, access and maintenance of children, and to domestic
violence. These cases were, therefore, also those most regularly reported during the
operation of family law reporting project.164 The family courts increasingly became
child courts. Taking 2007 as an example, the Courts service reported 10,002
applications involving custody, maintenance (non-married parents), and access to
children made independently from judicial separation and divorce proceedings. In
contrast, there were just over 5,000 judicial separation and divorce applications, of
which only 886 involved child-related applications.165 The principle business of the
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family courts was thus adjudicating childcare disputes between non or never married
couples; child law and marriage law were thus, in reality, quite separate in their
operation.

8.7 Conclusion.
8.7.1 Governed by marriage law
The form of divorce introduced in Ireland was restrictive and often required a two
stage process of litigation. A number of commentators pointed out the chaotic
operation of the adjudicative system and the punitive effect of marriage law on those
whose relationships had broken down. Nonetheless, the political problem identified
with marriage law at the beginning of the twenty-first century was not its problematic
operation, nor its imposition of lifetime support obligations. The political problem
with marriage law was its failure to attend to the relationship practices of those falling
outside the morally bound Constitutional definition of ‘marriage.’ The heterosexual
exclusivity of marriage was challenged on the basis of human rights and equality
imperatives that gained political currency with greater integration of the European
Union and the political settlement in Northern Ireland. In seeking to address the
exclusionary effect of existing marriage law, the Irish government legally authorised
the new relationship statuses of civil partnership and qualified cohabitation and
applied the tenets of marriage law to them to the extent that they mimicked lifetime,
dependency marriage. Advantages conferred on marriage by social policies, taxation
and other functions of government were also extended to civil partners.
The regulatory strategies applied to marriage in the 1980s and 1990s were thus
extended to a wider range of relationships in the 2000s. The political conceptualisation
of normative relationship behaviour had shifted from morally bound ‘marriage’ to the
more rationalised ‘marriage performance.’ The emphasis on women and their
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dependency had, in the main, receded (although vulnerable dependent cohabitant’s
were imagined as women), replaced by the need for relationship stability, whichever
form it took. The mechanisms deployed to achieve relationship stability replicated
those relating to marriage; State provided counselling and mediation, court based
adjudication, lifetime support obligations. Government was thus able to rely on the
pre-existing dense network of interests already installed around marriage to regulate a
greater range of social relationships.

8.7.2 The role of law
At the end of the 1980s, the Irish government embarked on a new political strategy
that involved the promotion of economic growth and stability. This approach was
supported by the highly rationalised approach to economic management advocated by
the expanding remit of the European Union. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties
on European integration emphasised the importance of social stability to economic
growth and social stability, providing a non-moral rationale for the marriage-saving
objectives of the Irish government. Social inclusion, brought about through workforce
participation, was a central element of economic development, both at European and
National level. This required the activation of Irish workers, and married women in
particular.
The social aspects of the growth imperative led to increasing investigation of the
Irish social behaviour, and family practices in particular. Sociologists supported
marriage as the optimal foundation for family life, offering politics a way to think
about marriage outside of the constitutional paradigm. Marriage was no longer a moral
relationship but a route out of dependency for lone parents, a secure environment for
children and representative of continuity and stability in society. Social science also
emphasised the interpersonal nature of the marriage relationship and the role of
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individual spouses in maintaining marriage. Their efforts were necessary, not only for
social stability, but to ensure the economic success of the country as a whole. Agencies
were established and strategies developed with the objectives of setting standards for
relationship behaviour and engaging with the lives of individuals in order to sustain
and promote stable familial relationships. Although stable relationships outside
marriage were recognised, legally sanctioned marriage remained important and
legislation was enacted in 2004 setting out, for the first time, the legal pre-requisites
for State-sanctioned marriage. Marriage had become a fully legal matter. The social
domain, by now heavily regulated, continued to rely on marriage as a relay and support
for a large number of government functions.
During this period, rights based claims derived from European and International
agreements began to sculpt a new meaning for marriage, completely effacing the
gendered, dependency-based nature of the constitutional paradigm. A government
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, negotiated in 2000, following the ratification
of the Amsterdam Treaty, connected gender equality to the needs of economic
development. Married women were no longer conceptualised as women in the home
providing a valuable service to the community; they became potential workers. The
stable two-parent family, in which each partner carried their fair share of domestic
responsibilities became an essential element of the growth imperative. Legal
articulations of rights could produce equal opportunities for women to avail of
education and training and to enter the workforce, but they also served the economic
objectives of government. The vulnerable dependent housewife was lost to political
discourse. She also disappeared from the courts as increasing numbers of women
joined the labour market. Applications for spousal maintenance almost disappeared in
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the lower courts, arising most often in applications for ‘ample resource’ divorce or
judicial separation applications.
Human rights based claims for equality precipitated the most recent reform of
marriage law. The exclusion of same-sex couples from legal recognition and the
advantages of marriage attracted significant political attention during the 2000s.
Although the extension of marriage law to same-sex couples in 2010 can be
constructed as a victory for human rights and equality, its enactment had seemed
inevitable since the early years of the decade, and was politically uncontested. Early
arguments in favour of recognition of same-sex relationships adopted the rationalised
economic language of European Union. The State had a vested interest in stable
lifetime relationships because they promoted social, and hence economic stability.
There was, however, political resistance to the extension of the definition of ‘marriage’
to same-sex couples. Old morally driven arguments, cloaked in the constitutional
marriage protection doctrine, were deployed to confine marriage to heterosexuals.
Article 41 was represented as an absolute limit to State action, despite the ‘woman in
the home’ element of the Article having been discarded by politics many years
previously.
Legal processes continued to exert their jurisdiction over relationship behaviour,
providing a forum, but not a remedy for marital misbehaviour. Whilst government
acted to normalise the performance of lifetime marriage through direct
encouragement, financial and regulatory preferencing, the courts contributed to these
normalising aims by demonstrating the distress of marital breakdown. Adjudicating
upon disputes involving children within the same conceptual and physical space as
those involving adult relationships provided a visible link between marriage failure
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and the vulnerability of children. Relationship breakdown was not only a tragedy for
adults; it also risked significant infringement of the rights of the vulnerable child
The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010
was enacted at the end of my research period, and I have not investigated its effect at
the level of practice. In the first year of operation (2011) 536 civil partnerships were
registered. 166 Courts Service statistics for 2013 record no dissolutions of civil
partnerships, and do not specifically identify applications made to the courts under the
co-habitation provisions of the 2010 Act.167 The practical effects of the legislation are
perhaps less important, given the small number of individuals engaging with the
legislation, than the link it represents between the liberation discourse of human rights
and the strategic objectives of political government.
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Nine – Governed by Marriage Law

Foucault discusses ancient Greek and Roman marriage practices in the third volume
of The History of Sexuality, tracing their evolution from a private ceremony, a
celebration, to a public institution increasingly subject to legal regulation. He notes
how legislative measures reproduced the traditional ethical systems, ‘transferring to
public power a sanction previously under familial authority.’

1

The gradual

‘publicizing’ of marriage was accompanied by other transformations. Marriage as a
private act had been favoured among the wealthy because it forged allegiances and
ensured the transmission of property, but as it become more public it became more
popular across the social classes appearing more and more as ‘a voluntary agreement
entered into by the partners, who pledged themselves personally.’ 2 The economic
imperatives that had sustained marriage among the wealthy became less important as
trade replaced agriculture, whilst among the less privileged it came to symbolise
commitment and mutuality rendered significant, not by economic imperatives, but by
law. From this series of transformation arose a number of paradoxes:
[Marriage] looked to public authority for its guarantees; and it became an
increasingly important concern in private life. It threw off the economic and social
purposes that had invested it with value; and at the same time, it became a general
practice. It became more and more restrictive for spouses, and gave rise at the same
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time to attitudes that were more and more favourable – as if the more it demanded,
the more attractive it became.3
Foucault’s objective in analysing marriage practices in antiquity was to
demonstrate the productivity of power, its dispersion throughout the social body and
the link between power exercised at the level of the State and relationships of power
within society. Marriage, in antiquity and today, is an ideal object of study because of
the connection it forges between the most personal concerns of individuals and the
collective administration of lives. Foucault, although referring briefly to the legislative
regulation of marriage in Rome, places no great emphasis on how the connection
between public authority and individual lives is made through legislative and other
legal measures, and it this aspect of marriage that I have explored using the Irish
experience as a case study. The relationship between public authority and marriage,
as suggested by Foucault, is not binary; the State does not impose rules on individuals
in pursuit of patriarchal or other ideological objectives. Rather, the regulation of
marriage, through legislation and other techniques of government acts in a productive
way to shape the aspirations and choices of individual citizens.
The principle aim of this research was to question the centrality of marriage to the
legal and social policy systems of Western States. Using Ireland as a case study, I have
attempted to show how marriage law and social policy operate to govern social
behaviour by shaping possibilities, guiding behaviour and engaging with the selfregulatory capacities of individual citizen. Furthermore, I have questioned the
articulation of marriage law as a source of liberation by pointing out how it has acted
to install a detailed mechanism of surveillance and control around individual
relationship practices in an attempt to regularise them. In this final chapter, I draw
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together the findings from the empirical chapters, specifically addressing the research
objectives and exploring the possibility that the overall aim and strategic effect of
marriage law is to conduct conformity in relationship behaviour.

9.1 Governed by Marriage Law
Existing literature dealing with marriage law tends to adopt a juridical formulation of
power, imagining the State as a unified entity capable of imposing its will on citizens.
It also assumes that law can challenge political power by supporting alternative visions
of truth. By examining the historical development of Irish marriage law through a
foucauldian lens, I have shown that marriage law, rather than oppress or liberate, acts
to govern our affective lives in accordance with mobile imaginings of optimal
relationship behaviour. It does not command obedience, but acts with other regulatory
frameworks to shape our field of action, and engage our self-regulatory capacities in
the interests of social stability.
When marriage presented itself as a difficulty that the Irish government was
required to address in the late 1960s, it had already established its usefulness as a
marker of interdependence. Marriage, between men and women who produced
children and performed specific gender roles, was an established social behaviour,
subject to traditional and religious rules to which individuals looked for guidance in
building their lives. Until the 1970s, government used the practice of marriage to
support its labour policies - married women could be excluded from the workforce
because their husbands would support them. With the adoption of a Keynesian
economic model in the 1950s, it became necessary to make centralised welfare
provision for indigent citizens in order to support economic advancement. The marital
family again presented itself as a convenient instrument, becoming an institutional
relationship through which financial support was disbursed. Government assumed that
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men would support their wives and children; social practice and religious doctrine
required it. Thus, government could rely on this social institution to relay State
services through the social domain.
The link between government, marriage and the lives of individual citizens was
firmly established before reform of marriage law began in the 1970s, making the
relationship behaviour of individuals an important issue of national policy. When
difficulties consequent on marriage practices became politically visible at the end of
the 1960s therefore, it was inevitable that they would be seen as an issue for
government. Furthermore, in attempting to address these difficulties government was
confined in its objectives by the discourses of truth then revolving around the social
practice of marriage. The problem needing attention was the indigence of married
women abandoned by their husbands, and the solution was seen only in terms of the
regulation of existing marriage practices. Men had a social and moral obligation to
support their wives; the solution to the problem of unsupported wives was therefore
the legal enforcement of those obligations.
In order to protect the institution of marriage in the form upon which the State had
come to rely for administrative purposes, legal mechanisms were deployed to entrench
its obligations. This had two effects; first it affirmed the State’s interest in a particular
relationship practice and secondly, it began the process of transferring the supervision
of marriage practices from the moral to the regulatory domain. This process continued
in the 1980s when the presumed permanency of marriage was called into question by
increasing rates of marital breakdown. The centrality of marriage in administering the
social domain led to the activation of legal discourses that required the political
protection of marriage. Article 41 of the Constitution, and its textual support for
marriage, was deployed by both government and political activists in creating a
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political imperative to supervise marriage. Further lines of penetration were
established, and the State took a stake, not only in the performance of the financial
obligations of marriage, but also in its actual performance as an interpersonal
relationships. Information was collected regarding the causes of marriage failure, and
expertise sought in respect of methods of protection. Professional services such as
counselling and mediation were identified as relevant to the marriage saving project,
and judicial separation legislation introduced at the end of the 1980s required
individuals to consider bringing their relationship difficulties to experts paid by the
State.
Government remained committed to protecting the institution of marriage in the
1990s, introducing measures to support and enrich existing marriages. Moral
justifications remained to the fore, leading to a divorce jurisdiction that required a four
year wait to facilitate ‘counselling, reconciliation and a period of adjustment.’ 4
Governmental concern for the welfare of children further intensified the relationship
between marriage and the State; children needed stability and this was best achieved
within a loving, lifetime, marital relationship entered into by their biological parents.
The moral nature of marriage became less important following the introduction of
divorce, but the marital form remained central to the process of social government.
With the development of a new, intensely rational approach to government, shaped
in large measure by the requirements of closer European integration, marriage came
to be seen in rational, sociological terms. Marriage, and marriage-like, relationships
became more common, and moral justifications for marriage, both among the
population and within government, receded. Relationship status nonetheless continued
to play a central role in social government, with relationships outside marriage
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attracting regulation according to how closely they resembled the picture of lifetime
monogamy represented by traditional marriage. As Ireland became a regulatory State,
increasing its legislative output, and expanding the domains within which government
had a stake, relationship status became more, rather than less important. Furthermore,
stable couple relationships could provide two workers to the labour market and
provide protection and support for the rights bearing child.
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the linkages between
marriage as a social practice and the performance of social government had intensified
to the extent that the legal status ‘married’ had become almost fetishised. Marriage
had cast off its moral connotations, as well as its connection to gendered relationship
practices. It had been identified as the sociologically superior relationship, providing
a guarantee of lifetime care to adults and vindication a child’s right to family stability.
From the perspective of government, the performance of marriage was more important
than its institutional form - promoting social and economic stability required the
recognition and regulation of any couple relationship that could perform lifetime
monogamy.
Throughout the research period, marriage connected the concerns of the State to
those of individual citizens. The Irish government did not seek to control relationship
behaviour by juridical command, rather it sought to regulate it in accordance with its
normal characteristics, ranging from lifetime, dependency, heterosexual marriage in
the 1970s to cohabitation and same-sex monogamy in the 2000s. Although activists
sought liberation for women, parties to failed relationships, and alternative
relationship practices, the effect of marriage law reform over the research period was
to entrench the necessity of relationship regulation and make lifetime monogamy an
individual imperative.
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9.2 The Effects of Marriage Law
Over a forty-year period, the Irish government constructed a dense network of
regulation around the relationship practices of individuals. The social domain was
largely managed through the officially legitimated couple relationship and a complex
legal machinery had been installed around it. In the 1970s, the deserted wife was the
focus of marriage law and her poverty created a justification for intervention. The
failure of male support was the source of her difficulty and the Family Law
(Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976 gave her a legal right to redress
against her husband. A right to social support was also provided. Both of these
remedies required individual women to identify themselves as parties to a failed
marriage and to submit to administrative mechanisms of inquiry. The Family Home
Protection Act 1976 supervised marriages by requiring spouses to record their
agreement to property transactions, re-enforcing a woman’s position of dependency in
marriage. A significant intensification of relationship management occurred in the
1980s. The Law Reform Commission illustrated the efficacy of legal process in
identifying and containing marital abnormality. It offered solutions that would allow
individuals in difficulty to plead their deviance from the normal, lifetime, successful
marriage away from public view within the apparatus of the legal system. The Judicial
Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 built a legal apparatus that required
those experiencing marital difficulties to withdraw from public view behind a veil of
confidential mediation, counselling, or court based adjudication, provided and
supervised by the State. On the face of it, the Act presented a picture of a caring state
ready to support citizens through their relationship difficulties; however, the reality of
the family courts was far removed from the rhetoric of politicians. Very quickly, the
family courts became ‘a system struggling and barely managing to cope,’ an ‘ill
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equipped and intimidating process.’ 5 The wide discretion afforded to the judiciary
required litigants to plead the intimate details of family life in court documents and
claim relief under every available heading. Upon the introduction of divorce in 1997,
a further layer of judicial discretion was added to the marital exit path, and again there
was no escape from the financial obligations of marriage. Those who failed at marriage
could remain trapped within an adjudicative quagmire for years, or even decades
negotiating courtrooms described by the Law Reform Commission as ‘a disgrace.’6
The actual operation of marriage law, the requirement to consider counselling and
mediation, to allege and disclose marital misbehaviour, the conflation of marriage law
with child law, the constant reviewability of marriage law decisions, all acted to both
warn individual citizens, and society as a whole, of the evil/irrationality of relationship
breakdown and to manage, marginalise and control those who must enter the domain
of marriage law.
Marriage law, in its actual effect acted to oppress those required to engage with its
rules. Nonetheless, it did not act juridically to marginalise and exclude, rather it
created lines of penetration through the relationship practices of individuals, leading,
guiding and directing them toward normative relationship behaviour. Those unable to
conform were identified and observed, their lives questioned, their desire to comply
activated. Marital breakdown was designated as a social risk, by naming, counting and
regulating it. It became a danger that could happen to anyone encouraging selfexamination of relationship practices by reference, initially to moral invocations of
ideal marriage, and later sociological formulations of optimal couple behaviour.
Francois Ewald’s notion of social norm helps to explain the particular hold that
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normative relationship forms have on individuals. Regulatory instruments, by
reflecting social norms, provide a way for individuals to measure their own
relationship behaviour. In the Irish context, marriage, endorsed by public authority,
conferring significant financial and regulatory benefits, set the standard. Ewald argues
that the mere existence of such a standard means that only the most intransigent will
oppose or resist most will actively seek to conform.7

9.3 Conducting Conformity in Relationship Behaviour.
Foucault’s description of the operation of power in the modern State implies that
government manages the State in accordance with the regularity of groups, seeking to
maximise normality. This involves the making of choices regarding what is natural or
normal and the deployment of techniques and strategies intended to maximise its
performance. From this formulation, I draw the hypothesis that marriage law both aims
to, and has the effect of conducting conformity in relationship behaviour. As noted
above, marriage law has acted, over the research period, as political technique. Its
political objective until the 2000s was to preserve lifetime, dependency marriage. With
a shift in how government was rationalised in the 1990s came acceptance that marriage
performance outside the institutional form could contribute to the political objective
of social stability. Marriage law reform thus acted to encourage and reward, through
recognition, the performance of lifetime monogamy. The actual effects of marriage
law in supervising those who failed to conform further emphasised the advantages of
relationship harmony. The political aim of marriage law over the period was therefore
to produce stability in relationship practice, to encourage relationships that provided
lifetime companionship and care. I therefore suggest that the political objective of
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marriage law over the research period was to encourage and conduct individuals
toward conformist lifetime monogamy.
With regard to its effect, the position is more speculative. Until the 2000s, marriage
law focused on the traditional institutional relationship between spouses of opposite
sex. The notion that other forms of relationship could be ‘good enough’ began with
the accommodation of heterosexual cohabitation in social policy, and same-sex
relationships achieved ‘normal’ status at the end of the research period. The common
features of these relationships, from the perspective of government, was their stability.
Relationships were acknowledged, conferred with advantages, and subject to marriage
law if they demonstrated the key characteristics of monogamy and longevity. The role
of marriage law in conducting conformity before the last decade of the research period
seems clear – it posited a normative relationship form and installed detailed
mechanism of surveillance and control around those unwilling or unable to reform.
The extension of marriage law in 2010 would suggest a political impetus to draw more
relationships into the regulatory net and therefore to bring more relationship practices
toward the lifetime monogamy ideal. The practical effects of the 2010 reforms have
not been investigated in this research, although the absence of disputes involving the
newly regulated relationships in the courts would suggest that the legal complex has
been less effective in grasping their practice. 8 At this stage, therefore it may be
appropriate to conclude that the objective of government in regulating relationships
through law is, as suggested by Foucault, the normalisation of relationship practice.
Law is not special in this regard; it is simply one among many regulatory instruments
deployed in pursuit of the political objectives of social, and hence economic, stability.
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9.4 Conclusion
Marriage law does not liberate relationship practice. Rather, it categorises lives,
divides them into authorised and unauthorised forms, supervises, observes and
manages interpersonal conflict, and connects relationship failure to social and
economic instability. Marriage, when subject to social and religious control between
the foundation of the Irish State and the 1970s, constructed women as dependents and
those who failed at marriage as social exiles. As the State apparatus gradually moved
marriage from social and religious control, making it a political concern, lives were
not liberated, they were simply transferred from one network of power relationships
to another. Methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the
relationship practices of the population, and undertook to control and modify them.
The bio-political mechanism of marriage law took control of life, ensuring that it was
regularised. The process of marriage law reform in Ireland since the 1970s, coupled
with shifts in how government is conceptualised, resulted in a dense network of
regulation that requires us to declare publically who we are, who we love, how we
live. These declarations have significant economic, social and cultural significance,
not least because they re-enforce the necessity of the categorisation and act to further
re-affirm it. The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our ‘liberation’
is in the balance.9
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